Vocabulary of knowledge and understanding in Serbo-Croat and English by Yarwood, D.
THE VOCABULARY OF KNOWLEDGE AND UNDERSTANDING







Introduction i - x
CHAPTER ONE: Material used, informants, procedures,
method applied to them and method of
research 1
1.1 Material used 1
1. 1. 1 List of references 3
1.2 Informants 5
1. 3 Procedures and method applied by informants 6
1.4 Method of research 8
1.4. 1 List of verbs under analysis 12
1.5 Contextual and non-contextual features 13
CHAPTER TWO: Presupposition 15
2. 1 The concept of presupposition 15
2. 1. 1 Assertion and presupposition 16
2.2 Kinds of presupposition 17
2. 2. 1 A third kind of presupposition 20
2. 2. 2 A criterion for establishing presuppositions 22
2. 2. 3 First person negative and the verb realize in the
Kiparskys* article 1970 22
2. 2.4 Truth and specific reference 23
2. 2. 5 Factive and non-factive complements in
Serbo-Croat and English 23
2. 2. 6 Karttunen on factive verbs 26
2. 2. 7 Fillmore on presupposition 27
2.3 Presuppositions as features 28
Footnotes 34
CHAPTER THREE: General characteristics of verbs of
knowledge and understanding 35
3. 1 Introduction 35
3.2 Aspect 35
3. 2. 1 Ridjanovic on statives and non-statives 36
3. 2. 2 Division of SC verbs in terms of aspect 38
3. 2. 3 Classification in terms of process, state and event 39
3. 2.4 The relationship of consequence 46
3.3 Time adverbials 48
3. 3. 1 Omissible and non-omissible determiners 48
3. 3. 2 D. Crystal on time adverbials 49
3, 3. 3 An overall representation of collocations of the
verbs analysed with the time adverbials 50
3, 3.4 Illustrations from both languages of collocations of
verbs and time adverbials 53
3.4 Sentence construction 57
3.4. 1 Imperative 57
3.4. 2 Type of sentence taken as complement 59
3. 4. 3 A note on factivity and V + sentence construction 64
3.4.4 V + object construction 67
3.4.5 V + V construction 79
Footnotes 81
Appendix: Adverbials 82
CHAPTER FOUR: Modality 84
4. 1 Halliday on modality 84
4.2 N. Leech on modality 86
4. 3 Conclusions about modality 88
4.4 Some examples of subjective modality 88
4.5 Some particular aspects of subjective modality 90
4. 5. 1 The speaker's role in the system of modality 92
4. 5. 2 The hearer 93
4.6 The feature /Speaker's knowledge/ 94
4. 6. 1 Particular reference to the verb realize 105
4. 6. 2 Other verbs and their specification for
/Speaker's knowledge/ 107
4.7 'Parenthetical' use of verbs 108
4. 7. 1 A further argument for the feature /informative/ 114
Footnotes 115
CHAPTER FIVE 116
5, 1 The feature /importance/ 116
5.2 /Volition/ and/intention/ 116




6. 1 The feature /Ability/ 143
o. 2 Group I: / +Ability/ - / +Observation/ 145
6.3 Group II: /+Ability/ - /+Storing/ 149
6.4.1 Group III: /+Ability/ - /+Reasoning/ 152
6.4.2 Analysis' verbs 154
6.5 Group IV: /Ability/ • (/Observation/ / +Storing/) 164
6. 5. 1 Subclassification of Group IV 165
6.6 The feature /Direct information/ 170
6. 6. 1 Relevance of this feature for most verbs of the field 176
6.6.2 / Factivity/ and /Direct information/ 180
6.7 Group V: /Ability/ -(/+Observation/ / +Storing/
/+Reasoning/) 189
CHAPTER SEVEN 197
7. 1 'Skill' verbs 197
7.1.1 Znati. urrietl and know 197
7.1.2 (Na)uciti and learn 200
7.1.3 Modi and can 201
7.1.4 Biti u stan.iu and be able 207
7.1.5 Biti sposoban and be capable of 208
CHAPTER EIGHT 211
8. 1 Predictive statements 211
8. 1. 1 Introduction to analysis 215
8* 1. 2 Analysis 216
8* 3 Misliti/vierovati and think/believe 221
8.1.4 Osietiti and feel
Summary of conclusions 225
Works consulted 243
SUMMARY
Chapter One gives a general account of the material used in
the analysis of the verbs of knowledge and understanding,
informants and method of research. Two novels, Joyce Caryfas
•To Be a Pilgrim' and Dobrica dosic's 'Daleko je sunce* ('Far
Away Is the Sun'), served as basic material for collecting the
data. Altogether the number of contexts considered amounted
to two thousand three hundred. The term 'substitution' is used
to mean replacing the items of the semantic field with a view to
keeping the meaning of the contexts constant. Some problems
of identification of features are mentioned. The reasons are
given for employing a ternary rather than a binary system of
features in the componential analysis. A distinction is made
between contextual and non-contextual features.
Chapter Two deals with the notion of presupposition, discussing
philosophical and linguistic approaches to it as put forward by
Strawson, Keenan, Karttunen, the Kiparskys and Fillmore.
Three kinds of presupposition are mentioned: logical and pragmatic
(as discussed by Keenan, 1971) and presupposition which accounts
for the speaker's belief in the truth of what he is expressing.
This third kind of presupposition is taken as the basis of the
present study. Attention is focussed on the Kiparskys' article
'Fact' (1970) and, in connection with that, Lj. Bibovic's article
'Some Remarks on the Factive and Non-factive Complements in
English and Serbo-Croation' (1971) is discussed. Karttunen's
classification of verbs in terms of factivity (1970c) is taken as
a framework for the classification of the Serbo-Croat and English
verbs of knowledge and understanding.
Chapter Three discusses general characteristics of the verbs of
this semantic field including aspect, time adverbials which they
take and sentence construction. In connection with aspect.
M. Ridjanovic's Ph. D. thesis is discussed and a classification of
the verbs is made as to process, state and event. M. Ivic's and
D. Crystal's approach to the relationship of verbs and time
adverbials is referred to and the verbs of knowledge and under¬
standing are classified on the basis of D. Crystal's list of time
adverbials (1966). The sentence constructions which those verbs
enter is examined with respect to imperative, type of sentence
taken as complement, type of object required by the verb and
V + V construction. A note is made on the difference in factivity
relative to the V + Sentence construction.
In Chapter Four modality is discussed in connection with Halliday's
and Leech's approach to it and a distinction is made between modals
and pseudo-modals. General conclusions are made as to what the
notion of modality involves. The significance of the speaker's role
in the system of modality is dwelt upon in more detail and related
to the feature /Speaker's knowledge/, the existence of which is
supported by examples from both languages. A classification of
the verbs is made on this basis. A small group of verbs is then
analysed in terms of their 'parenthetic* use.
In Chapter Five the features /importance/, /Volition/, and
/intention/ are ussecf and supported by examples. G. Ryle's
theory about achievement verbs is commented upon and taken as a
plausible basis for the classification of the verbs of knowledge and
understanding.
Chapter Six discussed /Ability/ as one of the major and most
relevant features of subjective modality. Three types of ability
are recognized: ability to observe, to store information and to
reason. The verbs are divided into five groups which are
considered separately. Within each group various sub-features
are identified and tables are given by way of summary. Among
other features, /Direct information/ is regarded as a very
important one and one that is relevant for most verbs of the field.
It is discussed with reference to a number of verbs apd related
to the feature /Factivity/.
In Chapter Seven a group of verbs named 'skill1 verbs are examined
and sub-classified in terms of features found relevant in the
analysis.
Chapter Eight takes up the notion of predictive statements relating
it to Boyd and Thome's article (1969) and Mcintosh's article (1966).
Numerous examples are given in support of the argument that
several discernable kinds of predictions are presupposed by the
verbs of knowledge and understanding, such as predictions based
on repeated experience, those based on an immediately preceding
event and those for which no basis is obvious in the context.
INTRODUCTION
A number of linguists, anthropologists, psychologists and
philosophers have concerned themselves in the past with
semantic problems of language analysis. The approaches have
varied* so have the purposes of each particular work. Some
authors have engaged themselves in the theoretical aspect of
the question (such as U. Weinreich, J.J. Katz, F. Postal,
R. Burling, Ch. Osgood), some have dealt with the practical
problems of analysing part of the vocabulary of a particular
language (among these are E. H. Bendix, H. C. Conklin,
W, H. Goodenough, A. Lehrer, F. Lounsbury, K. Reuning,
K. Sparck-Jones). Some, on the other hand, have worked on
both (like E. H. Nida, J. Lyons, or M. Ivic).
For purposes of this research, which is a componential analysis
of Serbo-Croat and English verbs of knowledge and understanding,
the most relevant works are those analysing a particular semantic
field.
S. Ohman (1953) relates that the term 'field' was first mentioned
by Ipsen in his paper 'Der Alte Orient und die Indogermanen'.
The first detailed development of the notion of semantic fields
comes from Trier (1931). The main asset of his theory is that
the meaning of a lexical item is determined by its opposition with
other items in the vocabulary. The general linguistic theory
outlined by de Saussure, in which a language is viewed as a system
of signs, is implicit in Trier's approach.
A. Lehrer defines the term 'semantic field' (in her forthcoming
book on semantic fields) as 'a group of words closely related in
meaning, often subsumed under a general term'. Further, she
states that 'the object of the analysis of semantic fields is to
collect all the terms that belong to a field and show the relationship
i
of each of them to one another'.
A componential analysis is then conducted within a semantic field
in order to establish the most significant distinctive features of
the items in question. Nida (1964) claims that this kind of
analysis underlines the differences between units rather than
emphasizing their similarities. It is, nevertheless, true that
by selecting the distinctive features relevant for the relations of
items, we also establish what they have in common.
As for the cross-linguistic contrasting of Serbo-Croat and English
verbs of knowledge and understanding, once we have set up the
components, we can disregard the fact that we are dealing with
two different languages. What matters from then on is the applica¬
tion of items and we can start contrasting them on this higher level
of abstraction.
The theory on which I intend to base my analysis is the one
outlined in Lyons (1963), (1968a). The main postulates of this
semantic theory are as follows:
a. Language is viewed as structure: every lexical item
has its place in the vocabulary and contracts different relationships
with the other items in the vocabulary.
b. The theory distinguishes between sense and reference,
but both sense and reference are included in the meaning of a
lexical item. Reference is based on what a lexical item denotes
in the 'real* world. Therefore, the referential meaning can , in
an explanation, be partly reduced to ostention, i. e. pointing at the
object in question. Sense is the sum total of all relations,
syntagmatic or paradigmatic,that an item contracts with other
lexical items of the vocabulary of a language. It has proved
necessary to distinguish between sense and reference mainly
because a comparatively limited number of lexemes of any
language have referential (ostensive) meaning. Therefore, we say
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that referential meaning is useful when it applies, but, since it
does not apply in all cases, it cannot be regarded as universally
valid. The meaning of an item is primarily its sense, and since
I will here be concerned with 'intellectual1 terms, I assume that
I will be dealing solely with the sense of the items in question.
c. The sense relations that items contract are manifold.
A few commonly recognized are: synonymy, hyponymy,
incompatibility, converseness, etc. Since in this analysis the
stress is on how the two languages work and how their vocabularies
are related within the semantic field of knowledge and understanding,
and since its aim is to find out the basic principles of correspondence,
I do not think it necessary to postulate that any of the relationships
between the lexical items analysed is basic. I do not find it
necessary to claim with Sparck-Jones (1964) that synonymy is
basic, or with Lyons (1963, 1968a) that it is redundant. For the
purpose of this analysis the point is irrelevant. This does not
mean that some of the relations may not be basic or redundant, but
the primacy might well prove to differ with the type of semantic
field considered.
In his article on Semantics (in Lyons, 1970), Bierwisch states that
'two sentences S. and S are synonymous or paraphrases of each
X C*
other - if their semantic representations are identical', and
further on: 'Notice, incidentally, that relations like paraphrase,
entailment, etc. are suitable generalizations of lexical relations
like synonymy, hyponymy, etc. This is a natural consequence of
the fact that the semantic representations of sentences are, in
principle, of the same character as lexical meanings.' (1970:180)
This point is useful for it establishes a definite link between a
sentence as a whole and its parts in the sense that, as Weinreich
puts it, 'the meaning of a sentence of specified structure is
derivable from the fully specific meanings of its parts* (1966:417).
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Referring to lexical meanings in particular, Bierwisch argues
that 'In terms of componential analysis, the meaning of a word
is a complex of semantic components (...) connected by logical
constants. This assumption immediately allows us to define
certain properties and relations of lexical entries (...). Two
entries Ej and are synonymous, if their meanings consist of
the same components connected by the same logical constants.'
(1970:170) Depending on how this statement is understood, some
modifications might be necessary to account for fhe nature of the
semantic field of knowledge and understanding. If it means that,
two items have to share all the features encountered in the
analysis, regardless of the context of situation, then very few
verbs of this field (if any) can be called synonymous. If, on the
other hand, they are supposed to share all the features that a
context presupposes, or allows for, then we shall be able to
establish the relation of synonymy for quite a number of these
verbs. Since, for purposes of an empirical work in semantics,
the context is indispensable, it seems more reasonable to make
the notion of synonymy essentially context-dependent and consider
two items to be synonymous (in the limiting case) even if they are
interchangeable in only one context. This point is worth stressing
since it has been assumed, especially in philosophical semantics
(e.g. Goodman, 1949), that there are no real synonyms since
there are no two items that can be substitutes for each other with
the same meaning in all contexts (a general definition of context
is given below). I, therefore, want to emphasize, with Lyons
(1968a), that we need not take such an extreme view at all,
particularly because the diversity of use of items in a language
allows them to contract different kinds of relationships in different
contexts.
d. Context and application play a significant role in this
theory. The theory has indirectly merited from the insights of
such linguists as B. Malinowski and J, R. Firth. Malinowski (1923)
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was the first one to point out the importance of the context of
situation) although his emphasis on reference is somewhat too
strong. Firth's concept (see Lyons, 1966b) consists of complete
contextual!sat!on, context within context, of all levels - phonological,
grammatical, semantic • of language description. But neither of
the theories of context mentioned is fully accepted here. I will
assume that there are two types of contexts relevant in semantic
analysis. One is verbal context, which comprises everything that
has been said (or written) before and after the expression under
examination. (By expression 1 mean any stretch of analysed text,
from an item to a full sentence. ) The length of a context required
for the analysis will depend on information needed. The other type
of context is the context of situation in which the verbal context
takes place. It will be 'held to include, not only the relevant
objects and actions taking place at the time, but also the knowledge
shared by the speaker and the hearer of all the relevant conventions,
beliefs and presuppositions 'taken for granted' by the members of
the speech community to which the speaker and hearer belong.'
(Lyons, 1968a:413). Therefore, we can conclude that the context
of situation should be regarded as including the verbal context,
i. e. that the verbal context is dependent on the context of situation.
It will be in order here to mention the concepts of culture and
cultural overlap. In the analysis of semantic fields, culture is
taken as implicit in the vocabulary and the texts analysed. And,
indeed, it has been repeatedly stressed by both linguists and
anthropologists that a satisfactory language analysis should include
the analysis of culture of he speech community to the extent that
it accounts for the cultural influence on the selection and formation
of the structure of the vocabulary. In this study the culture of
the two countries is accounted for by way of the context of
situation.
Before going on to explain the term 'application', one more
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concept should be defined, and that is the concept of the use of
an expression. Wittgenstein (1953) quite justifiably proclaims
that the meaning of an expression is its use. This claim seems
justifiable simply because we are not at present able to examine
what the psychological implications may be. To look for the use
of an expression in order to find its meaning is the most straight"
forward and the most reliable way, at least at present.
Application is employed by Lyons to mean the occurrence of a
particular expression in a particular context. Application is also
the relation of reference (where such a relationship holds, i. e. if
an item has a referent). The term is also employed to indicate
'the relation (...) between elements of the language, and such
features as relative location in space and time, status.of one
participant with respect to another, etc. ' (1963:55) It follows,
from what has been said above in connection with reference, that
1 shall be concerned with the first and the third of the uses of the
term 'application'.
It comes to be a very useful term if we consider a further point that
Lyons makes: 'When items of different languages can be put into
correspondence with one another on the basis of the identification of
common features and situations in the cultures in which they
operate we may say that items have the same application.' (1968a:434)
This leads us a step further towards a hypothesis that we can
regard translation of items as their interchangeability based on the
correspondences found between them in their respective contexts
and cultures. We can say that the sameness of message is the
criterion of applicability (or 'translateability') of the items in
question. In other words, if the message is the same, two (or more)
items across languages can be said to be synonymous in terms of
their application. By employing the term 'message* here I follow
Roman Jakobson (1959).
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We can, therefore, conclude that such notions as synonymy*
antonyrny, etc. * can be appropriately used not only within one
language* but also across languages. So* for example* we say
that one or more items of a language are synonymous with one or
more items in another language if by translating them we find
that the message has remained the same.
e. Implication, equivalence, consequence and causation
will be regarded as implicit in the coroponential analysis. Their
definition is the one given in Lyons (1963). They* of course,
presuppose the notions of assertion and denial on the part of the
native speaker, and they are presupposed in such relations as
synonymy* hyponymy* and so on.
Concerning the svntagmatic vs. paradigmatic relations* this study
will be mainly in the direction of closely following the paradigmatic
patterning within the vocabulary, and the syntagmatic only in so
far as it influences their substitutability. By this 1 do not wish to
imply that either of them is prior* but simply that the nature of
the analysis makes a greater use of one than the other.
There is no great need nowadays to stress the importance of
validating one's conclusions in semantics and, to be sure* in any
other kind of language analysis* since it has been repeatedly
discussed and recognized in the past. I claim that the present
work satisfies the conditions of both operational and material
adequacy as outlined in Lyons (1963). Working with verbal contexts
provides an empirically testable analysis. By checking the native
speakers' intuition about the substitution of items* I have reached
the material adequacy required. The native speaker's judgement
of acceptability (thd notion put fowardby Chomsky' (,1 965a; 11) ) will
provide the framework for the substitution of items. If we take
for granted that there is a distinction between competence and
performance, I wish to regard intuition as part of a native speaker's
competence rather than his performance.
vii
Finally, a few words ought to be said as to the standpoint taken
in this work regarding the position of semantics within generative
transformational grammar. Various models of linguistic
description have been proposed, starting with Chomsky's
Syntactic Structures in 1957. Although Chomsky himself modified
his view in Aspects of the Theory of Syntax and explicitly included
semantics in grammar, the role of the semantic component was
not discussed in great detail. In recent worl^ the question has
arisen whether to regard semantics as 'generative* or 'interpretive',
i. e. as generating semantic representations which are converted
into sentences by the syntactic rule? or as assigning semantic
interpretations to sentences generated by the syntax. In this
connection there have been various suggestions, from that of Katz
and Fodor (1963) and Katz and Postal (1964) for the 'integration'
of syntax and semantics by way of projection rules, to the recent
approaches of Fillmore (1968a-b), McCawley (1968), Boyd and
Thorne(1969)» Leech (1969), and others.
Fillmore claims that semantics (certainly the semantic interpret¬
ation of cases) deserves its place in the base component of a trans¬
formational grammar and points out that Chomsky himself recog¬
nized the fact that before some stylistic trans formations, such as
those involved in preposing the object noun-phrase in 'Him I like',
there ought to be a rule assigning case distinctions to the pronouns,
McCawley bases his approach on Weinreich's model (1966), which
is a modification of that of Katz and Fodor. Here the stress is
certainly on the fairly independent role of semantics within the
grammar of a language. The grammar is conceived as a set of
rules which 'convert semantic representation through various
intermediate stages into surface syntactic representation'.
(1968:167)
However, the issue is still uncertain. The question of ordering
such rules, and of the form they would have to take, is far from
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clear. Moreover, it is not at all clear whether these are to be
envisaged as two different kinds of rules (which presupposes the
examination of the nature of both semantic and syntactic descrip¬
tion). The results so far obtained in generative semantics are
certainly very significant, but still not sufficient. It still
remains to be empirically proved, it seems to me, whether we
can talk about semantic representations being mapped into
surface structure syntactic representations, or, conversely, of
syntactic representations being mapped into (i. e. interpreted by)
semantic representation. What seems interesting at present is
that it has been found out that some features that have been
regarded as syntactic can be interpreted on semantic basis.
This certainly goes towards the assumption that semantics
determines syntax; and this is part of the generative semahtici'st's
thesis. In this respect, what McCawley (1968) and Boyd and
Thome (1969) have to say is most revealing. Because of this
uncertainty (which stems from the fact that there are still
unexplored parts of language), I will assume that this analysis
is based on an adequate syntactic description. I believe that the
substantive points made in this dissertation are unaffected by
current controversies centring upon the integration of semantics
and syntax.
The main aim of this study is to capture the major correspondences
and differences of the verbs of knowledge and understanding in
Serbo-Croat and English. A further aim, resulting from this, is
to provide, in the form of distinctive features, a system of
underlying principles which could be followed in the translation of
these lexemes from one language into the other. It is hoped that
this system of distinctive features will contribute^ not only
towards a more adequate, but also towards a more varied
ix
translation of the verbs of this semantic field.
The analysis has been conducted on the basis of information
obtained from a number of people. The assumption is that the
information is correct, ha certain particular instances this
assumption may be at fatilt. Nevertheless, it should hold
generally; and this study will, it is hoped, serve as a step
(however small) towards the opening of new areas of research in
semantics, so far one of the least studied branches of linguistics.
I am extremely grateful to Professor John Lyons and
Professor Dennis Ward for their many constructive and invaluable
comments constantly given in supervising the work. Also I am
indebted to my parents, Peter Trudgill, Anthony Warner,
Jane Bryan-Jones and many other friends and colleagues who
patiently acted as my informants. Special thanks are due to
Patrick Griffiths for reading and commenting on some sections
of the rough draft, and to Keith Yarwood for careful proof¬
reading. Finally, I would like to thank Arne Foldvik for making
his typewriter available to me at any time.
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CHAPTER ONE
MATERIAL USED, INFORMANTS. PROCEDURES and METHOD
APPLIED by THEM, and METHOD of RESEARCH
I. 1 Material U3ed
For the purpose of this thesis it was important to choose as the
principal source of material a text which would provide a large
number of contexts continuing the verbs under analysis. It was
also important to find a text which would ensure as much variety
as possible in the range of each verb. For both these reasons it
seemed appropriate to select a literary work, and, more
specifically, a novel, rather than a philosophical or a critical text.
Also, since the concern was solely with modern lanaguages, the
choice was made between novels written within the period of the
last 25 years. A further objective within this range was one of
finding a novel of a 'meditative' type (i. e. one which is mostly
concerned with psychological aspects of life, involving thoughts,
analysis of situations, etc, ) rather than a 'descriptive type* (mainly
concerned with action of its characters].
From the outset this research was meant to have a contrastive
character, bringing into focus two languages: Serbo-Croat and
English. It was, therefore, necessary to select a Serbo-Croat,
and an English novel of the desired type. Preferably, each of
these novels was to have translations into the other language. As
a result the choice was greater among English novels, since the
number of translations from English into Serbo-Croat was greater.
The choice fell on Joyce Gary's 'To Be a Pilgrim* which was
translated into Serbo-Croat by Dr. Svetozar Koljevic, Professor
at the Department of English language and literature at Sarajevo
University, and Naum Dimitrijevic, lecturer at the Department
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of English at the University of Belgrade. It was published by
'Svjetlost', Sarajevo, in 1962.
This novel provided over one thousand six hundred relevant
contexts, and over one thousand eight hundred examples of the
relevant words (some contexts contained a given word more than
once).
The Serbo-Croat novel chosen was less profitable for the purpose
of the research. There are only a few novels from the post-war
period which have been translated into English. The one finally
chosen is a war-novel (about a battle between a group of partisans,
on the one hand, and Germans and quislings during World War II),
full of action, decisions and movement, allowing less time and
space for thought. The title of the original is 'Daleko je sunce*
(translated as fFar Away Is The Sun'). The author is Dobrica
/
Cosic. It was translated into English by Muriel Heppell and
Milica Mihajlovic, and published by 'Jugoslavija', Belgrade, in
1963.
This text provided over five hundred contexts, with about eight
hundred examples of the chosen words. Although the smaller
number of contexts in the Serbo-Croat novel would not necessarily
have been of great importance, the words for knowledge and under¬
standing seem to have a considerably narrower range than they do
in the English novel. To compensate for the lack of variety, and
also for the fact that certain words do not occur at all, it was thought
desirable to turn to current newspapers and literary magazines, in
search for modern short stories preoccupied with the psychology of
man in modern times, or even for critical works and historical
articles which promised interesting uses of the relevant items. In
spite of the fact that one could not hope to find an official translation
for all these texts, this step proved to be fruitful, since it resulted
in about one hundred interesting contexts. Additional material
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which amounted to about eighty sentences, was drawn from Milka
Ivic's book 'Pravci u lingvistici' (Trends in Linguistics), published
by Dr&avna Zalozba Slovenije, Ljubljana, 1963, (translated by
Muriel Heppell, and published by Mouton).
Altogether, therefore, I have considered about two thousand and
three hundred contexts, and more than two thousand and seven
hundred examples of relevant verbs.
It is interesting, and also important to note the obvious fact that
the choice of material almost inevitably excluded some and included
other words of this semantic field. The language of a literary
critic varies considerably from that of a novelist or a newspaper
reporter. The style of a dialogue differs in precision as well as
in the choice of words from the style of a passage in which
linguistic (or any other) events are being enumerated. For example,
the Serbo-Croat verbs spoznati ('realize'), or pojmiti ('grasp') are
very unlikely to occur in the dialogue of a novel, unless the dialogue
is of a fairly sophisticated nature. Although this question of
registers* is extremely important and cannot be wholly disregarded
in a semantic study of a language, we shall not be able to go into it
in detail. The analysis of the vocabulary of knowledge and under¬
standing is complex enough without complicating it further by attempt¬
ing to deal with differences of register.
1. 1.1 The following is a list of references and their abbreviations.
Serbo-Croat
/ /
DS ='Daleko je sunce' by Dobrica Cosic
Published by 'Prosveta', Beograd, 1955.
* According to Halliday, Mcintosh and Strevens (1964: 87-94)
a register is a variety of language according to use (as opposed -
to users).
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Tn by Muriel Heppell and Milica Mihajlovic, published
by 'Jugoslavija', Belgrade, 1963.
NIN * 'Nedeljne Informativne Novine', No, 1021, 2nd August,
1970.
From Odjek 15 - 16, Sarajevo, 1970:
OF * 'Filozofija i kriticka teorija' by Herbert Markure.
OF1 = 'Fijasko' by Anastazija Subid.
OI * 'Impresije o muzickom zivotu Sarajeva' by Eugene and
Toby Glickman, tr. by Dr. Midhat Ridjanovic.
OJ = 'Jezik i knjizevno djelo' by Zdenko Lesic.
OJN = 'Jedan lik nase putopisne literature* by Ljubomir Cvijic.
OK s 'Refleksije o naciji' by Arif Tanovic.
OKJ = 'Kontekst Jugoslavija-Evropa* by Mitar Miljanovic.
OMZ = 'Muzidki zivot Dubrovnika u XVIH stoljecu' by Fatima
Hadiovic.
OSP= 'Osjecanje praznine u sauremenom dovjeku' by
/ ,
Dr. Zijo Catovic.
OSS s 'Lose vrijeme za liriku* by Zeina Mehmedbasic.
PL = 'Pravci u linguistic!* by Milka Ivi<^, published by
Drzavna Zalo2ba Slovenije, Ljubljana, 1963. Tr. by
Muriel Heppell, published by Mouton, The Hague.
PW s 'Pavilion of Women' by Pearl S. Buck, tr. to Serbo-
Croat by Nenad Jovanovic, published by Matica Srpska,
1967.
From Zivot 9, year XVHI, Sarajevo, Sept. 1969:
ZIN * 'Izmedju neutemeljenosti i proizvoljnosti' by Risto
Trifkovic.
V f
ZJ s 'Jedan trenutak radio-drame' by Slavko Santic.
ZKN » 'Knjiievne impresije Novice Petkovica' by Nenad
Radanovic.
ZL = 'Lenjinove ideje o umjetnosti i literatxiri, socijalisticki
realizm' by Muhamed Filipovic.
ZMS= 'Mene zlatne vatre' by Ratko Orozovic.
■
ZPS x 'Pismo svorn tvorcu' by R&nko Risojevic.
v
ZS = 'Sta se dopadalo Lenjinu iz lepe knjizevnosti' by
N. K. Krupska, tr. by Dragisa Zivkovic.
ZSO x 'Samo-odbrana poezije' by Mila Stojnic.
ZT « 'Treca prica' by Mile Pecanac..
English
AG = 'African Genesis1 by Robert Ardrey, Collins, London,
1961.
P x • To be a Pilgrim' by Joyce Cary, published by Michael
Joseph Ltd. , London, 1953. Tr. by Dr. S. Koljevic
and N. Dimitrijevic, published by 'Svjetlost', Sarajevo,
1962.
1, 2. Informants
One of the main tasks in the analysis of this semantic field was to
establish the semantic relationships between the verbs of the field
in each language, and then to examine those between the correspond*
ing groups in both languages.
To perform this analysis it was necessary tw find informants (i. e.
native speakers) who would, on the basis of their intuition about
their language, indicate as far as tbey could, the possibilities and
impossibilities of substitution between the items of this semantic
field in their language. What is meant by 'substitution' in this
context is explained in the following section.
English speaking informants were chosen who spoke the variety
of the language which was most familiar to me: i. e. English as
spoken in England, rather than Scottish English, American English
or some other variety. Of the two informants, each of whom wait
through approximately half the English material, one came from
the South of England and the other from East Anglia.
The same criterion was applied in the choice of Serbo-Croat
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informants. I myself went through the whole of the Serbo-Croat
material, and then asked my parents to do the same. I thought
it best to remain within the boundaries of my own dialect, spoken
in Bosnia. *
Most of the informants that were consulted had received a university
education (6 out of 8). Three of them had been trained in linguistics.
In order to lessen the risk that their judgement would be affected by
their linguistic prejudices and presuppositions about syntactic and
semantic equivalence, I asked them to go through the data as fast
as they could, without stopping to think about any particular
substitution.
No doubt, if this research had been done with the help of a very
large number of native speakers, it would have been so much the
better. It would have probably made certain things clearer. But
it would also have brought about a vast number of differences in use
between any two informants. Even in this relatively small group
the differences were sometimes quite striking. It, therefore,
seemed best to take all obtained alternatives as valid, and to assume
that a larger variety was certainly possible.
1.3 Procedures and Method Applied by Informants
The procedure was to present the informant with the contexts and
ask him to substitute other words of the group for the original ones.
The substitution was conducted between items of the given part of
speech, i. e. verbs, although it was obviously possible, quite
frequently, to exchange the items belonging to different parts of
speech, provided that one made consequential syntactic changes in
the sentence.
^Bosnia is the northern part of the Republic called
Bosnia and Herzegovina, situated in the central part
of Yugoslavia.
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The term 'substitution' has been used in the past to refer to several
different kinds of criteria for language description. Bar-Hillel
(1964) stresses the need of disambiguation of this term in linguistic
research: 'Oculist and dentist are SUBSTITUTABLE in the sense
that any sentence containing the one will turn into a sentence (not
necessarily a sentence with the same meaning or even with the same
truth-value) when this is replaced by the other. Oculist and eve-
doctor are substitutable in the sense that any sentence containing
the one will turn into a sentence with necessarily the same truth-
value when this is replaced by the other. For both these essentially
different relations the term SUBSTITUTABLE (or REPLACEABLE,
or COMMUTABLE or even EQUIVALENT) is used indifferently,
more often than not, without even a qualifying adverbial. A
consistent use of qualifiers like DISTRIBUTIONALLY and
LOGICALLY (...) could assist in avoiding the pitfalls connected with
this equivocation; but a convention to use, say, COMMUTABLE for
the first sense and INTERCHANGEABLE for the second, would be
even better. • (1964:42)
The term 'substitution' will in this study be used synonymously with
'interchangeability* suggested by Bar-Hillel, i. e. it will be used to
mean replacing the items of the semantic field with the view of
keeping the meaning of the contexts in which they are replaced
constant. Subtle shades of meaning are disregarded provided that
the informant agrees that there is no gross semantic difference
between two items in a context. This precaution had to be taken
since, as we know, it is often possible to substitute two words in
the same context but with the result of changing the meaning. A
simple example is (la-b):
I. (a) I see him.
(b) I understand him,
where the substitution of see and understand leads to the complete
change of meaning of the context.
On the other hand, in (2a-b) the difference of meaning is slight, or,
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perhaps, for some native speakers, non-existent.
2. (a) I understand him.
(b) I comprehend him.
Generally, if the informant had any doubt about substitutability,
regardless of whether this doubt had to do with the semantic equiva¬
lence of the words or the grammatical acceptability of the sentence,
he was instructed to regard the substitution as impossible.
1.4. Method of Research
It will be remembered from above that, apart from analysing this
semantic field of each language in turn, the task was to contrast the
two languages.
In order to obtain similar contexts for both languages, so as to make
the corirastive analysis more straightforward, one Serbo-Croat and
one English speaker was asked to substitute the given verbs in
contexts taken from the translations of the novels as well as in
contexts from the originals. This way of organizing the work not
only simplified the analysis, but it also increased the number of
available contexts for each language.
The method of research was then to go from context to context trying
to establish the most probable reason which led the informants to
allow for substitution of some items and not of others. All the
contexts at hand were examined, and it was mostly through looking
at impossible substitutions* that the main differences between items
were discovered. For example, one of the differences between the
two verbs in (la-b) is that see has a visual aspect, as well as the
mental one, and depending on the Kind of object it takes (whether
concrete or abstract), its characteristics are either visual or mental.
*As already mentioned above, substitutions were regarded as impossible
if they would cause the change of meaning of the context.
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Admittedly, not all substitutions were 'impossible' because of the
change in meaning. Some were rejected on various other grounds,
in particular that of sentence construction. For example, it is a
fact that some verbs are not normally used in the imperative. In
some cases a general account can be given in terms of the syntactic
or semantic classification of the verb in question, but in some others
*
it may indicate a peculiarity of the verb itself , For instance, the
English verb know does not occur in imperative constructions of the
type V + that + Sentence , whereas the Serbo-Croat znati, its
closest equivalent, does. That is to say, the sentence 'Know that
I will come' (meaning roughly 'Be sure that I will come') is quite
possible in Serbo-Croat, The reverse holds true for the V + Object
construction. In Serbo-Croat 'Know your neighbour better' would
be expressed with the verb upoznati ('get to know*), which is, of
course, another possibility for English,
Dealing with lexemes of an abstract nature and contrasting them
within a semantic field, one is faced with the problem of how to
establish features so that they provide a reliable and convincing
distinction between the terms. Unlike, for example, the semantic
field of kinship terms, in the analysis of the verbs of knowledge and
understanding one is not directly faced with obvious distinctions which
are valid for the semantic analysis. That is, with kinship terms,
even without looking at the contexts in which they occur, one may be
fairly confident that, for example, the feature I Generation/
* This was brought to my attention by Professor J, Lyons,
** Although it may do in V + Object (as in 'Know your neighbour
better ,..'),
We shall again take this up briefly in Chapter IV,
*** Throughout the work slashes will be used to bracket the
established features.
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is relevant, the same with the feature /Sex/, and so on. The two
semantic fields, therefore, inevitably pose different problems.
Unlike kinship terms, the verbs of knowledge and understanding
require a closer look at the contexts in which they occur. One of
the very few features that could be 'predicted*, as it were, is the
feature /Factivity/. The verbs of the group can be checked for it
without any reference to the contexts. The 'predictability' of this
particular feature arises from the sole nature of the field as an
expression of the enquiry into truth or falsity of our knowledge.
It seems, therefore, important to stress that the objectivity of the
selected features can only be confirmed by referring to all the
contexts in which a certain lexeme appears. This does not mean
that the number of contexts is indefinite. Rather, we can say that
each lexeme has a pattern of occurrence which is limited and
repeated throughout the language. Depending on the number of
senses which can be discerned in a lexeme, the pattern varies in
complexity.
But to analyse a semantic field in terms of components does not
only mean to try and find out how many different senses are recog¬
nizable in a lexical item. The importance of the task lies, it seems
to me, in the fact that the features themselves are a hard core of
universal properties underlying the relationships of lexical items.
This is why we should sharply distinguish between a dictionary
definition and a feature. For example, the feature /Factivity/ is
not a dictionary definition} rather, it accounts forjmore general,
underlying property shared by the items of a semantic field.
Features are not meant to be ready definitions. They are elements
of meaning which influence interchangeability of items. A dictionary
definition implies a whole set of distinctive features.
Since I was in this work primarily concerned with contrasting two
languages within a semantic field, it was important for me to find
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a means of accounting for the data by the same set of features.
For purposes of contrasting them, it is, obviously, impossible to
work with two different sets of features previously established for
both languages. The working principle is that equivalents (or near*
equivalents) must have a similar underlying pattern of semantic
features in order to be substitutable.
Looking at the material, it has become obvious that, in order to
analyse and contrast these verbs by binary distinctions, one would
come up against innumerable problems of how to account for very
small details, and reasons of non-occurrence of items in contexts.
Not only would it be a tedious job, but an unnecessary and misleading
one. In these terms generalization of any sort would be inconceivable.
It has also become evident that two verbs need not both be positively
specified for a certain feature to occur in the same context. In
other words, it does not seem justifiable to argue that the
substitutability in the same context ensures that two verbs have a
feature in common. For example, one could not prove that know and
realize share the feature /importance/ (discussed in Chapter V,
pp. 116-21) in the following example;
3. I know/realize that he is coming.
The only satisfactory solution seems to be (since it is obviously untrue
to assign /-Importance/ to know) to state that, while realize is
positively specified, know is unspecified for this feature.
It, therefore, seems necessarytt® introduce zero specification as
the third value in this componential analysis.
The ternary nature of the analysis corresponds roughly to the inter¬
pretation that the native speaker would give, if asked to choose between
two items in the same context. Although they may be very near in
meaning otherwise, he would very often reject one of them as Jieing
•too strong*, or *too weak* to be applied in a particular context of
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situation.
1.4. 1 The verbs chosen for this analysis (56 altogether, including
three that will only be glanced at - here listed in brackets) are:
Serbo-Croat English
biti jasno be able
biti sposoban be aware
biti svjestan be capable









poznavati get to know
prepoznati grasp
primijetiti hear















1.5 In this study we shall be concerned with two basic kinds of
features: NON-CONTEXTUAL and CONTEXTUAL (or inherent and
substitutability features). Non-contextual (inherent) features are
those that the verbs can share regardless of whether they can ever
appear in the same context. These features are* in fact*
restrictions of a more general nature* accounting for properties of
verbs without saying anything about their substitutability* in the
same context. In fact* two verbs can share a non-contextual
feature without being substitutable for each other in any context.
In other words, we are dealing here with features of the type that
would be relevant in the analysis of any semantic field the objective
of which is not to account for mutual interchangeability of items.
However, although these features themselves do not guarantee .
substitutability on the basis of sameness of meaning, they impose
certain restrictions in a fundamental and significant way. If a verb
is positively marked for a certain non-contextual feature its range
of use in contexts will always be limited by the restrictions imposed
by that feature. (For convenience, the examples will be given in
the discussion of each particular feature. At the same time an
attempt will also be made to define them.)
Contextual (substitutability) features* on the other hand* determine
the context in which items (in this case verbs) occur. That is to
say, they specify the requirements of a verb with respect to a
context, and so further delimit its substitutability.
Together, these two kinds of features account for quite a number of
significant restrictions, eventually forming a description, or
partial analysis, of eachwerb.
* As above, (see p. 7 ), and throughout this work, substitut¬
ability will mean interchangeability of items on the basis of
sameness of meaning.
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It will be seen that most substitutability features are also inherent
for some of the verbs substitutable in a particular context.
Notice that I am talking about the lexemes that constitute one
particular semantic field. In some other semantic field they need
not have the same positive specifications. E. g. the verb to hear
is, in this semantic field, negatively specified in relation to the
feature /Direct information/, whereas it has different characteristics
in the 'acoustic* field.
Of necessity, this study will be limited only to those features that
have been found significant within the chosen material, possibly
leaving quite a few important features unrevealed.
Throughout the work the sign '-P will stand for inherent features,





2. 1 The Concept of Presupposition
Presupposition has only recently attracted the attention of linguists
to any considerable extent. Previously it has been mainly
discussed in philosophical works.
Philosophers like Frege and Strawson placed presupposition in a
logical framework accounting for it in terms of truth and falsity of
propositions. More specifically, they were concerned to establish
the truth values of X and Y in a presupposition formula *X presupposes
Y' , i. e. X presupposes the truth of Y (Cf. Garner, 1971:27). They
considered the effects of a presupposition failure, and accounted for
it in various ways. Strawson, for example, producsd ee»eral
instances of a presupposition failure of which I will mention but
two: 1. (a) If someone tells us 'There is not a single foreign book
in his room', it is presupposed that there are some books in the
room. But if we find out later that there are no books in the room
we will conclude not that we have been told a lie, but, as Strawson
puts it, that the person who pronounced the sentence l.(a) 'has
misled us'. And he goes on to say that for truth or falsity of
1 * (a) 'it is necessary (though not sufficient) that there should be
books in the room'. (1952:178)
Another of his examples is 1. (b): If we are told: 'All John's
children are asleep' we will assume that John has children. But
if we discover afterwards that John has no children, we shall be left
feeling 'misled', but not that we have been told a lie. Therefore
(Lf 'John's children' is represented by S and 'asleep* by P and put
in the form 'all S are P'), according to Strawson, the statement 'all
S are P' will be true if there are no S that are not P, and false if
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there is an S which is not P.
are no S at all. (1952:195)
It cannot be true or false if there
Philosophers are also concerned, as Garner points out (1971:35-42),
with the illocutionary force of the sentence. This term was
employed by Austin (1962) to indicate that one and the same sentence
can be intended by the speaker to mean and presuppose different
things, depending on the moment and situation of utterance. So
that, for instance, a sentence like 2.' Why don't you go?*can be
intended to have different interpretations, depending on whether the
speaker wants the addressee to go, or whether the addressee himself
had previously expressed a wish to do so and the speaker is agree¬
able.
If a sentence can be uttered with varying illocutionary force it can
be used to make a variety of illocutionary acts: e.g. to issue a
command, ask a question, make a statement, a supposition, a
prediction, etc.
Some linguists have also introduced the notion of illocutionary force
in their linguistic discussions. Fillmore, for example, would like
to distinguish between the presuppositional and the illocutionary
aspect of speech communication (1971:276). The presuppositional
aspect, according to him, has to take account of all necessary
conditions for an illocutionary act to take place. It is, he also
stresses, important to note the relationship between the structure
of a particular sentence and the presuppositions attached to it.
The utterance of an imperative sentence (like: Please, shut/don't
shut the door) presupposes, among other things, a certain kind of
relationship between the speaker and the addressee.
2.1. 1 From what has been said above we can draw a distinction
between the assertion of a sentence and its presupposition or
presuppositions (see P. &C. Kiparsky 1970:147). By an assertion
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we mean that which a speaker expresses by uttering a sentence.
By a presupposition we mean.for example, his belief and assumption
that what he is expressing is true. To illustrate the distinction
just drawn, we give the following example: by saying 'John is sad'
the speaker is asserting the fact of John's sadness, but he is pre¬
supposing that John exists.
We shall see later that what has come to be called factivitv (PA C.
Kiparsky, 1970) is not the only type of presupposition that we might
wish to consider. There are other presuppositions of highly
specific kind, or of a much narrower range. For instance, the
sentence 'Don't you like your new flat?' presupposes not only that
the addressee has just moved into a new flat, but also that he has
expressed some dislike about it. Since this involves more closely
the discussion of semantic features appertaining to the semantic
field of knowledge and understanding, we shall leave its further
elaboration to later sections.
2, 2 Kinds of Presupposition
Having established what the concept of presupposition involves,
we would further like to consider several different kinds of pre¬
supposition. Within a philosophical framework we have seen that
the distinction can be drawn between what various philosophers
considered to be the result of a presupposition failure*.
But we can also draw the distinction with respect to who or what is
doing the presupposing.
In his article on presupposition, Keenan (1971:45-51) discusses
* Above, we have only mentioned Strawson's approach but other
philosophers account for it in similar terms. Frege states that in
cases of a presupposition failure ho act is performed or no object
is produced' (see: Garner, 1971:347).
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two kinds of presupposition: logical and pragmatic. The first is
defined in terms of truth and logical consequence* the truth being
conceived of 'as a relation between a sentence* considered as a
syntactic object and the world (model, interpretation)' (1971:45).
A sentence is considered to be a consequence of a set of sentences
if it is true under all conditions under which this set of sentences
is true* in which case it is also logically implied by this set of
sentences. In this framework, presupposition is defined in terms
of implication so that S presupposes S 'only if S and also its negation
NS imply S'.
Keenan. points out that 'the logical notion of presupposition is
defined solely in terms of abstract sentences and the world.
Whether anyone actually utters or believes some sentences has
nothing to do with whether the sentence makes a particular logical
presupposition.' (1971:48)
The pragmatic kind of presupposition, according to Keenan, has
to do with an utterance, that is actually uttered by the speaker on
some particular occasion* and with its relationship with the
contextual conditions that justify the speaker in using it. The
contextual conditions must take into account all the individuals that
participate in the speech act and also the physical and cultural
setting in which the speech act is being performed. These contextual
conditions are called presuppositions of the speech act. In any
particular language there may prove to be a complex network of
criteria, involving, to quote Keenan '(a) status and kind of relations
among the participants: (b) age, sex, and generation relations
among the participants: (c) status, kin, age, sex, and generation
relations between participants and individuals mentioned in the
sentence: (d) presence or absence of certain objects in the physical
setting of the utterance: and (e) relative location of participants and
items mentioned in the sentence itself.' (1971:49)
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Keenan enumerates examples from various languages to illustrate
this point. For instance, he quotes Mary Haas's example (1964)
of the Louisiana Indian language, Koasati, where the utterance of
LAKAWATAKKAS (1 am not lifting it) presupposes that the speaker
is a man, and LAKAWATAKKO, that the speaker is a woman.
Therefore, this pragmatic kind of presupposition operates on the
relevant relationships of an utterance within a context, and the
context itself, which here comprises primarily individuals involved
in the speech act, reflecting their status, cultural background, and
so forth, on the utterance itself.
Again, this kind of presupposition, like the logical one above, does
not take into account the belief or assumption of the speaker with
respect to the truth of the sentence he has uttered. To this, third,
kind of presupposition, we shall turn shortly, in the next section.
It is, however, convenient at this point to redefine the notion of the
context of situation (as presented in the Introduction) in terms of the
concept of presupposition. It is obvious, from what has been said,
that both logical and pragmatic presuppositions constitute a very
important part of the context of situation, namely that part which
renders theiwse of an utterance justifiable and 'appropriate' (to use
Keenan's term) on a particular occasion*. The context of situation
in its broad.ir sense may involve additional cultural factors of non-
presuppositions.! character which, for example, in a literal trans¬
lation from one language to^another, can result in misinformation
rather than break-down of communication. One example is the
convention for numbering the floors or storeys of a building in
American English. If there happened to be a translation into Serbo-
Croat of a text containing the expression 'fintt floor' translated
* It is worth noting here that Firth's notion of context of situation
(1957) lends itself, in part, to interpretation in terms of pragmatic
presupposition.
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literally* the Serbo-Croat reader* unaware of the difference in
the numbering convention* would be misinformed* since for him
the first floor is not the ground floor, but the floor above the ground
floor.
In this work I wish to talk mainly about that part of the context of
situation which involves presupposition since it is presuppositional
factors of this kind which are relevant to analysing the use* or
meaning, of many items in the vocabulary of knowledge and under¬
standing. It is moreover presuppositions of a different kind from
those discussed by Keenan with which we shall be primarily
concerned: presuppositions which account for che speaker's belief
or assumption with respect to theitruth of what he is expressing.
This question is the object of a more detailed discussion in the
following sections.
2. 2. 1 A Third Kind of Presupposition
This, third, kind of presupposition was discussed by Paul and Carol
Kiparsky in their article on 'pact' (1970:143-171). They showed
that there is a class of what they call factive verbs in English and
that the use of one of these verbs as the main verb of a sentence
committed the speaker to a belief in the truth of what was expressed
by the complement of the factive verb. They further showed that
the syntactic behaviour of factive verbs was in various ways
different from that of non-factive verbs.
The term factive. therefore, refers to those verbs the use of which
commits the speaker to the belief that what he is saying is true.
The converse term, non-factive, applies to the verbs which do not
commit the speaker to any such belief. (The term 'verb' is used
by the Kiparskys to refer to both verbs and adjectives. The term
•complement' is also used somewhat broadly to refer to what in
their view would be deep structure complements, although they may
appear as surface structure subjects.)
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The Kiparskys give several examples to show how the truth or
falsity of what is expressed in the complements depends upon the
belief of the speaker. 1 shall mention but three:
*
1, Only factive verbs allow 'the full range' of gerundial
constructions, and gerunds as objects. For example:
3. (a) His being found guilty astonished me,
(b) *His being found guilty was likely,
4. (a) I resented Susan eating the cake.
(b)* I believe Susan eating the cake.
2, Only non-factive verbs allow the noun phrase of the
complement clause to be converted into the subject of the main
clause. For example:
5. (a) It is likely that we'll be there in time,
(b) We are likely to be there in time,
(c)* We are significant to be there in time,
3, Only non-factive verbs allow the 'accusative-plus-infinitive'
construction. For instance:
6. (a) I believed Susan to have gone.
(b)* I regretted Susan to have gone.
Notice that not all non-factive verbs take the accusative plus infinitive
construction. Those that naturally come first to mind are the non-
factive verbs belonging to the semantic field of knowledge and under¬
standing. Two that can be readily produced are think and hear (the
latter of which, as we shall see later, is non-factive only in certain
constructions). So that (6, a) is acceptable, but (7a-b) are not:
* Notice that some non-factives take gecunds. To take Lj. Bibovic's
example from the article discussed below: She dreaded his having
another heart-attack.
** Notice that 'non-factive'is kere. being ut,ed <ls eomjolemtvit o{. oLv»d wot
bvj Kuril" unen q. wiOire speajJc -SMbclciis (discusseddn pp. 28-31).
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7. (a)* I thought Susan to have gone.
(b)* I heard Susan to have gone.
2. 2. 2 One of the criteria for establishing presuppositions,
^
according to the Kiparskys, is that they should remain unchanged
under a negation. Consider the following examples:
8. (a) I regretted that I had gone to the party,
(b) I didn't regret that I had gone to the party.
where in both cases the speaker's presupposition expressed by:
I went to the party, has remained unchanged.
One way to establish the factivity of a verb (i. e. whether it
presupposes the truth of its complement) is to conjoin a clause
containing it with a 'but-clause* denying the presupposition. For
example:
9. (a)* I knew that he had gone, but he hadn't.
(b) I heard that he had gone, but he hadn't.
(c)* It was clear to me that he had gone, but he hadn't.
(d) I thought that he had gone, but he hadn't.
where the anomaly of (9a) and (9c) reflects the factivity of know and
be clear.
2. 2. 3 There is a point of interpretation in the Kiparsky's article
(1970:148) which may be mentioned here. They merely state that
factives like realize are not acceptable in the first person^ej. There
is, however, more to it than that. And this is where other
presuppositions apart from factivity come into focus. We can
account for the anomaly arising when realize is used in First
Person Sing/PI Negative, present and future, by fk>siting the
highly specific presupposition of the speaker when the uses this
verb in a sentence that he was in possession of the knowledge upon
which he is commenting before the time of his utterance. The
Kiparskys do mention the crucial fact that the negative of
present and future first person sign/pl renders the use of realize
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unacceptable. There is, of course, nothing anomalous about
'I realize that I am late1.
But since we are going to return to this question in more detail
later, with necessary examples, I will say no more about it here.
2. 2.4 One further point of interest in the Kiparskys' article
(1970:167) is their assumption that there is a syntactic and semantic
correspondence between truth and specific reference. They gave
the following examples:
10. (a) 1 ignored an ant on my plate.
(b) I imagined an ant on my plate.
where the factive verb ignore presupposes a specific object of
reference (in this case: an ant), and the non-factive one does not.
While this argument seems to be quite plausible, it is probably
more open to dispute whether the non-equivalence of the well-known
pair
11. (a) Everyone in this room speaks two languages
and (b) Two languages are spoken by everyone in
this room
can be explained in terms of indefinite noun phrases which, when
placed initially refer to a specific object. Since, for some speakers
at least, if they said (lib) it would not be unacceptable for them to
go on and say: Some speak French and German, and some Spanish
and Italian. This last question, however, does not concern us here
to any greater degree.
2. 2. 5 A Yugoslav linguist, Ljiljana Bibovic, has in her article
'Some Remarks on the Factive and Non-Factive Complements in
English and Serbo-Croatian' (1971) drawn interesting distinctions
between the two languages, with reference to the Kiparskys' article.
Four points are particularly worth mentioning:
1. While in English that-clauses can be employed both with
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factives and non-factives, Serbo-Croat distinguishes between da-
clauses (with non-factives), and £to-clauses (with factives).
Moreover, only emotive factives (see Kiparskys, 1970 ; 169) allow
sto-complementizers (vhich, as will be shown later, is not entirely
correct). The following examples were given:
Factives:
Emotive
12. (a) E It is extremely odd that nobody is interested
in the problem.
SC Pravo je 2udo Sto nikoga ne zanima taj
problem.
(b) E She regrets that some people were unable
to come.
SC £ao joj je Sto neki ljudi nisu mogli da dodju.
Non-Emotive
13, E She is aware that some people were unable
to come.
SC Svesna je toga da neki ljudi nisu mogli da dodju.
Non-Factives:
14. (a) E I believe that John is ill.
SC Verujem da je Jovan bolestan*
(b) E I think that he will come.
SC Mislim da ce doci.
2. The sto-clauses are never equivalent to the English
•accusative-plus-infinitive' construction, which, as Lj. Bibovic
points out>*is due to the fact observed by the Kiparskys that the
accusative-with-infinitive construction (...) is possible only with
$
non-factive complements* .
* but, as we have seen, not with all non-factives either.
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3. Bibovic argues that, like the English know and realize,
the SC znati and shvatiti are also semantically factive and syntactic¬
ally non-factive. The only examples that she gives for syntactic
non-factivity of these verbs are the ones below, which show that
her criterion was her argument (1971:38-39) that factive verbs do
not take da-clauses:
15. (a) E 1 know that John is ill.
SC Znam da je Jovan bolestan.
(b) E I realize that the difficulties are enormous.
SC Shvatam da su te£koce ogromne.
However, her further discussion of emotive and non-emotive factives
(1971:45) refutes this hypothesis since she states that only emotive
factives in Serbo-Croat take sto-clauses. In which case it can be
reasonably argued that znati and shvatiti ARE non-emotives and
therefore may be expected to take the da-clause complement. If,
therefore, this is the only basis for the assumption that the SC verbs
are syntactically non-factive, we would do better to discard it, until
we have found a more reliable reason to argue differently.
It would, perhaps, also be interesting to note at this point that all
the factive SC verbs analyzed here take da-clauses as complements,
and none of them could be described as 'emotive'.
We shall return to a general discussion of the constructions taken
by particular verbs later.
4. E factive gerunds are rendered in SC by &to-clauses and E
non-factive gerunds (where they are possible) by SC da-clauses.
* The Kiparskys argued that the 'accusative-plus-infinitive'
construction was a feature of non-factive verbs. The verbs know
and realize, however, (which are semantically factive) can occur
in this construction.
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Again, since we have established that there are factives in SC
that take da-clauses, it seems reasonable to assume that there
might be some factives in this language which would render E
gerunds by da-clauses, although no such example has been found.
The articles by the Kiparskys and Bibovic have undoubtedly provoked
a considerable amount of thought about the direct connection between
factivity of the main predicate and the syntactic structure of the
complement. But just to what extent it will prove to be a
significant causal relationship, is at present hard to discern and
we shall probably have to await further empirical evidence before
coming to any decision.
2. 2. 6 More generally, Karttunen (1970c:7) has remarked that some
factive verbs, like regret and realize, for example, in conditional
sentences do not presuppose the truth of the complement. However,
it seems that these verbs cannot be regarded as exceptions to some
general rule in this respect, because all the factive verbs included
in the present analysis, if tested for it, also show the same
property, as the reader may verify for himself. (We are not,
however, directly concerned with the behaviour of factive verbs in
conditional sentences.)
Let us note that not all types of conditional clauses have the
same effect on these verbs. Karttunen's example is in the form
If-fVerb Pres, Main clause Verb Future:
16. If I realize later that I have not told the truth, I
will confess it to everyone.
With respect to this kind of conditional his observation seems to be
correct. The same holds true for the type If-fVerb Past, Main
clause Pres Cond.:
17. If I realized later, etc., I would confess ..., etc.
But it does not hold true for the third type of conditionals ('past
counter factuals'):
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If-fVerb Pluperf., Main clause Past Cond.
18. If I had realized that I had not told the truth, I
would have confessed it to everyone.
This may tie up with Langendoen's proposal that 'a conditional
sentence has the property that its presupposition is presupposed in
a (possibly imaginary) world in which its antecedent is true'
(1971c:58). Or even better, perhaps, with Fillmore's view 'that
an utterance of the sentence presupposes the falsity of the pre¬
supposition contained in the if-clause' (1971c:277).
2, 2. 7 In a slightly different connection, Fillmore has had quite a
lot to say about presuppositions. In a considerable part of his
work he has been concerned with the case relationships of verbs,
namely the various 'roles* that one is able to attach to different
verbs, on the basis of what kinds of subject and object they take
(see especially Fillmore, 19681*382-390). This means, to borrow
his terminology, that different predicates presuppose and require
different kinds of arguments. His examples are numerous, but I
will mention only the verbs break and bend. They both require
that what is referred to by their objects shall have a specific
property, that is to say, for break what is referred to by the object
should have a certain rigidity, and for bend, on the contrary, it
should be flexible, but, as Fillmore puts it, 'offering resistance'.
But, as mentioned above, not only do verbs require certain
properties of the referents of their objects. They have special
criteria for what they take as their subject. So that in the above
two examples, both verbs require the referents of their subject either to
be animate, or if they are inanimate, to have strength resulting
from their internal structure or composition. This is why sponge
would not be an appropriate subject of these verbs, but stone
would. When used intransitively, however, these verbs will
require their superficial subjects to have a property of rigidity and
flexibility respectively.
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Fillmore further talks about the differentiation between what a
word conveys and what it presupposes. His example is the noun
bachelor: 'We have learned that the noun bachelor identifies some¬
thing which is Male* Human, Adult and Unmarried. It seems to
me that only Unmarried (...) is the concept that one would wish
to associate directly with the meaning of bachelor, and that the
other three properties make up part of our understanding of the
nature of arguments that bachelor as a predicate can accept.'
(1968b:393)
A more elaborate description of verbs is given by Fillmore in his
recent article on the verbs of judging (1971) where this distinction
between 'basic* meanings and presuppositions is explicitly stated*
For example:
ACCUSE / JUDGE, DEFENDANT, SITUATION (of)/




2. 3 Presuppositions as Features
In this work I propose to treat the presuppositions of items as
semantic features, that is to say, to try to explain their differences
and similarities in terms of presuppositions that they involve.
As was stated earlier (in Chapter I) the description will be
conducted within a ternary, rather than binary system of features
which reflects the empirical evidence that some words can remain
unspecified with respect to a certain feature rather than have the
value plus or minus.
Factivity is of primary importance in the network of the semantic
field of knowledge and understanding and in this study is taken to
be a presupposition which has specific relevance to the use of all
the verbs of the field.
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It is for this reason that we would now like to turn to Karttunen's
classification of verbs in terms of factivity (1970c)^ mainly to
establish its significance for the present semantic field.
He has observed that verbs may show different properties relative
to factivity in affirmative and negative assertions. This is based
on the commitment of the speaker with respect to the truth or
falsity of the complement. According to Karttunen, it is possible
to distinguish clearly several groups of verbs on the basis of this
criterion. He established four, which are as follows:
1. FACTIVES (e. g. realize, odd). Both affirmative and
negative assertions commit the speaker to the belief
that what is expressed by the complement is true.
For example:
19. (a)* I realized that he was very ill, but he wasn't,
(b)* I didn't realize that he was very ill, but he
wasn't.
2. IMPLICATIVES (e. g. manage, happen), where affirmative
assertion commits the speaker to the belief that the
complement is true, and the negative assertion that the
complement is false.
For example:
20. (a)* I managed to get there in time, but I didn't.
(b)* I didn't manage to get there in time, but I did.
*
3. IF-VERBS (e.g. force, certain), where affirmative
assertion commits the speaker to the belief that the
complement is true, but the negative assertion does not
involve any such commitment.
For example:
* Karttunen also talks about negative implicatives and negative
if-verbs, but since they do not have a deeper relevance to this
work, I have omitted them.
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21. (a)* He forced her to go, but she didn't.
(b) He didn't force her to go, but she went.
and she didn't.
4. ONLY-IF VERBS (e.g. able, possible), which, in affirm¬
ative assertions do not commit the speaker to the belief
of truth or falsity, but which in negative assertions commit
him to the belief that the complement is false.
For example:
22. (a) He was able to go, but he didn't.
and he did.
(b)* He wasn't able to go, but he did.
Therefore, the pattern of commitment of the speaker can be
*





ONLY-IF VERBS 0 •
We can now relate Karttunen's observation to the verbs of knowledge
and understanding. None of Karttunen's implicatives fall within this
field, 3o that we can, on the basis of factivity, i. e. employing the
but-test, divide them into four subgroups:
1. FACTIVES , which in both affirmative and negative
assertions presuppose speaker's commitment to the
truth of the complement;
* • -f, '-' and 'C* represent the values of the complement when the
main verb is in affirmative and negative: '•? »true; '-' = false;
'O' = Tinspecified.
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2. AFFIRMATIVE COMMITTALS*, which presuppose truth
in affirmative assertions, but are unspecified in negative
assertions;
3. NEGATIVE COMMITTALS, which are unspecified in
affirmative assertions but presuppose the falsity of the
complement in the negative ones;
4. NON-FACTIVES, which are unspecified with respect to
the speaker's belief, in both affirmative and negative
assertions.
(It will be noted that the term 'Non-factive' is here being used in
a narrower sense than it was in the discussion of the Kiparskys'
article. )











And the following is a list (selected for the purpose of this study)
of SC and E verbs of knowledge and understanding that constitute
these subgroups:
* The terms 'Affirmative Committals' and 'Negative Committal?
have been chosen instead of Karttunen's 'If-Verb' and 'Only-If

































































osjetiti learn (in the sense of 'memorizing')
razumjeti understand
shvatiti
As we shall see later (on p. 64 some verbs vary in factivity
depending on the V + Sentence construction that they enter. In the
above classification account has been taken only of V +that +Sentence
construction, with the verb in the affirmative or in the negative.
The verbs that take only V +Object construction, poznavati,
(pre)poznati and recognize (in the sense of 'known before'), have
been found to be factives.
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FOOTNOTES
1. Prof. J. Lyons has drawn my attention to the fact that it is
necessary to distinguish in the use of the negative of a factive
verb between the denial of a previously asserted (or implied)
positive proposition and the assertion of a negative proposition.
For example, *1 don't know that it was raining* can be followed
by 'and I don't believe it', if it is an answer to •It's raining',
whereas otherwise it cannot. It appears likely, from my




GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS of VERBS of KNOWLEDGE
and UNDERSTANDING
3. 1 There are certain properties that can be discerned throughout
the group of verbs of knowledge and understanding, and which are
common to those not belonging to this semantic field at all. The
ones that seem to be of crucial importance here are the features
that relate to ASPECT, TIME ADVERBIALS which the verbs can
take and the SENTENCE CONSTRUCTION they can enter. Each of
these properties will be discussed separately.
3. 2 With regard to the two languages contrasted in this work,
aspect is one of the properties which is overtly marked in SC but not
in E. By 'overtly marked' I simply mean : recognizable in the
infinitive form of the verb. Therefore, while in SC there may
exist two infinitives of one and the same verb, expressing aspectual
♦
differences of duration and punctuality , this difference is not marked
in E. This is the reason why we shall here make a distinction for
the SC group of verbs and not for the E one. It is, however,
important to observe that, although this overt distinction cannot be
matched in SC and E, the related semantic categories are identifiable
with respect to both.
Traditionally, the two infinitive forms of verbs in SC are named
PERFECTIVE (expressing punctuality, i. e. an activity or process
that takes up only a short section of time), and the IMPERFECTIVE
(expressing mostly a process or a state which can last over a longer
period of time). This is, however, not the whole point. We shall
be able to observe that some perfectives can express a durative
* The terminology is borrowed from the PhD. dissertation by Midh&t
Ridjanovic, which will shortly be mentioned in more detail.
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process or activity, i. e. process or activity that may last for a
longer period of time* Also, we shall notice that some imperfect*
ives can occur as punctuals, in an appropriate context, i. e. context
modified by adverbials, or sometimes even if the context is not so
modified.
The Ph.D. thesis by Midhat Ridjanovic (1969), a Yugoslav linguist,
reveals a few very interesting points about aspect.
3. 2. 1 Commenting on one of Ross's arguments about auxiliaries
he states that verbs like force take a non-stative verb, and those
like seem generally require a stative verb. But while force rules out
pure statives, seem does not exclude non-statives provided that they
•do not involve a single (mathematical) point in its temporal contour*.
(1969:66-67). He gives the following examples:
1. I forced him to ( learn the answer.
(*know theianswer.
0 T- , (*leam the answer.2. He seems to ; ,
( know the answer.
where in 2. 'He seems to learn the answer' would be quite accept*
able if it had, for example, a manner adverbial attached to it:
3. He seems to learn the answer(s) very quickly.
Here the context indicates that the main verb does not represent
a short term action, but one that goes on over a period of time in
*
a repetitive manner.
Ridjanovic then goes on to say that 'the first thing to notice about
these examples is that durative and punctual aspects usually
characterize not the verb itself, but the entire verb phrase'
(1969:84).
* We shall come to the distinction repetitive vs. continuous later.
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Notice that the SC perfective (na)uciti (learn) is restricted in the
same way as the E equivalent when it is preceded by izgledati
(•seem*). Consider the following examples:
4. (a)* Xzgleda da onmauci odgovor.
'"(He seems to learn the answer. )
(b) Izgleda da on nauci odgovor(e) brzo.
(He seems to learn the answer(s) quickly. )
Further on, Ridjanovic states that 'a durative VP subordinate to
•
,
hope refers to present time, a punctual VP to future time*. (1969:110)
The examples given are:
5. (a) I hope he knows.
(b) I hope he says something.
Notice, however, that there are a number of E verbs with which we
are concerned in this study, that, although they can be marked as
durative, exhibit ambiguity between present and future time in the
environment (i. e. syntactic frame): I hope/1 1 1. These verbs
are: feel, believe, be clear, perceive, think, understand.
comprehend, and see. Consider the following examples:
6. (a) I hope he feels that I am right
[now that I have tried to convince him.once he's seen it himself.
,, . _ , , , ,, Tsince you have asked him to.
(b) I hope he believes you ,v r 1 [when you tell him.(c) it's clear to him(d) he understands(e) he comprehends(f) he sees what I mean.when I explain it to him.
(g) he perceives the difference
since there is one.
when I point it out to him.
(h) he thinks that I'm good enough for he job
|"now that I've tried to prove it.
|_when I try to prove it.
This can be explained (as indeed Ridjanovic did (1969:143) )by the
37
fact that these verbs (and probably many others not belonging to
this semantic field) have the property of functioning with different
*
duration depending on whether they are in the past and future tense
or whether they are in the present tense. In fact, only a few verbs
of this field are confined to only one dimension. We shall return
to this shortly,
Ridjanovic mentions a further constraint on the perfective verbs
in SC, and that is 'their incapability of appearing as complements
of the verbs poceti 'to bqgjb.'stad prestati 'to cease'. ' (1969:127)
We can, perhaps, add here that this is not only the case with
perfectives, but also with verbs like znati ('know') that mainly
express a state.
For example:
7. 3C *Po£eo sam da znam sta on misli.
E * I began to know what he meant.
(A further interesting distinction between perfectives and imperfect*
ives will be mentioned in the next section with reference to
M. Ivic's article on determiners (1962). )
Ridjanovic draws the following conclusion: 'The study of the
syntactic constraints on the use of the so called perfective and
imperfective verbs in SC reveals that the major feature of the
opposition between them is not the completion versus the incomple-
tion of the action designated by the verb, but rather the indivisibility
versus divisibility of the temporal dimension associated with the
action. • (1969:128).
3, 2. 2 Ridjanovic's primary division of SC verbs is into:stative
(denoting properties, relations and states), cursive * traditionally
imperfective (denoting activities and processes), and totive -
* by 'different duration' I mean one of the three dimensions
discussed below. See distinction : process-state-event.
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A
traditional perfective . This roughly corresponds to the division
made in this study, except that, instead of naming the verbs
themselves as, for example, 'process-state* verbs, or 'process-
state-event' verbs, the notion of aspect is divided into three semantic
features; /Process/,(further subdivided into /Repetitive/, and
/Continuous/), /State/, and /Event/,
/Process/ is a feature that refers to an action which takes up a
longer period of time and usually shows some kind of development
with respect to the starting point of that action. The subfeature
/Repetitive/ refers to actions which may last for a longer period of
time, but within which shorter time periods are easily discernable,
that is, those during which only one part of the whole process has been
accomplished (each of thes e shorter sections marks a repetition and
not a continuation of the previous one). The subfeature /Continuous/
refers to processes which take up a longer section of time, but
within which shorter periods are not discernable. /State/ and
/Event/ are contrasted on the basis of the duration of the action.
While /State/ refers to a lasting action, /Event/ indicates that the
action occupies a single point on the time scale.
These three features are based on two notions: activity (which means
that the Subject is the Agent), and length of time. So that / Process/
and /Event/ may refer to activities, while /State/ does not. On the
other hand, /State/ and /Process/ refer to 'lengthy' actions,
whereas /Event/ does not.
3. 2. 3 Collectively, SC and E verbs for knowledge and understanding
* From the Ph. D. dissertation by J. E. Miller (1970)'i it is obvious
that a similar classification is possible for the Russian verbs,
** the term action (as opposed to activity) is employed here in a
broader sense to mean anything that a verb can refer to whether
it was a process, a state or an event.
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seem to fall into six distinct groups with respect to these aspectual
features:
I /Process/, /State/, /Event/
II /Process/, /Event/




Since the analysis of aspect, because of its complexity, needs a
separate study, I will not even attempt here to present it in any
great detail, which means that, among other things, it will be im¬
possible to include all possible tenses relative to the aspectual
differences of each verb. Also, the adverbial side of the question
will not be presented systematically, but only in passing. The aim
of this work (with regard to aspect) is to provide an overall picture
of aspectual possibilities of each verb, in order to establish how
the verbs are related and when they are substitutable.
We can now proceed to enumerate the verbs and give examples for
each group.






biti u stanju recognize




* Moci, biti u staniu, biti s posoban and umj eti cannot be characterized
as perfectives, but they can take all three features of aspect although only




S. SC Polako sam razumio sta on misli.
E I gradually understood what he meant.
/State/
9. SC Vidim sta on misli.
E I see what he means.
/ Event/
10. SC Razumio sam odmah Sta misli.
E I understood immediately what he meant.
Notice that the adverbs polako. ('gradually'), odmah ('immediately')
in (8) and (10) play a significant role in the complete disambiguation
between /Process/ and /Event/. While the rest of the sentence is
a constant, adverbials are variables which, in this case shift the
meaning of the whole context either towards /Process/ or towards
/Event/.
Notice also that vidieti in (9) is essentially a perfective verb? but
(Ridjanovic also mentions this phenomenon (1969: 143) ) in the Present
Tense it may have either the feature /State/, or the feature / Event/,
whereas in the Past Tense it can only have the feature /Event/ unless
it is modified by a time adverbial. It seems that the same holds for
the English see.
* The imperfective is vidiati. which does not belong to the
semantic field of knowledge and understanding.
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A further subdivision of these verbs has to be made on the basis
of what kind of /Process/ they are marked for. All SC perfectives
enumerated above are marked /Repetitive process/, while only a








In English only make out is not marked /Repetitive process/,
and only conceive and hear are not marked /Continuous process/. *
Examples:
/Repetitive process/^
11. SC dujem novosti od njih.
E I hear the news from them.
I Continuous process/
12, SC Polako sam postao svjestan svega toga.
E I slowly became conscious/aware of all that.
I Event/
13. SC Cuo sam (cujem) da je bolestan,
E I have heard (I hear) that he is ill.
It may be noted here from examples (11) and(13) that in some cases
the 'repetitiveness' of a verb is expressed in the plurality of the
object associated with it. This seems to apply to verbs that are
mostly event-orientated (like cuti and hear above). Other verbs
do not necessarily need their objects to be in plural in order to
express •repetitiveness'. For example, SC prepoznati and E
recognize:
14. SC Prepoznao sam svako drvo u toj basti.
where plurality is expressed by the words svako and each in SC
and E respectively.
Group III /State/, /Event/















15. SC Znam Sta mislis.
E I know what you mean.
/Event/
16. SC Tad sam znao sta namjerava da ucini.
E I knew then what he intended to do.
Notice that the time adverbials, like tad in SC and then in E, make
it clear that in (16) we are concerned with a momentary action*
while their omission may leave open the ambiguity with Lespect to
*
the lenjth of time involved (as in (15) ).







17. SC Razumij evali' 3U dobro Sta sam im govorio.
E(They were understanding well what I was telling them.)
/ State/
18. SC Razumij eyali- su se vrlo dobro.
E (They understood each other very well.)
The imperfective razumij evati is very seldom used in my dialect.
Mostly* it is employed in the past tense, as above. 1 have found
* The question of time adverbials as verb modifiers will be taken
up in the following section with particular reference to the
articles of M. Ivid (1962) and D. Crystal (1966).
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three examples, (in casual reading) in the translation of Pearl S, Buck's
novel Pavilion of Women (translated by Nonad Jovanovic). There is

















These verbs differ with respect to the subdivision of the feature
/Process/. It seems that most of them are marked for both.
However, saznavati, doznavati, and prepoznavati seem to be marked
only for /Repetitive process /, while postajati svies tan and postajati
jasno, are only marked for /Continuous process/.
Examples:
/Repetitive process/
19. SC Doznavao sam sve o njemu preko njegovog prijatelja.
E(l got to know all about him through his friend.)
/Continuous process/
20. SC Postajala je svjesna svoje zelje za promjenom,









21. SC .Poznavao sam ga. (I knew him.)
SC Uvidjao sam (osjecao sam, vjerovao sam) da je u pravu.
( I realized (felt, believed) tin.the was right. )
While the SC verbs quoted in (21), because of their imperfective
nature, unambiguously reflect the feature /State/, it is worth
observing that the E verbs given in the translation of these examples
can here express either /State/ or /Event/.
3. 2. 4 It is important to point out here the relationship of consequence
(see Lyons; 1963:111-119) which holds between verbs that express
/Process/ or /Event/ (as antecedents), and the verbs that express
/State/ (as consequents). Lyons calls this relationship 'a special
type of (pragmatic) implication operating within the aspectual system
of the language'. He distinguishes between unilateral and bilateral
implication, the latter resulting in synonymy of antecedent and
consequent.
Since we are here mainly concerned with the interchangeability of
items on the basis of sameness ofmeaning, we will give a few
examples from both languages to illustrate the relation of consequence
named 'bilateral implication'. As will be seen, in both SC and E
the antecedent is in the past tense, while the consequent is in the
present tense. Or, if the antecedent is in the pluperfect, the
consequent is in the past tense.
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22. (a) SC Jesi li Suo Sta o tome govore? (DS150. 32) - Znas
li sta a tome govore?
E Have you heard what they are saying about that? (My tr. )
(b) SC Taj njegov £ovjek licno je iskusio i naucio sta staje funta
zla. (ZS035. 12) - Taj njegov £ovjek (...) zna sta
staje funta zla.
E That man (...) has personally experienced and learnt
the cost of evil. (My tr. )
(c) E 'Lucy, ..." have vou heard that Tolbrook is being
sold, to be pulled down (P15. 30).
•Lucy,... - do vou know that Tolbrook is being sold .. .
(d) For though he canjt speak, he has learnt to pray. (P288. 20)
For though he can't speak, he knows how to pray.
Here is shown the bilateral consequential implication between the
SC verbs cuti and nauSiti, and the verb znati. Also the same
relationship is shown between the E verbs hear and learn and the
verb know(how). The relationship can be represented as follows:
SC cuti (past) ------- znati (present)
nauSiti (past)------- znati (present)
E hear (present perfect) ------- know(how) (present)
learn (present perfect) ------- know(how) (present)
SC cuti |
naugiti ) znati )
) (pluperfect) ) (past tense)E hear j know(how) j
learn )
A further point (and a very important one) to notice here is the
fact that 'bilateral implication' is a contextual phenomenon since
it need not always be necessarily true that the sentences in (22a-d)
stand in such a relationship. Generally they would be interpreted
to stand in relation of unilateral implication.
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3, 3 Time Adverbials
3. 3. 1 In her article on determiners Milka Ivic (1962) discusses the
distinction between omissible and non-omissible determiners with
particular reference to SC. A few points from the article are well
worthwhile taking up here, because they throw a new light on the
question of verbal tenses and their interrelationship with the time
adverbials. According to Ivic there are two kinds of non-omi*§ibl«t
determiners. There are those that are introduced at a particular
point in speech in order to delimit and specify the meaning so that
their omission would result not in an ungrammatical expression,
but would, rather, change the meaning of that expression. The
example given was the 3C verb putovati (•travel1) (1962:201), which,
used in the present tense without any time adverbial means 'I am
travelling1, but which, with the time adverbial sutra ('tomorrow1)
*
refers to a future action :
23. (a) Putujem. - I am travelling.
(b) Putujem sutra. - I am going to travel tomorrow.
According to Ivic the time adverbial sutra is classed as a non-
*othissible determiner since it marks a contrast in meaning between
the situations when it is used and when it is not.
As opposed to this kind of non-omissible determiners, there are
tbr<3e the omission of which would yield a meaningless expression.
As an example, Ivic contrasts the present tense of the imperfective
frerbs with the present tense of the perfective verbs in SC: \ ..
the perfective present tense form appears either free or
* J. Lyons points out that in E 'I'm travelling by train' could
refer to the future, provided it is clear in the context. The same
holds true for SC.
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*
bound to the presence of an accessory grammatical element
depending on the concrete use: the perfective present is an obligatory
bound form. This is in direct correlation with the fact that it is
impossible to denote the actual event by means of perfective present
(dodjem means nothing; but kad dodjem means 'when I come',
dodjem jucc i... (*I came yesterday, and ... 'V (1962:201).
3.3.2 Referring to Ivic's article, D. Crystal (1966:5) states: 'The
crucial point is that it is not the present tense on its own which is
causing thec6hange in temporal emphasis which is then given a new
label, but the present tense (...) colligated with, or (... ) being
specified by an adverbial word, phrase or clause of time, both of
which work together to produce a definable time-relationship which
may then be referred to vith a new label. It is not a question of
tense-form alone giving the relevant distinguishing indication of
time, as has been traditionally assumed, but of tense-form with
or without adverbial specification which gives unambiguous indication.
One interprets a given tense-form in a particular way either because
the key to the interpretation is given in the form of an adverbial
specifier, or because the absence of such a key is itself equally
clear as a pointer to which time is being referred to. '
In his discussion about this interrelationship Crystal considers six
verb forms: 1 present ('live')
2 preterite ('lived')
3 perfect ('Jiave lived')
4 pluperfect ('had lived')
5 conditional ('would live')
6 future ('will live')
* The use of the terms free and bound here, as Ivic explained,
refers to the above differences between the two kinds of non-
omissible determiners, and thus differs from what might be
regarded as their standard use in morphology and syntax,
(cf. Bloomfield, 1935:160.)
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He then classes the time adverbials into 4 main categories, as
follows: I How often? Frequency of occutffence
II How long? Restricted duration
III When? The reference explicit
IV When? Require previous explicit time reference
The fourth category branches off into three subcategories:
a: time referred to precedes explicit time reference
b: time referred to is simultaneous with the explicit
time reference
c: time referred to follows the explicit time reference
Each of the categories as well as the three subcategories are again
subclassi fied into smaller units (listed in the Appendix).
The two main issues of the discussion were to establish 'the number
of tense-forms which colligate with an adverbial, and the number
and type of meanings ascribable to each individual colligation. '
(1966:16).
3. 3. 3 Because of the complexity of the matter, it has been thought
best, for the purpose of this work, to establish broadly (on the
basis of Crystal's classification) which adverbials colligate with
which verbs without considering, apart from an illustration, the
two issues mentioned above (and even then not taking into account
the differences in meaning). To undertake a systematic and
exhaustive study of this kind would not only take up much time and
space, but would also envolve a further complication arising from
the contrastive character of this analysis: i. e. the correspondence
of tenses (or, better, their non-correspondence) in the two
languages would largely have to be taken into account. Also the
very relevant question of the perfective-imperfective opposition
in SC would have to be discussed in detail in order to represent
their relationship to the time adverbials. All this would take us
way beyond the limits of the present study.
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An attempt will now be made to present the collocation of verbs
and time adverbials. For mnemonic reasons it seems convenient
to give an example of the feature in question at the head of each
column. For reference, the same example will be quoted against
each feature in the Appendix to this chapter. Also, for brevity,
the number of collocations (which will be marked 'i1 in brackets) or
the number of non-collocations (marked •-•) will be stated, deproding
on which is smaller. The number in brackets after each example
indicates the feature as listed in the Appendix.
The E time adverbials taken into consideration by Crystal, have been
compared with the SC ones to establish their near-equivalence. They
will be listed in brackets beside the English ones.
All colligations have been checked with one SC and one E native
speaker.














biti u stanju can
raoci be able
get to know
II (-) annually (godiSnje) A8





III {-) once before (jednom ranije) (A2), a few times (nekoliko put4 (A5)#
all the time (cijelo vrijeme) (A9).
biti sposoban
IV (-) any moment now (svakog trenutka) (CI)
SC uvidjeti
V (-) annually (godi^nje) (A8), from now (odsad) (B4)
SC pojmiti
VI (-) annually (godisnje) (A8), all that day (cijeli taj dan) (Bl),
so far (do^ad) (B2), for the moment (trenutno) (B3)^
from now (odsad) (B4), any moment now (svakog tr®nutka) (CI)
at present (trenutko) (C2a), right now (upravo sad) (C2b)
SC spoznati
VII (-) annually (godisnje) (A8), any moment now (svakog trenutk^ (CI)
SC (po)misliti
(po)vjerovati
VIII |.+) never (nikad) (Al), for the moment (trenutno) (B3),
for ages (dugo vremena) (B5), at present (trenutno) (C2a),
right now (upravo sad) (C2b), just now (upravo sad) (C3b),
already (vec) (Dl), by then (dotle) (D3)# at that age (u to doba)(E)
finally (konacno (F3), a day later (dan kasnije) (F5)
SC poznavati
SC umjeti E be capable
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IX (-) once before (jednom ranije) (A2), once more (jo.S jednorn)
(A3), almost never (skoro nikad) (A4), a few times (nekoliko
puta) (A5), often (desto) (A6), nearly always (skord uvljek)
(A7), all the time (cijelo vrijeme) (A9).
SC upoznati
X (i) never (nikad) (Al), once before (jednom ranije) (A2),
once more (jo! jednom) (A3), almost never (skord nikad) (A4),
a few times (nekoliko puta)(A5), often (desto) (A6),
nearly always (skord uvijek) (A7), this morning (jutros) (C4),
already (ved) (Dl), all of a sudden (odjed. nom) (Fl)
SC poznati (prepoznati)
XI (-) annually (godisnje) (A8), all the time (cijelo vrijeme) (A9>
all that day (cijeli taj dan) (Bl)
E comprehend
XII (-) annually (godidnje) (A8), all that day (cijeli taj 4an) (Bl),
for the moment (trenutno) (B3), for ages (dugo vremena) (B5)
E grasp
XIII (-) so far (dosad) (B2), from now (odsad) (B4)
E realize
3.3,4 In order to illustrate the interrelationship between the verb-
forms and the time adverbials in both languages we shall have to
establish the difference existing in this respect in E and SC. The
numbers and letters beside the verb forms in SC and E respectively
will then serve to represent them in the illustration.
SC 1 present ('znam')
2 imperfect ('znadjah*) - knew
3 perfect ('znao sam') - knew, have known
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4 aorist (knadoh') - knew
5 pluperfect ('bio sam znao') - had known
6 conditional ('bih znao') - would know
7 future ('4u znati') - will know
E a present ('know')
b preterite ('knew')
c perfect ('have known')
d pluperfect ('had known')
e conditional ('would know')
f future ('will know')
The difference in the number of verb-forms as well as the difference
♦
in meaning of the tenses in the two languages are reflected
significantly in the colligation of the verb-forms and he time
adverbials. (Of the SC tenses, the imperfect is today restricted
mostly to fiction, being less and less used in everyday speech, )
The purpose of the illustration below is to show the extreme com¬
plexity of the differences in the two languages with respect to time
adverbials. It is a rough representation of the contrast between
3
SC znati and E know in their colligation with the time adverbials :
* For example, in translation, the SC imperfect, perfect and a®rist
(of course, with nuances of meaning), would correspond^roughly
to the E preterite. Although the E perfect would mostly be
represented by the SC perfect, the SC perfect may be translated
by the E preterite as also may be the SC perfect and aorist.
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SC TENSE(S) TIME ADVERBIAL(S) - examples
1 2 3 4 5 6 ? nikad (Al)
- 2 3 4 --- --------------- iednom ranije (A2)
1 2 3 4 - 6 7 --------------- jos jednom (A3), gesto (A6)
skoro uvijek (A7) jutros (C4)
--34--- --------------- skoro nikad (A4)
1 2 3 4 - 6 - --------------- nekoliko puta (A5)
1 2 3 4 --- --------------- cijelo vrijeme (A9)
- 2 3 - 5 6 7 --------------- cijeli taj dan (Bl)
1 - 3 4 5 - - --------------- dosad (B2)
1 - 3 - - 6 7 --------------- trenutno (B3), odsad (B4),
poslije toga (F4)
- 2 3 - 5 6 7 --------------- dugo vremena (B5)
------ 7 --------------- svakog trenutka (CI)
1 - 3 - - 6 - --------------- trenutno (C2a)
1 - 3 4 - 6 7 --------------- upravo sad(G3b), upravo sad (C2b)»
konacno (F3)f odjednom (Fl)
--34-6- --------------- poSetkom sedmice (C3a)
1 - - - - 6 7 sve u svoje vrijeme (C5)
1 - 3 - 5 6 7 vec (Dl)
- - 3 - 5 - 7 uoci_(D2)
-- 3 4 5 6 7 --------------- dotle (D3), dan ranije (D4)
1 2 3 - - 6 7 --------------- u to doba (E)
-- 3 4 - 6 7 --------------- dan kaanije (F5)
- - 3 ... 7 --------------- uskoro poslije toga (F2)
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TIME ADVERBIAL(S) - examples
never (Al), almost never (A4),
nearly always (A7), once more (A3),
all the time (A9), already (Dl),
at last (F3), at that age (E),
often (A6), so far (B2)
once before (AZ), earlier this
week (C3a)
all that day (Bl)
for the moment (B3), just now (C3b)
all of a sudden (Fl), this morning
(C4), all in good time (C5)
from now (B4)
right now (C2b), at present (C2a)
for ages (B5), a few times (A5).
on the eve of (D2), a day later (F5l
a day earlier (D4)
by then (D3)
a short while afterwards (F2)
any moment now (CI)
after that (F4)
3. 4 Sentence Construction
The question of sentence constructions relevant for the verbs of
this semantic field will be discussed in five parts:
(a) Imperative
(b) Type of sentence taken by the verb as complement
(c) Type of object required by the verb
(d) V + V construction
(e) Volition (discussed in Chapter V)
3.4. 1 The feature /imperative/ is important for this analysis as
one of the restrictions on substitutability of verbs. For example*
SC shvatiti and E understand are, according to the components they
share, very close in meaning. But an imperative SC sentence with
the verb shvatiti would generally be rendered in English by the form
*
must, should, ought +V :
24. SC Shvati da je izlaz iz ove situacije napu&tanje
Jastrebca. (DS132. 31)
E You must understand that the way out of this
situation is for us to leave Jastrebac. (My tr. )
The following is the list of verbs b£ knowledge and understanding
which can generally occur in the imperative:
SC E
znati upoznati zapaziti be clear believe
cuti nauciti uociti be aware find out
saznati vidjeti see get to know
doznati (po)misliti hear recognize
razumjeti (po)vjerovati learn ('known before*)
shvatiti (pre)poznati discover
biti svjestan otkriti notice
biti jasno primijetiti think
* J. Lyons reminds me that understand can be used in the imperative,
though with restrictions, e.g. 'Understand me well*.
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In Chapter I it was mentioned that know in E, unlike znati in SC ,
is not normally used in the imperative in the construction
V +THAT +Sentence. But it can be so used in the construction
V +Object, and one of the contexts is, for example*that of the teacher
telling his pupil:
25. Know your multiplication tables by Monday.
In SC this would be rendered not by the verb znati. but by the
perfective of the verb u£iti ('learn'). The E verb learn would, of
course, be an alternative here.
The imperative can in SC be expressed (as far as znati is concerned)
not only by the verb in the imperative form, but also by the
construction da +V Pres, with approximately the same meaning as
in the following example:
26. Vojnik ne gine od topa, vec od nepaznje i svoje
lude glave. To da znas. (DS 30. 10)
-It's not bullets that kill a soldier, but carelessness
and loosing his head. You should remember this,
(tr. p. 32)
SC cuti, saznati and doznati, and E hear, learn (in the sense of
gaining information)>make out are not used in the imperative without
a verb like go. or try preceding them, in the form go, try +V Imp.
For example:
27. (a) Idi i cuj (saznaj, doznaj) sta se dogodilo.
- Go and hear (learn) what has happened.
(b) Try and make out what he means.
The reason for (27a) can be found in the fact that all these verbs
share the feature /-Direct information/, which involves the hearer
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obtaining information about a situation not by observing it, but from
somebody's account (discussed on pp.170-189).
The reason for make out being accompanied (preceded) by try seems
to be that this verb presupposes some difficulty of perception or
interpretation, i. e. leaves open a possibility of failure. As we
shall see, this verb is positively specified for the feature /Effort/
(discussed on pp. 189-196).
SC biti sviestan and E be conscious of, otherwise quite close in
meaning, differ with respect to the feature /imperative/. While
the SC verb can be used in this form, the E one cannot. For
example, it is possible to say in SC:
28. Budi sviestan da sam ja take morao da postupim.
- You must realize that I had to act that way.
But the E translation which employs be conscious is hardly acceptable:
*Be conscious that I had to act that way.
*
SC biti jasno and E be clear behave similarly here, forming the
imperative by NEKA + Obj (Dat) +V in SC, and by LET IT +V +Obj
(Dat) in E, therefore both having the characteristics of third person
imperative . Consider the following example:
29. SC Neka ti je jasno da ja necu popustiti.
E Let it be clear to you that I won't give in.
3.4. 2 The question of the type of sentence which a verb can take
as a complement will be discussed on the basis of the following
features: /implied question/, /Direct question/, and /Statement/,
the last cf which is again subdivided into: /Negative/ and
* also used in the imperative form in contexts of 'clarification',
where another alternative would be clarify (in SC raziasniti)
** as in: Neka dodje (let him come)
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/Affirmative/.
The verbs have been tested (with respect to these features) for
seven types of complement clauses, i. e. clauses beginning with the
following conjunctions: da-that (e. g. I know that I am right. ),
da 11-whether (e. g. I always know whether to go or not. )>
zaSto-why (e. g. I know why he went. ), kako-how (e. g. I know how
he feels.), kad-when (e. g. I know when he is coming. ), gdic(kuda)-
where (e. g. I know where you are going. ) and sta-what (e. g. I know
what he thinks. ).
The presentation of the relationships of verbs will be made by indica¬
ting at the head of each group what type of clause they take, for
convenience stating the non-occurrences, since their number is
smaller for most verbs. If a verb varies in its behaviour towards
a certain clause type from component to component, the brackets
beside it will contain either the component of non-occurrence, or
the component of occurrence (preceded by H'X depending on which
number is smaller. If there are no brackets after a verb it means
that it behaves identically throughout.
For easier reference, we shall first present the table of features
and the types of clauses:
/implied question/ (negative)---- ------1 da-that






(A more detailed analysis would have to take into consideration the
tenses of the verbs with each type of clause, since there seem to
be differences in that respect too.)
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In this study the analysis of SC misliti and vjerovati and E think
and believe will be restricted to the sentence construction
V + THAT +Sentence, as the only relevant one. It does not mean,
however, that they cannot enter other constructions as well.






































Group IV: /-Direct question/
SC
spoznati









get to know (/implied question/)
Group VI: (-) Sta-what
In both languages, provided a verb can occurindirect question,
direct question, or statement, it can always take a sta-what-claus e.
The exceptions are SC osjetiti (which does not take this type of clause
in /implied question/), and E feel (which does not take it at all).
Group VII: (-) zasto-why
SC E
osjetiti be conscious (/Negative st. /)
opaziti feel
notic e (/Affirmative statement/ )
perceive (/Direct question/)
Group VIII: (-) kako-how
SC E
osjetiti realize (/Negative st. /)
recognize
feel






Group IX (Cont'd. )
SC
uvidjeti
Group X: (-) gdje(kuda)-where
SC
osjetiti (/ -fAfflrmative st. /)
opaziti













be conscious (/-(Direct question/)
feel
E
realize (/Negative st. /)




grasp (/ -(Implied question/)








From this list it would be relatively straightforward to establish
the status of each verb with respect to the type of clause that they
take, as well as the similarities and differences between them. If
we, for example, take the SC verb spoznati, and the E verb realize.
we shall see that spoznati does not occur in Implied questions and
Direct questions and that it does not take whether-clauses in
Negative statements and Affirmative statements ; while realize
does not occur in Implied questions, and it does not occur with the
following type of clauses in Negative statements; whether-clause,
how-clause, when-clause and where-clause and with when- and
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whether-clauses in Affirmative statements. Thus we have
established that they overlap in Negative statements with that-
clauses and why-clauses and in Affirmative statements with that-.
why, how- and where-clauses.
The E verbs be conscious and be aware are interesting in that they
take the preposition of obligatorily before some complement clauses,
but not others. This also depends on whether the verb is u»d in
Implied questions. Direct questions. Negative statements, or
Affirmative statements. So that be conscious takes _of obligatorily
whenever it is used except with that-clauses and whether-clauses
in Affirmative statements. Be aware takes of obligatorily with
how-, when- and where-clauses in both Negative statements and
Affirmative statements, with why- and whether-clauses in
Affirmative statements and with what-clauses throughout.
3. 4. 3 A note on Factivity and V + Sentence Construction
It has been observed that the verbs of knowledge and understanding
vary in factivity according to the V + Sentence construction that they
enter. The following is the summary of results for the verbs that
can occur in such constructions. The verbs have been tested with
respect to the types of clauses discussed above, i. e. that-, what-,
why-, how-, when-, where- and whether-clauses. The abbrevia¬
tions are: F sfactive, AC a affirmative committal, NC = negative
committal, NF snon-factive. The non-occurrences in the table
indicate that the verb does not normally enter, or (in the case of
misliti/vierovati and think/believe) that the verb is not considered
in such constructions.
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SC that what why how when where whether
znati F,NC F F F F F NF
2uti NF NF NF NF NF NF NF
saznati AC F F F F F NF
doznati AC F F F F F NF
spoznati F F F F F F
razumjeti F, NF F F F F F NF
shvatiti F, NF F F F F F NF
pojmiti F F F F F F NF
biti svjestan F F F F F F NF
biti jasno F F F F F F NF
u£iti NF NF NF NF NF NF NF
vidjeti AC F F F F F NF
uvidjeti F F F F F
misliti NC
vjerovati NC
osjetiti NF NF NF
otkriti AC F F F F F NF
primijetiti AC F F F F F NF
opaziti AC F F F NF
s^paziti AC F F F F F NF
uociti AC F F F F • F NF
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E that what why how when where whether
know F, NC F F F F F NF
understand F,NF F F F F F NF
comprehend F F F F F F
grasp F F F F F F
realize F F F F F F
rocognize F F F F
be clear F F F F F F NF
be conscious AC F F F F F NF
be aware AC F F F F F NF
see AC F F F F F NF
make out AC F F F F F NF
hear NF NF NF NF NF NF NF
learn(obt. inf.) AC F F F F F NF
learn (mem.) NF NF NF NF NF NF NF
discover AC F F F F F NF
feel NF NF
notice AC F F F F F NF
perceive AC F F F F F NF
conceive NC F F F F F
think NC
believe NC
find out AC F F F F F NF
get to know AC F F F F F NF
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3.4.4 The construction V +Obj poses a great many questions with
relation to the verbs of this semantic field. To state merely that
some of these verbs do not take 'concrete' nouns as their objects
is far from being satisfactory or adequate. There still remains a
question of what kind of 'abstract' nouns they take. Also, as has
become obvious, some verbs do not require this distinction at all,
but impose very specific restrictions of an entirely different kind.
Furthermore, the nouns taken as objects impose their own
restrictions on the context in which they occur.
In this study a rather tentative and general picture has been formed
as to what it is that restricts the occurrence of a noun with a
particular verb.
To discuss the question of V +Obj constructions within this semantic
field, we will have to draw upon features which will be defined in
appropriate sections later, and,which, to avoid repetition, will only
be referred to briefly here. All of them, however, involve
presuppositions, so that, when we say, for example, that a verb
has the feature /Complexity/ we mean that the verb presupposes
4
complexity of the referent of the object .
The procedure was to take from the material all the nouns occurring
as objects and ask native speakers to indicate which verbs can be
significantly used with which nouns, irrespective of the change in
meaning. In this test 111 SC and 173 E nouns and nominal
expressions as objects were considered. Objects like something.
nothing, enough, too little, too much and that have also been
included. The tests have shown that these are in fact generalized
enough to be taken as objects by all the verbs in the group.
SC misliti and vjerovati as well as E think and believe will not be
analyzed with respect to this construction, since their relevance
for this analysis is particularly connected with V +THAT +Sentence
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construction.
There are two verbs in SC that occur only in this construction,
namely: poznavati ('know*) and (pre)poznati ('recognize').
Let us, first of all, establish how the verbs differ with respect to
objects marked as /Concrete/ and /Abstract/:
/Concrete/ /Abstract/ /Concrete/ /Abstract/
SC SC E E





razumjeti razumj eti recognize recognize
shvatiti shvatiti be conscious be conscious
pojmiti be aware be aware
biti svjestan biti svjestan see
biti jasno make out
poznavati poznavati hear
(pre)poznati (pre)poznati learn learn






opaziti get to know get to know





The verbs that can have both 'concrete* and 'abstract* objects have,
however, various other restrictions.
SC znati and E know and be aware can take most nouns as their
objects, which clearly relate to their being unspecified for most
restrictions imposed by other verbs. Znati and know seem to differ
in only one respect here: znati could not be used in the translation
of the following passage (relating the meeting of brother and sister
after a long period of time), unless the construction V +Object is
changed into V +that +Sentence.
30. But in the same moment that secret nerve moved,
I knew Lucy, and I was shocked by the voice of
my 'good evening' ...
'Lucy*, I cried, 'have you been ill?'
'You didn't know me', Lucy said. 'I'm not
surprised. ' (P 85. 1)
Know would here have to be translated by poznati, which corresponds
to E recognize, but is narrower in meaning.
It is, however, the relation of SC znati, saznati and doznati. and
E know and learn to the feature: /Direct information/ (see p.170 )
that I would like to discuss briefly here, with particular reference
to the question of their correlation with the prepositions (SC) za and o,
and (E) of and about.
We shall consider a selected number of nouns employed as objects,
and see how these verbs behave in their environment with and without
the prepositions in question. We shall, that is to say, try to
establish under what circumstances the meaning of the verbs is
restricted either to information gained by direct observation or to
information gained from a third source, indirectly. We shall also
try to establish when the meaning of the verbs stays unspecified.
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Thesymbol'+'ignifies/Directinformation/. Noun-),.;obiect pronoun-) SCmi(we) ERobert Ethisnewworld SCdogadjaj(event) Ehisplots SCnjihovlogor (theircamp) SCmagacini(stores) Ehiscondition SCnjegovaprollost (hispast)withoutpreposition /■•/ znatiknow /+/ znati know /+/ znati know /+/ znati,know saznati doznati iti znati know
/-/ learn /-/ saznati doznati learn
Thesymbolignifies/-Directinformation/ prep. /-/ znati saznati doznati /+/ m znati know !±t znati know i.*i znati know /±/ znati knowza-of know learn /-/ saznati doznati learn /-/ saznati doznati learn /-/ saznati doznati learn /-/ saznati doznati learnprep,o-about /+/ m znati saznati doznati ft/ znati know it/ ALL itI ALL ftl znati know
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/-/ saznati doznati learn
iti znati know
/-/ saznati doznati
itl znati know /-/ ALL Itl ALL
l-l saznati doznati learn
From this we can conclude the following:
1. that zpati and know express, in the environment of the
prepositions za and oi_followed by an animate noun as object, informa¬
tion indirectly obtained, i. e. information obtained through somebody
else and not by direct, personal observation. Otherwise they are
generally unspecified with respect to the feature /Direct informa¬
tion/. Consider the following examples:
3i. (a) Znajuci za niegovu patniu (...) ljudi su prelazili
preko toga i cutali. (DS 35.13)
Knowing what he had suffered (...) the men did
not go further than this and kept quiet, (tr. p. 37)
(b) On zna za magacine. bolnice. bez njega odred ne
moze da obstane. (DS 388.4)
He knows where the stores are, and theihospital,
the company couldn't survive without him.
(tr. p. 369)
(c) Po njihovom izgledu cinilo mu se da oni vec
znaju za odluke koje namerava da im saopsti.
(DS140. 22)
From their appearance it seemed to him that
they already knew the decision about which he
intended to inform them. (tr. p. 138)
(d) Budocnost nece znati za nas. (DS 64.17)
The future will not know of us. (My tr.)
(e) What astonished us was that Bill had known of
his condition when he took the cottage. (P259. 19)
(We can take it for granted that in31(a,b,c) the possible translation
may be rendered in the form V +of +Object rathenthan V +Sentence
or V +Object. )
If we look closely how znati and krc-y relate to the feature /Direct
information/ we shall be able to see that in all but (3Id) they can
be marked as unspecified. (31 d) is marked /-Direct information/.
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There seem to be at least two reasons for this. One is that the
object is animate, which seems to influence the distinction, and
the other is the contemporaneity of the events referred to by the
subject and object. This second reason also holds true for the
verbs saznati. doznati and learn. In (31d) the subject and the
object are non-contemporaneous: Subject/HFuture/-Object/-Future/.
Consider further two examples for contemporaneity.
32. (a) PoSto Nikola nije bio saznao za dogadjai sa
Acorn Vuk mu u nekoliko rijeci isprica.
(adapted original DS192. 14)
Since Nikola had not learnt about Aca, Vuk
told him in a few words what had happened.
(My tr.)
(b) Pavie (...) nije ni sam znao njegovu pro^lost
i zanimanje.
Paul himself did not know his past or his
occupation. (My tr.)
While in (32b) the subject and the object may but need not be
contemporaneous, in (32a) they are non-contemporaneous:
(32a): Subject/-Past/---------Object/-tPast/
(32b): Subject/^ Past/--------Object/ +Past/
2. It is also interesting to notice ;hat the noun news is itself
marked / -Direct information/ and, taken as object, would
influence the context to be invariably marked as such. For example:
33. 'Znate li za nove vest! sa fronta?' (DS 20. 20)
'Dn ymi know tha latest n»ws from the Front?'
(my tr.)
3. As can be seen from the chart above on pp. 70-72 # sC
cay.nati anrf Hnmati and E Iftam are marked /-Direct information/
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when they are followed by the prepositions za andjaf. The fact
that they are / -(-Perfective/ in these contexts, as well as the fact
that the prepositions za and of, as opposed to o and about, can
indicate a very slight amount of information, may provide an
explanation for this phenomenon.
I will now proceed to list the features figuring as restrictions of
verbs on their objects. These restrictions are generally the
same as those established for a whole context. As always, it
should be stressed that the restrictions established here have been
encountered within the material at hand, so that some significant
ones may have been left unnoticed.













-Direct information/: (abstract nouns: not those implying




doznati get to know
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otkriti (concrete and abstract) discover (concrete and abstract)
make out (abstract)
find out (abstract)

























XII / +Memory: Cumulative/ (see p. 169) (abstract)
SC E
(na)uciti learn
XIH / +Persuasion/ ( see p. 1^3 ) (abstract)
SC E
uvidjeti realize




XV / +Distinguished object/ (concrete and abstract)
SC
zapaziti
Only a small group of verbs of this semantic field can take the
word lartgnago (in general), or the name of any language (in






While (na)uciti and learn are in most contexts consequentially
related to the rest of he group, i. e.
understand
the remaining four are contemporaneous with respect to each other.
In these contexts razumjeti and understand relate to znati and know
in a significantly different way from their relationship otherwise.
As we shall see later, (see p. 154 ) razumieti and understand in
other contexts signify a higher degree of knowledge, involving
reasoning and analysis. The difference between such contexts and
the ones involving language is obvious in the following examples:
What is significant here is that the values are reversed as to what
degree of knowledge is considered necessary for a successful
performance of an individual. With respect to 'language contexts'
like (34b), the notion 'performance' can, however, be divided into
the performance of an individual as a hearer, and the perform, nee
of him as a speaker. Understanding a language can be a successful
performance for a person as a hearer, whereas for a successful
performance as a speaker he must both understand and speak a
language.
In contexts like (34a) the required performance is of a different
nature in that no distinction need necessarily be made in terms of
speaker and hearer. In such contexts, however, understanding





34(a) I know the answer but I don't understand it.
(b) I understand Spanish but I don't know it. (I
can't speak it. )
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The relationships of (34a) and(34b) can be represented in a diagram
as follows:
razumjeti
; j +per£ormajive:jiearer/ (lower degree)understand
'Spanish'
znati : / +Performative:hearer and speaker/ (higher degree)
know
: / +Performative:hearer or speaker/ (lower degree)
'the answer'
: / +Performative:hearer or speaker/ (higher degree)
This relationship holds true for sentences like (34a-b) above where
one clause is affirmative and the other negative. Notice that,
because of this difference in the degree of knowledge in (34a) and
(34b), it is impossible to negate the first clause and make the
second one affirmative. However, it is possible to make both
clauses in (34a-b) affirmative and still preserve the difference in
the degree of knowledge, by stressing the conjunction:
35. (a) I know the answer and 1 understand it.
(b) I understand Spanish and I know it (and I can
speak it).
3.4. 5 And, finally, we should briefly mention the V +V construe*
tion, characteristic of sons verbs in this group,namely SC umieti.
moci, bitl u staniu and biti sposoban. and E can, be able and
be capable. We can call them 'Skill verbs'. As such they require
another verb to express the kind of ability being referred to
(i. e. I am able to swim. I am not able to think). SC znati and
(na)u£iti and E know and learn also occur in these contexts. The
difference between SC znati and the E know here is that know takes
how obligatorily, while with znati, kako occurs optionally in 'skill'








36. SC Znao sam (kako) da mu odgovorim.
E I knew how to answer him.
The V +V construction comes in SC in the form: V(present or past)
+ da +V (present), and in E in the form: V(present or past) +V (inf)
(except for be capable of, which comes in the form: V(present or
past) +of +pres«it participle).
Further differences between the 'skill verbs' will be discussed in
the appropriate section (see p. 197 ).
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FOOTNOTES
1, It will be noted that I have distinguished between postatl svicstan.
postati iasno. and biti svjestan, biti jasno in SC and also between
become and be conscious - clear * aware, since they obviously
involve different aspectual features. So, for example, while
become clear can have either the feature /Process/ or the
feature /Event/, be clear can be either /State/ or /Event/. In
SC, however, there is also an aspectual difference between
postati (perfective) and postajatl (imperfective), so that the first
can figure as /Process/ or /Event/, while the second is only
marked as /Process/.
2. J. Lyons suggests that the criterion for the subfeature
/Repetitive/ could be the fact that it is possible to use verbs
marked for this feature in complements of keep, for example:
'I keep hearing that he is ill*.
3, It may well be that there are particular situations in which some
of the collocations of adverbials with particular tenses here
said to be unacceptable might occur. I am assuming, however,
that at least the more usual range of occurrence is covered by
my informants' responses.
4. It must be borne in mind throughout this section (and indeed
throughout the whole study) that the restrictions found to apply
significantly to the items of this semantic field might not have
any bearing on (and might even be opposite to) the requirements




A: How often? Frequency of occurrence
Al: non-occurrence: never (nikad)
A2: single occurrence: once before (jednom ranije)
A3: fresh occurrence: once more (jos jednom)
A4: rare occurrence: almost never (skoro nikad)
A5: occasional occurrence: a few times (nekoliko puta)
A6: frequent occurrence: often (cesto)
A7: usual occurrence: almost always (skoro uvijek)
A8: regular occurrence: annually (godi&nje)
A9: How often? How Long? continuous occurrence: all the
time (cijelo vrijeme)
B: How long? Restricted duration
Bl: limits of duration explicit or known: all that day (cijeli
ta.i dan)
B2: end-point of duration known: so far (dosad)
B3: contemporaneous present: for the moment (trenutno)
B4: beginning point of duration known: from now on (odsad)
B5: limits of duration net known: for ages (dugo vremena)
C: When? Time reference explicit
CI: in future: any moment now (svakog trenutka)
C2: in present: (a) contemporaneous: at present (trenutno)
(b) simultaneous: right now (upravo sad)
C3: in past: (a) removed, specified time: earlier this week
(pocetkom sedmice)
(b) recent: just now (upravo sad)
C4: in daytime period: this morning (jutros)
C5: unspecified as to past, present or future: all in good time
(sve u svoje vrijeme)
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APPENDIX - continued
D, E, F: When? Require previously explicit time reference
D: Time referred to precedes explicit time reference
Dl: non-specific overall: already (vec)
D2: immediate: on the eve of (uoci)
D3: end point known: by then (dotle)
D4r specific: a day earlier (dan ranije)
E: Time referred to is simultaneous with explicit time reference:
at that age (u to doba)
F: Time referred to follows explicit time reference
Fl: immediate* nan-specific: all of a sudden fodiednom)
F2: removed non-specific: a short while afterwards (uskoro
posliie toga)
F3: end-point known: findly (konaSno)
F4: overall period: after that (posliie toga)




4,1 One of the most significant characteristics of language
expression is without doubt modality. Although* in its broadest
sense* it is by no means confined to verbs* in this study we shall
focus our attention on the SC and E verbs of knowledge and under¬
standing in order to see how modality is reflected in the network of
their sense-relations.
The concept of modality is a very complex one. It can be expressed
overtly by modal verbs like can, be able, may, but it can also be
present and affect various other expressions in language, for
example those that signify intention or volition. Furthermore, as
will be seen* its presence can be inherent in a verb, and that* in
fact* is the type of modality that we shall concentrate on in this
study.
Perhaps at this point we could proceed to ask and try to find an
answer to the question: what does modality involve?
In his article 'A Note on Modality in English (Modals and 'Pseudo-
Modals,)t* (mimiographed, forthcoming) M, A, K. Halliday distin¬
guishes between 'pseudo-modality1 and 'modality-proper' with
respect to the modal auxiliaries can, could, may, might, will.
would, should, must, ought to and need. His distinction is based
on the fact that these modal verbs can be employed in language either
some
to express a comment on/content or to serve as part of a content.
He labels these notions 'modality-proper* and 'pseudo-modality*
respectively. To quote Halliday: 'Whereas in the modals the process
is qualified by an assessment of the speaker, in the pseudo-modals
the qualifying factor is in the situation (or* better, in the thesis). '
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Being part of the content* 'pseudo-modals' have tense* while
'modals-proper', as comments* are tenseless. The difference between
'pseudo-modals' and 'modals-proper' is reflected in the ambiguity
of John could have done it (Halliday's example)* which 'can be
interpreted either modally 'possibly John did it' or pseudo-modally
'John would have been able to do it'.'
Halliday then concludes as follows: 'There are thus grounds for
considering that, while a number of different meanings need to be
recognized to account for the various uses of theimodal auxiliaries*
the distinction between 'true' modality* as an aspect of 'speaker's
comment* deriving from the interpersonal function of language} and
•pseudo-modality', which is part of the material of the content and
derives from the factual-notional* or 'experiential* function of
language* is the most significant of the distinctions that can be
*
made.'
But what is particularly important (and Halliday does not overlook
the fact) is that the two types of modality can overlap to a very great
extent: 'This is not to suggest a sharp boundary between them;
there are many areas where pairs of language functions overlap and
interact* and this is one of them. It is not difficult to understand
that modality and pseudo-modality show overlapping realisations;
the modalities of the 'real world' and those of the speaker's
estimation have much in common. '
However, very often the difference between two kinds of pseudo-
modality is contextually neutralised, that is to say* they are brought
together in a linguistic expression in such a way that it becomes
irrelevant in the context whether one or the other kind of modality
is involved. I am here thinking of expressions which for the most
part do not employ modal auxiliaries. For example in (1) it is not
* See also Halliday (1970).
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made explicit whether comprehension (or failure to comprehend)
was due to the speaker's powers of comprehension or to some
property of the external situation to which he is referring:
1. 1 understood (didn't understand) what he was saying.
The point here is that in some contexts what actually happened is
more important than the factors that have (or have not) brought it
about: in this example whether possibility or ability is the cause.
Furthermore, two or more factors can be equally influential during
a certain action. Contextual neutralisation is, in general, a
phenomenon not to be overlooked in language analysis. (See Lyons
(1968 : 453))
Halliday's distinction between modality and pseudo-modality depends
basically, therefore, upon whether the speaker is commenting upon
a situation or participating in it. It seems to me, that participating
in and commenting upon are related to each other not merely as
'having much in common', as Halliday puts it, but also in that
participating is in some instances included in commenting in the
following sense. While participating involves the participant and
the situation, the commenting involves the commentator, the
participant and the situation. (This, of course, does not mean that
the commentator and the participant cannot refer to one and the
same person. That is one of the reasons why the distinction between
the speaker and the subject of a sentence is necessary. We shall
come back to this distinction when discussing the feature /Speaker's
knowledge/* (see p.94 ).)
4. 2 The relationship between various kinds of modality is also
discussed by Geoffrey N. Leech (1969). Discussing features of
pseudo-modality such as 'permission', 'obligation*, 'ability*,
'possibility' and 'necessity', he comes to the conclusion that 'we
may go so far as to claim, in fact, that 'possibility' and 'necessity' logi¬
cally include 'permission' and 'obligation' - that 'permission' is a
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particular kind of 'possibility', and 'obligation' a particular kind
of 'necessity'. So:
'1 am permitted to $>pen this letter' implies 'It is possible
for me to open this letter'.
'I am obliged to open this letter' implies 'It is necessary
for me to open this letter'.' (1969: 218)
*
It is also evident that causation implies possibility:
2. 'I made John realiae that he should work hard' implies
'It was possible for John to realise that he should work
hard'.
This relation of logical implication, however, does not hold between
possibility and some other kinds of 'pseudo-modality', namely
intention and volition:
3. 'I try to know everything that is going on' does not
necessarily imply 'It is possible for me to know
everything that is gchg on'.
4. 'I want John to leam history' does not necessarily
imply 'It is possible for John to learn history'.
The relationships of phrases in (2), (3) and (4) are, however,
essentially different. In (3) and (4) the first expression is unspec¬
ified with relation to 'permission'. The first expression in (2)
is inverse of the second (see also Leech (1969:208)), since
'possibility' implies choice and 'causation' does not.
At this point attention should be drawn briefly to the fact that
contextual neutralisation (mentioned above) depends on the relation
* Leech (1969:208) distinguishes between 'weak causation' (i. e,
'permission') and 'strong causation' which is expressed by verbs
like make or compel. I am using the term 'causation* in the
latter sense here.
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of implication. That is to say, two aspects of modality can be
neutralised in a context only if one implies the other. In 'I didn't
understand what he was saying', 'I wasn't capable of understanding
him' implies 'It was impossible for me to understand him'.
4. 3 What is, then, the answer to our question: what does modality
involve? A broad and general answer would be the following:
(a) It, first of all, involves factors like the speaker and
(what Halliday calls) a content;
(b) It involves, in a very significant way, the distinction
between the speaker and the subject of the sentence;
(c) It reflects the distinction between the speaker as a
commentator and the speaker as a participant;
(d) As a result of (c) (i. e. the division of the speaker's role)
it is possible to express linguistically either a comment
on a situation or participation in a situation on the part
of the speaker. (Rather than adopting Halliday's
terminology, we shall refer to these two phenomena as
objective and subjective modality respectively.)
(e) Contextual neutralisation of different kinds of modality
is the result of two kinds of modality standing in relation
of implication.
(f) Some aspects of modality do not necessarily stand in
relation of implication.
4.4 Before we go on to discuss subjective modality in detail, we
shall merely exemplify one aspect of subjective modality, i. e.
'possibility*.
The overt form by which 'possibility' is most clearly expressed is
'can ' or 'it is possible to '. On examination it was
found that all the verbs of this semantic field can occur in such
environment. Here are the most obvious examples of 'possibility'
found in the material:
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5. (a) U zoru, ni on ni ostali partizani nisu mogli znati da
li zbog neopreznosti i nepaznje, pogire&no ocenjenog
polo£aja ill ne£eg drugog, £eta je uletela u nema£ku
zasedu. (DS152. 23)
- At dawn, the platoon fell right into a German ambush -
neither he nor the others could tell whether it was due
to carelessness or inattention, a false estimate, of
their position, or some other cause, (tr. p. 150)
(b) Psiholozi odavna poklanjaju pa^nju jezi£kim pojavama
smatrajuci da se preko njih mo2e na.jpouzdanije doznati
ono sto je neposredan predmet psiholo&kih studija. (PL120. 2)
- The psychologists started paying attention to linguistic
phenomena long ago, in the belief that through them one
could learn most definitely what is the immediate subject
of psychological studies, (my tr.)
" (c) Izbori, naravno, nisu zakazani ddmah posle osnivanja
Kraljevine Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca (...) jer Aleksandru
niie odmah bilojasno na koje 6e sve ljude moci da se
osloni. (NIN62)
- The elections were, of course, not announced immediately
after the foundation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and
Slovenes, since it was not immediately clear to Alexander
which men he could rely on. (my tr.)
(d) Moze neko da ga prepozna. (DS162. 27)
* It was possible that someone there would recognize him.
(tr. p. 159)
(e) We could not know that events within a few years would
prove the southern ape to be the human ancestor.
(AG28. 12)
(f) Say that the children cannot know what they are talking
about until they have lived their lives. (P40. 7)
(g) And I could not know how that break would affect her.
(P304. 19)
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(h) I could not understand then, as I do now, that to the old,
a broken marriage is little more than a broken knee
in a child. (P85. 25)
(i) No one can understand that private quality of life )
who has not known it in himself. (P99. 12)
(j) 'It is impossible for her to understand me or me to
argue with her. ' (P141. 25)
(k) I moved among the crowd with that sense of separateness
and importance which one perceives still in young men at
that critical age. (P141. 30)
In (5) it is shown thaf'possiblity' can be expressed covertly as
well. See examples (5c) and (5k). It is obvious that the rest of
the examples in (5) can also be switched over to the covert form,
but as a result an ambiguity between 'possibility' and 'ability' would
arise. The obvious disambiguation, where necessary, is achieved
by overt forms of expressing 'possibility'.
4. 5 Now that we have summarised in general terms what the
concept of modality involves, and exemplified one aspect of it, i. e.
'possibility', we can go on to examine some particular aspects of
subjective modality, trying to concentrate on those that have emerged
in the analysis of the verbs of knowledge and understanding, within
the limits of data collected.
I will give my own examples where necessary, to compensate for
the lack of the appropriate ones in the material.
Since these aspects of modality can be recognised as features that
the verbs have in common, or can be distinguished by, in this study
I will refer to them by this term.
4. 5. 1 We have seen above, in Chapter IV, that the speaker's role
in the system of modality is highly relevant and central. We have
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also mentioned that because of this role it was necessary to distinguish
between the speaker and the subject of the sentence. The distinction
is normally neutralised in contexts where both the speaker and the
subject of a sentence are in the first person singular or plural.
However, since we are not able, in the majority of cases, to express
a collective judgement (assessment) of a situation, the first person
plural is less readily accepted to indicate the role of commentator.
This leaves us with the first person singular which can represent
both the speaker and the subject of the sentence.
6. (a) I didn't know John then.
The person referred to by 'I' is both the speaker and the subject of
the sentence. But, let us examine the same sentence changing only
one item, namely 'I':
6. (b) You (singular)





It is obvious that the speaker and the subject of the sentence are
most clearly distinguished in (6b) and (6e) where the subject of the
sentence is in the second person singular and plural. These are,
in particular, cases of the hearer's direct involvement. By
•direct' I mean the involvement resulting in the hearer being
addressed by the speaker.
If considered as 'reported* or 'direct' speech, (6b) and (6e) can
be phrased as follows:
6. (g) I said to him (them): 'You didn't know John then'.
Here the distinction between the speaker ('I') and the subject of
the sentence ('You') is explicitly marked. The distinction is
explicitly retained even if (6g) is phrased as 'indirect* speech:
'I said to him (them) that he (they) hadn't known John then (at that
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time).'
(6«) is interesting in hat it is possible in some cases to interpret
*he' both as the speaker and the subject of the sentence. Admittedly,
this interpretation is perhaps more frequent in literary works. If
an author, for example, is writing an autobiographical novel he may
choose to express his own experiences, thoughts and comments in¬
directly, by the third person singular. Undoubtedly, this means
an at least partial detachment, which in turn can lead to the
separation of the speaker and the subject of the sentence, but that
separation is fictitious in the sense that the speaker and the subject
of the sentence still have the same reference. A particularly good
example of the interchangeability of the first and the third person
singular, in which the referential identity is retained, can be found
in Giinther Grass's novel 'The Tin Drum', where Oscar is referred
to as either '2' or 'he': '1 had no need to calm down for I was
already calm, awaiting things to come in a state of almost complete
seH-immersion.To be perfectly truthful, Oscar gave barely a thought
to what the future might hold in store, for he required no distraction.
Let us say, then, that he was not waiting but just sitting at his desk,
pleasantly aware that his drum was where it belonged and otherwise
preoccupied with the clouds behind paschcally polished window-
panes (...) Tearing myself away from the clouds which obviously
had no school that day, I leapt to my feet, pulled my drum sticks
out from under my suspenders, and loudly, emphatically drummed
out the time of the song.1 (pp. 74-75) (translated from the German
by Ralph Manheim, published by Penguin Books).
hi everyday speech, however, the referential identity of the
speaker and the third person singular as the subject of the sentence
is less usual, although possible. For example, it is possible to
imagine a situation where, in a group of people, A overhears B
asking C: 'Has A heard the news?', to which A himself answers
•Yes, he has! •
The subject of (6d) implies that one of the group referred to by
•We' is the speaker. Taking for granted that a common assessment
of a situation has taken place, it (the assessment) is reported by
one speaker. The same holds true for (6f): the speaker is one of
the group referred to by'They' in the same kind of context as the
one mentioned in connection with (6e).
Having thus established that various interpretations are possible for
the subject of the sentence in the third person singular and plural
and in the first person plural with relation to the role of the speaker,
let us grant the following:
I The most usual, or most readily acceptable assump¬
tion is that the speaker is referred to by the first person singular;
If The notion of the speaker's role is normally one of
singularity rather than plurality;
HI The distinction between the speaker and the subject
of the sentence is most readily observable when the subject of the
sentence is in the second person singular or plural.
4. 5. 2 On the basis of what has been said so far we can assert
(what is well recognized in linguistic theory) that the speaker (or
•ego') is the central figure in the modal system of language
expression. But what about the hearer?
From the examples given above (6a-f) we can conclude, first of
all, that he is identifiable as referentially identical with the subject
in the second person singular and plural, and, secondly, that he is
only then explicitly referred to. The referential non-identity is
implied when the subject of the sentence is in the first and the third
person singular and in the third person plural, but it is not implied
in the first person plural.
We shall here restrict our attention to the notion of hearer in cases
where he is referred to explicitly, i. e. when the subject of the
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sentence is in the second person singular or plural.
4. 6 Closely related to the notion of centrality of the speaker's role*
and indeed dependent on it* is the feature to which we shall refer as
/Speaker's knowledge/. It is a presupposition which is inherent in
some verbs and only contextual in others. * It can be best
explained by examining a few examples from both languages:
7. (a) 'ZnaJ li ti da je danas Neva Godina?' (DS39. 21)
*
- 'Do you know that it is New Year's Day to-day?' (my tr. )
(b) 'Stiglo pismo od tate. I znas &ta pise, U£o?' (DS324. 23)
- 'I had a letter from your father. And do you know
what he says, Prof ?' (tr. p. 310)
(c) 'ZnaaS Ita bih radio?' - §apnu Silja Vuksanu, (DS335. 23)
- 'Do you know what I'd like to do?', whispered Silja
to Vuksan. (tr. p. 320)
(d) 'Znas li ti, bre, Sta si uSinio s nama? Znas li ti:
da Vuk nekad nije bio 'sokolovac', svi bi mi propali
zbog tebe.' (DS225. 35)
- 'Do you know what you did to us ? And do you know
this: if Vuk hadn't been a member of the 'Sokol' (Falcon)
gymnastic club before the war, we'd have all had it
because of you. ' (tr, p. 217-218)
(e) 'Znate sta, ljudi', - nastavi Djordje, 'sfala na stranu,
sve me neSto golica da joj veSeras kucnem na prozor. '
(DS380. 4)
- 'I'll tell you what, chaps', continued George, 'joking
apart, it would just tickle my fancy to tap on her
window to-night. ' (tr. p. 361)
(f) 'Ne kazem, druMe Pavle, da su drugarice kukavice. Pa
zna$ i sam: £ene su 2ene! ' (DS78. 10)
* The Heppell-Mihajlovic translation 'Do you know, (...), it's
New Year'8 Day to-day?* (p. 4l) did not seem quite adequate.
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- 'I never said the girls were cowards, Comrade Paxil.
But you know yourself: women are women.' ' (tr. p. 79)
(g) 'And do you know where Master Robert is now?'
(P. 319. 31)
(h) 'Don't you realize that you might lose us the election?'
(P. 155. 34)
(i) 'But, Uncle Tom, you don't realize - '(... )* He doesn't
care one farthing for Tolbrook or you.' (P. 329.43)
(j) 'Don't you know ribs don't bendj?' (P. 107. 39)
(k) 'Don't you see that Lucy enjoyed it?' (P. 100. 29)
(1) I notice a half crown lying on the pavement, but 1 do
not realize that the boy has dropped it. (P. 189. 18)
(m) 'Did you run away from us to scrub floors ?'
'Ch, no. Tommy, you know why I ran away - •
'Lucy, you don't really mean to marry that man. '
'That is for God to say. '
'You mean for him, Brown, to say. Do you know what
he is with women ?' (P. 59. 35)
Let us first consider (7g). Tli s sentence, considered in isolation
from the context of situation, can be interpreted in two ways:
the person asking the question knows where Master Robert is (and
is offering to convey that information to his audience) or he does
not (and he is seeking the information). Unless the context of
situation is provided we will not be able to deduce from the sentence
itself whether the speaker is willing to impart information or
whether he is seeking it. (But see be aware, p. 151 )
Within the dialogue (7m), the sentence 'Do you know what he is
with women?' indicates certainly that the speaker possesses the
information and the question itself may be taken as the initiation
of a further stage in the dialogue during which the speaker will
reveal to the hearer what he knows. But, outside the context of
situation, the sentence is neutral as to one or the other interpretation.
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There are, however, instances of unambiguous sentences even out¬
side the context of situation. If we look at examples (7a - e)
we shall be able to observethat znati and know unambiguously
reveal that the speaker possesses the knowledge. The possession
of knowledge is indeed strongly suggested here since the speaker is
expressing his own thoughts ((7c), (7e) ), his own experience
( (7b), (7d) ), or acknowledging some objective fact (7a). Notice
that, if we replaced 'you' by 'he* and 'us' by 'them' in the first
sentence of (7d), that sentence would immediately become
unspecified with relation to the feature /Speaker's knowledge/.
Or, if we replaced *1' by 'he' in (7c), that sentence, too, would
become unspecified. Thus the centrality of the speaker becomes
crucial here, since the reference to his own thoughts and
experience assigns to the context and the verb itself the feature
/Speaker's knowledge/. It indicates, consequently, that, as far
as he, the speaker, is concerned, such information is, of
necessity more reliable than, for example, information obtained
by hearsay. To rephrase it, we can conclude that direct involve¬
ment of the speaker, expressed linguistically to refer to his own
thoughts or experiences, automatically influences such an
expression towards the positive specification with relation to
/Speaker's knowledge/.
But, by this we have not accounted for (7a), since it expresses
neither thoughts nor experience of the speaker. It is obvious that
the speaker knows that 'it's New Year's Day to-day*, or else he
would not have been in a position to ask this question. But is. this
interpretation really the only one? Examples readily spring to
mind in support of the argument that it is not. For example, two
men lost in a forest for months without means of communication
with civilization may start wondering eventually what date it is,
unless they have kept a record. One of them says: 'It's New
Year's Day to-day.* ', the other answers incredulously: 'Do you
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know that it's New Year's Day today (i. e. 'have you kept a record'),
or are you just guessing?' The stress on know here would
emphasize the doubt of the speaker and the contrast between know
and guess.
But why is it more difficult to accept the second interpretation?
First of all, the normal setting of (7a) is, broadly speaking, a society
in which a time record is kept and available to its members. That
could be a non-linguistic, situational explanation, but is there a
linguistic explanation for it?
Linguistically, we can argue that certain expressions in language
reflect, normally, factuality rather than speculation. Such
expressions are that-clauses preceded by a factive verb like know
(except where know is explicitly or implicitly contrasted with some
other verb indicating less than complete certainty). (The relation
of the verbs of knowledge and understanding and various types of
clauses has been discussed above, see p. ^9 ), This argument,
if not the only one, is one of those that go a long way towards
explaining language phenomena related to expressions like (7a).
(7f) is similar to (7a) but it also reflects the speaker's experience,
as well as the implication 'I know that you know, I'm merely
reminding you of it', which is rendered and stressed by the
presence of the pronoun 'yourself' (SC 'i sam').
Before we go on to look at the rest of the examples under (7), it is
necessary to examine the verbs more closely in order to see how
they behave when they are followed by different types of clauses,
We have seen how know and znati behave with a that-clause, and
with a whaf-clause. But what about whether-, howr> why.?,where-,
when-clauses ? Also, do they behave in the same way in direct
questions and in negative statements ? And how is the rest of
the group related?
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The verbs have been tested by adding 'neither do I' and 'I do' at
the end of the direct question, and 'neither dolffc 'but I do' at the
end of the negative statement.
It has been found that, with five exceptions, the verbs behave in the
same way in direct questions and negative statements. That is to
say, the context containing them will in both cases either presuppose
the feature /Speaker's knowledge/, or not, depending on the
specification of the verb with respect to this feature. It also seems,
that some of the verbs are, with some clauses, negatively specified.
The tests have shown that a large number of verbs of this group are
unspecified with respect to /Speaker's knowledge/ when followed by
























8(a) SC (i)Jesi li ti cuo da (da li, *asto, kad)
je on dosao?
(ii) Ja ni*am ;... ?
(it) Ja jesam .... ?
# e • •
• see
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E (i) Have you heard that (whether, why, when)
he came?
(ii) I haven't ... ?
(iii) I have .... ?
(b) SC (i) Jesi li 2uo Ita se dogodilo?
(ii) Ja nisam ... ?
(iii) Ja jesam ... ?
CO Jesi li duo kako (gdje) se to dogodilo?
Vv) Ja nisam ... ?
(jji) Ja jesam ... ?
E (i) Have you heard what has happened?
(ii) I haven't ,,, ?
(iii) I have .,. ?
(i) Have you heard hew (where) that happened?
(ii) I haven't .,. ?
(iii) I have ... ?
(Since it is assumed that, apart from the exceptions which will be
discussed below, the verbs behave similarly in direct questions
and negative statements, examples have been given in the form of
a direct question. )
Tested by the same method, the rest of the verbs of this subgroup
will also prove to be unspecified for the feature /Speaker's
knowledge/.
GROUP II
The verbs of Group II do not readily take whether-clauses in direct
questions and statements. They are positively specified for this


















Shvatas li ti da je to opasan posao?
* Ja ne shvatam ... ?
Ja shvatam ... ?
Do you understand that that job is dangerous ?
*1 don't ... ?
I do ... ?
Shvatas li ti sta (kako, zasto, gdje, kad)
se to dogodilo?
Ja ne shvatam ... ?
Ja shvatam ?





(ii) I don't ... ?
(iii) I do ... ?
GROUP III
These verbs do not take whether*clauses in direct question and











(ii) * I don't ... ?
(iii) I do ... ?
that happened?
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(In a different kind of context, a context meaning 'to acknowledge',
recognize would prove to have the same characteristics.)
GROUP IV
There are two verbs in E that do not take whether-clauses, but are
otherwise unspecified for this feature. These are be conscious and
conceive.
Examples:
11. (a) (i) Are you conscious that this light is too bright?
(ii) I am not ... ?
(iii) I am ... ?
(b) (i) Can you conceive that it would be good for him
to work hard?
(ii) I can ... ?
(iii) I can't ... ?
(The behaviour of these two verbs in other types of clauses may
easily be verified. )
GROUP V
SC uvidjeti does not take whether-clauses and when-clauses.
Otherwise it is similar to SC biti svjestan and E realize and
recognize in that it is positively specified with respect to /Speaker's
knowledge/. For example:
12. (i) UvidjaS li da mi moramo uspjeti?
(ii)* Ja ne uvidjam ... ?
(iii) Ja uvidjam ... ?
- Do you realize that we must succeed?
GROUP VI
SC opaziti does not take why-clauses, but it behaves otherwise like
the verbs of Group I. For example:
13. (a) (i) Opazas li ti da je ona tuzna?
(ii) Ja ne opazam ... ?
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(iii) Ja opazam ... ?
- Do you notice that she is sad?
(b) (i) Opa£as li ti £ta se oko nas dogadja?
(ii) Ja ne opaSam ... ?
(iii) Ja opazam ... ?
- Do you notice what's going on around us?
The exceptions are the following:
GROUP VII
SC znati and E know seem to behave differently with whether-clauses
in direct questions and those in negative statements:












Zna§ li ti da li je on doSao?
Ja ne znam ... ?
* Ja znam ... ?
Do you know whether he has arrived?
I don't .... ?
* I do .... ?
On ne zna da li je to ispravno.
Ni ja ne znam.
Ali ja znam.




SC saznati and doznati in direct questions presuppose that the speaker
has not got the information, while it is not quite certain whether they
can, in these clauses, in negative statements, presuppose speaker's
knowledge. The usage would certainly be unusual. For example:
15. (a) (i) Jesi li saznao da li je on doSao?
(ii) Ja nisam ... ?
(iii) * Ja jesam ... ?
Have you learnt whether he has arrived?
(b) (i) On nije saznao da li je Jovan dosao.
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(ii) ?Ali ja jesam.
(iii) Nisam ni ja.
He has not learnt whether John has arrived.
GROUP IX
SC apoznati. as we have seen already (see p. 62 ).» does not occur
in direct questions. In negative statements it is positively
specified for /Speaker's knowledge/ and it does not take whether-
clauses. In this it is the same as Group III and Group V.
This verb, however, is seldom, if at all, used in everyday speech,
but is confinedmostly to literary criticism and fiction. Also, it
is more usual in V +0 sentence construction (e.g. Spoznao je
istinu. - He realized what the truth was. ) For want of a better
example, here is the following:
16. (i) On ne spoznaj.e gdje to vodi.
(ii) Ja spoznajem.
(iii)*Ni ja ne spoznajem.
- He doesn't realize what that's leading to.
Still, probably the most usual V +Sentence construction for this
verb is V +that-clause:
17. On ne spoznaje da to vodi u propast.
- He doesn't realize that it leads to destruction.
GROUP X
SC biti svlestan does not take whether-clauses in direct question
and negative statement. Otherwise, it seems to be positively
specified for this feature in direct question and also negative
statement with all but first person subject. For example:-
18. (a) (i) Jesi li ti svjestan da je on doSao?
(ii) *Ja nisam ... ?
(iii) Ja jesam ... ?
- Do you realize that he has arrived?
(b) (i) On nije svjestan da je taj posao oposan.
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(ii) *Nisam ni ja,
(ill) Ali ja jesam.
He doesn't realize that that job is dangerous,
(c) (i) Ja nisam svje»tan sta da radirojj
(")
(iii)
I don't know what to doi
We have tried here to establish the specification of these verbs for
the feature /Speaker's knowledge/ , and we have noticed a few
interesting facts. One is that (not surprisingly) that*clause can
have a different effect on the meaning cf the context from all the
other clauses. By this I mean that a verb can be positively specified
with relation to the feature /Speaker's knowledge/ with that-clauses
and not with any of the others. This indicates that what-, how-,
why-, where- and when-clauses presuppose a that-clause. That
is to say, 'what happened' presupposes 'that it happened'; 'how,
why, where, when it happened' presupposes 'that it happened',
(Of course, this is restricted to these clauses preceded by factive
verbs, or affirmative commital verbs in affirmative expressions.
The attitude of negative commitals and non-factives differs with
respect to what-clause » i. e. there 'what happened' does not imply
'that it happened'. (See p. 66 ) ). This fact in turn indicates that
we basically deal with two degrees of knowledge; lower degree
(•that it happened'), and higher degree ('what, etc. happened').
We can name these two degrees of knowledge as 'partial knowledge'
and 'full knowledge'. This distinction can also be recognized in
V +0 constructions (e. g. tlknow that poem but I don't understand
it'), where the understanding of an object is the full knowledge, while
knowing it is not. (See also p. 77in connection with 'language'
contexts. )
Another fact that we have observed is that some verbs are always








This means that they possess this feature 'inherently', i, e. that
it is present in their meaning in any context that they enter.
Or, in other words they always carry the presupposition of
speaker's knowledge. Examples (7h) and (7i) bring out this fact
very clearly in connection with realize. Both sentences cam be
translated into SC with uvidjeti (imperfective). (Spoznati. as we
have mentioned above^ is seldom used in everyday speech.)
Recognize cannot be substituted in these sentences which indicates
that the feature /Speaker's knowledge/ need not be a substitut-
*
ability feature . But sentences (7h) and (?i) are relevant from yet
another point of view. If we put (7i) in the form 'Don't you
realize that .., we would get two examples of negative direct
questions (in SC the direct negative question form is 'Zar ti ne
znas Let us how consider znati and know in (7h), (7i), (7j),
and (7k). It immediately becomes obvious that they unambiguously
presuppose speaker's knowledge. Any other verb of the group,
otherwise unspecified for this feature, used in negative direct
question presupposes speaker's knowledge. (The original 'know'
sentence (7j) proves this explicitly.) Negative direct questions
are, therefore, another means of disambiguation towards positive
specification with respect to this feature.
4. 6. 1 The feature /Speaker's knowledge/ first became obvious in
relation to the verb realize. In particular it is evident in contexts
for know which automatically exclude realize when the subject of a
* The distinction has been made (see p. 13 ) between 'inherent' (or
'non-contextual') and'substitutability' (or 'contextual')
features.
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sentence is in the first person singular and the verb in the negative
present or future. Here are a few examples:
18. (a) I do not know even what has happened to me. (P28. 32)
(b) 'I don't know what Robert is doing - he doesn't tell
me.' (P49.44)
(c) 'Then I don't know why your digestion is so bad.'
(Pi 72, 23)
(d) 'I don't even know where he sleeps. ' (P180. 37)
(e) I do not know what he meant. (Pi 97. 21)
(f) I do not know even now how far this was a deliberate
contrivance. (P200. 25)
(g) I do not know why or when I decided to stay. (P229. 24)
On the other hand, if all these examples were transferred into the
past tense (with appropriate changes), the substitution of realize
would be possible. What is more# they would all presuppose
speaker's knowledge* and, more precisely, speaker's knowledge at
the time of utterance, not at the time the action to which he is
referring took place. This last qualification is important and
necessary. It reflects the spatio-temporal relationship of the
speaker with the rest of the world and relates to the deixes of'this*,
'here' and 'now'. The full description of the feature is, therefore,
/Presupposes speaker's knowledge at the time of utterance/.
A further proof that this feature was inherent in realize was found
in affirmative sentences, which related to the future events, such
as 'I will know (soon) what has happened'. It was impossible to
substitute realize in such sentences.
But what about the example (71)? On close inspection it will be
found that the present tense is used in this sentence with past
reference relative to the time of the speaker's utterance. The
example is, in other words, part of a narrative. Realize can also
be used in expressions that refer to habitual actions, such as 'I
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never realize what's happened till it's too late*. All these examples
only emphasize the fact that, when a speaker uses the verb realize,
the context presupposes the possession of certain information at the
time he is using it.
4. 6. 2 However, difficulties arise when we examine the other verbs
of the group. In particular, SC saznati, doznati and otkriti. and
E learn, discover, find out and get to know. None of these verbs
appear in the first person negative present tense (unless they are
used in a narrative or habitually, or unless they are preceded by a
modal verb like moci/can). Here, their similarity with realize
is striking:
19. SC *Ne saznajem (ne doznajem, ne otkrivam) da je on
dosao.
E *1 don't learn (discover, find out, get to know) that
he has come.
But they can be used in negative sentences with future reference,
with the first person 3ubject, to express predictions:
20. SC Vidjeces, necu saznati (doznati, otkriti) da je on
do£ao. (Oni to kriju od mene.)
E You'll see, I won't learn (discover, find out, get
to know) that he has come. (They are hiding it
from me.)
They can also be used in negative sentences with past reference,
with the first person singular, without the presupposition of the
speaker's knowledge at the time of utterance:
21. SC Nisam saznao (doznao, otkrio) da je on dosao.
E I didn't learn (discover, find out, get to know) that
he had come.
Unless they are modified by the time adverbials tad/then, the
examples (21) indicate, rather strongly, that the speaker does not
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possess information at the time of utterance.
This leads us to the conclusion that the impossibility of using these
verbs in instances like (19) is not a reflection of their inherently
having the feature /Speaker's knowledge/. It seems to suggest,
rather, that instances like (19) reflect a constraint on these verbs
with respect to another modality feature, namely the feature
/intention/ (discussed on p. 128), since this feature, if implied,
is related either to the past or future relative to the time of
utteranc e.
4. 7 At this point it is convenient to discuss a small group of
verbs of knowledge and understanding which can be employed
•parenthetically'. What I mean by 'parenthetic' use will become
clear immediately with the examples given below. The verbs in








I will give here the examples found in the material, and subsequently
attempt to explain componentially the use of these verbs:
22. (a) 'Znate, komunisti se u poslednje vreme vrlo vesto
kamufliraju. ' (DS340. 13)
•Recently the Communists have been camouflaging
themselves very cleverly, you know. ' (tr. p. 325)
(b) 'E, vidis. Aco, i ja mislim da je kod tebe
interna stvar.' (DS190. 7)
'See here, Aca, I also think it's some internal
trouble that's the matter with you. ' (tr. p. 184)
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(c) 'Min je bio miram i uredan gradjanin. '
•A ja ga, vidite, ejto, ubih! (OK27. 1.1)
'Min was a quiet and orderly citizen. '
•But, you see, I killed him. ' (my tr. )
(d) Why? Because I wear a queer hat? To me, you know,
it isn't a queer hat - it's a sensible hat. ' (P10. 2)
(e) 'You know. Jaffery, I often think it would be a good
thing if this place were burnt down.' (P33. 36)
(f ) 'I'm not saying you meant to do all this, you know. '
(P105, 12A)
(g) 'Well, you know. Blanche, I'm a bit of a nuisance. '
(PI33, 33)
(h) 'This was our nursery, you know. ' (P. 15. 21)
(i) 'You know.1 she said, 'I didn't think I meant to marry
Robert and yet I was mad to get him. ' (Pi05. 12B)
(j) 'I'm rich, you know. ' (P258. 31)
(k) 'They even confess to murders they haven't done, you
know. ' (P310. 12)
(1) 'Asylums, you know, have plain walls. ' (P310. 20)
(m) 'I have had a good deal of experience, you know,
especially of fevers. ' (P293. 24)
(n) 'If you don't want to go back, Lucy, stay here - you're
free, you know. ' (P95. 34)
(o) 'I've always meant to get married, you know. ' (P98. 18)
(p) 'You know, uncle, I wouldn't have anything happen to
you.' (PI 19. 8)
(q) 'He does sometimes need me, you know. When he is
sick of politics. ' (P190. 17)
(r) 'He really believed it, you know. * (P201. 2)
(s) 'And, as you know, we get on pretty well. ' (P287. 17)
(t) 'No, I won't think any more. I don't need to think,
thank goodness. You see. I've promised. ' (P54. 16)
(u) 'Edward is a clever fool. See, he has suddenly got
tired of his holiday and his art and wants to play
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at politics again. ' (F. 222.40)
(v) 'You see, sir, I thought if 1 gave him a tray for
the wheels, and things, they'd be under my eye.'
(P318.40)
(w) 'Because, you see,' the young man speaks as if to a
child, 'there's not enough of it. ' (P168. 42)
(x) 'You see, he feels that he has disappointed us all. '
(P267. 17)
(y) 'But the question is slightly out of my depth. I'm
a pathologist, you understand.' (P310.43)
(Although the material does not provide examples employing the
other verbs, it will be comparatively easy to establish by substitu¬
tion how they are related to the ones exemplified above. )
Looking at these examples, we can observe a few facts straight
away. Initially we can notice that the use of znati and know differs
strikingly from that of vidjeti and see. Znati and know are,
obviously, broader in meaning (or in what they convey) than vidjeti
and see.
Another thing to notice is that the position of these verbs in the
sentence has a significance that must not be overlooked. We shall
come to this shortly.
We can now ask ourselves: what is the speaker's intention when
he uses these verbs in the examples above? What function do they
have? Are they employed to introduce new information, to seek
confirmation hat the hearer (addressee) already possesses that
information and, if not, to explain, or to remind the hearer
(addressee) of a certain fact that he speaker knows the hearer is
aware of? Because it is at least these three factors that seem to
be relevant here.
We have said above that znati and know are broader in meaning than
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vidieti and see, in these contexts. What does this consist in?
If we look at (22b), (22fc-x), we shall find that vidjeti and see have
primarily the function of introducing new information. This function
is emphasized particularly if the verb is placed at the beginning of
the sentence as in (22b), (22t), (22v) and (22x). The reason I
emphasize 'primarily* is that it seems to me that these verbs can
have additional implications such as that of seeking confirmation
that fiie hearer has grasped a certain fact and at the same time
showing an intention to explain things afresh or further (as in (22c)
and (22w) ). We shall refer to these two features as /informative/
and /Explanatory/.
The initial position, therefore, seems to suggest a positive
specification for /informative/. By this I do not mean to say that
in the initial position these verbs cannot convey, in addition, an
explanatory intention, but that, whether they do or not, they are
more likely when used initially to reflect introduction of new
information.
The same holds true for znati and know. While they are unspecified
otherwise for these two features, in the initial position they seem
generally to stress introduction of new information (see examples
(22a), (22e), (22g), (22i), (22p) ). We can express this in a table
as follows (the sign '+' in tables 1 and 2 does not indicate inherent
features. The distinction between '-fcfeand 'o' has been introduced




I Informative/ /Explanatory/ / Inforrra tive/ Explanatory/
znati + O o o o
vidjeti + (o) + o o







Let us now consider SC razumjeti and shvatiti. as well as E
realize, understand and comprehend with respect to the position in
the sentence. The initial position does not seem to affect these
verbs. It is true that they are found in this position less frequently
than the verbs just discussed but, when they are, they do not seem
to presuppose as strikingly the introduction of new information.
Rather, they seem to be positively specified for the feature
/Explanatory/ and unspecified for he feature /informative/. In
(22i) the difference between know and see on the one hand and realize
understand and comprehend on the other, suggests that this might be
an adequate interpretation (see also (22y) ).
E be aware differs from all the other verbs in this group in the fact
that it is never used to introduce new information. The syntatic
structure in which it is normally used in these contexts (i. e. 'as you
must/are') emphasizes this fact and serves as a constraint.
Another feature is necessary to account for this, since be aware
cannot be said to be positively specified (it is, rather, unspecified)
for the feature /Explanatory/. For want of a better term, we
shall refer to this feature as /Reminding/. The verb realize has
also been found to be positively, while vidjeti and see are negatively,
specified for this feature. If we look at the sentence (22s) in which
we can substitute be aware with the same effect as know, it becomes
* Throughout this work SF will stand for 'substitutability feature'.
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clear what is meant here. The feature reflects the fact that the
speaker knows well that the hearer is in possession of information
and that he uses these verbs only to remind him of it and to draw
his attention to its relevance in the context.




/ Informative/ / Informative/ / Explanatory//Reminding/
znati + o o o
vidjeti + + o -
razumjeti O o + o
shvatiti O o + o
know + o o o
be aware - m o +
realize o O + +
understand o o + o









From the table we can conclude that the flexibility of these verbs
enables their use with various nuances of meaning. As far as it
was possible, we have indicated the relevant factors that, at
least partially, account for the native speaker's distinctions. We
can assume that the four columns represent substitutability
features of these verbs. We can also assume that the verbs that
are assigned positive specifications with respect to a feature would
have preference over neutral verbs if the speaker wanted to be
more precise and more specific in what he was saying.
On the other hand, as has been mentioned above, contextual
neutralization is a very important phenomenon, since it enables
substitution to a large degree and also provides the means for the
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speaker to express himself less precisely and less specifically.
It also enables him, to both explain and introduce new information,
to remind and explain at the same time.
4. 7.1 There is one further reason that supports the hypothesis that
see possesses the feature /informative/ in all contexts of this
nature. The reason is that, as a response to information just
*
obtained, one often uses the phrase 'I see' where the marker of
information just received is overtly present. It can also be a
marker, depending on the context, of the explanation just obtained,
in which case it can be readily replaced by razumieti, shvatiti.
understand and comprehend. Notice that the opposite holds true
for znati, know, be aware and realize. Used as an answer, in the
same form as see above, they carry the presupposition that the
speaker was in possession of information before the dialogue took
place. In the following contexts, found in the material, they
would, therefore, be inappropriately used:
23. (a) 'Oh, I see.1 Ann said, 'he must have had that phone
call he was expecting.' (P209. 16) (Ann had just been
told that her husband had gone away.)
(b) 'Oh, I see, you've been reading some Moor, 'A Drama
in Muslin'.' (P303.41) (The speaker had heard a
remark which led him to this conclusion. )
(c) 'We're just gcfag to try how it works - there's no
promises on either side.'
'I see, everything left to chance and luck. ' (P325. 6)
(d) 'Well, ; Uncle, I rather agree with him there - if
you have a family, I think it ought to be a family, for
the family's own sake.'
'I see, so you've arranged everything.' (P331.31)
* No such proof exists for SC vidietl. Instead of an equivalent of
'I see' the SC native speakers often use 'tako dakle', which means
approximately 'Oh, that's how it is, is it?'.
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FOOTNOTES
1. By 'inherent' I mean a feature which is identifiable and present
as part of its meaning in a verb regardless of context, i. e. in
all contexts in which the verb is used. By 'contextual' I mean
that the feature is identifiable in certain contexts and not in
others, or, rather, that, depending on the context, a feature
can or need not be presupposed by the verb. This, of course,
holds true for those verbs which can be unspecified with
relation to a certain feature. Verbs that are positively or
negatively specified (that,is, those which possess a feature
'inherently', or do not have it at all) are not flexible in the
same way,
2. It must be pointed out that the accuracy of the specifications
here and elsewhere naturally depends largely on what the
native speaker considers to be 'a more usual' or 'a more
normal' interpretation. Because of their abstract nature these
verbs are particularly difficult to examine. More than with
some other semantic fields, it often presents a problem to find
examples as well as counter-examples in order to prove or
disprove what one thinks might be the case. This, of course,
arises from the fact that verbs of an abstract nature might
generally be considered to be more flexible in their use than
others. The accuracy of description of an abstract lexical
item will vary depending on its flexibility for each native
speaker. But, still, the prospects for a componential analysis
need not be so pessimistic if we remind ourselves that the task
of such an analysis is primarily to 'detect' a certain feature,
and only subsequently to investigate accurately how the lexical
items in question are related to it. Normally, the discovery
of a particular feature is originally connected with perhaps one
or two lexical items of the semantic field. The examination of
the rest of the field might prove to produce less certain results.
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CHAPTER FIVE
5. 1 We come now to a very interesting and also very difficult
aspect of subjective modality, related to the significance of the
expressed thought. The difficulty is due to at least two factors:
a. that of providing an adequate test which would prove or disprove
the hypothesis that certain verbs presuppose the significance of the
expressed thought inherently and some contextually; b. that of
finding out exactly for whom or what that thought is significant.
The two factors arise from a common source, and that is that the
hypothesis is intuitive rather than obtained empirically. Thus, we
must work within this vicious circle. We can name this feature
/importance/ and, without trying to establish at this stage for whom
it is relevant (that is, whether for the speaker, or for the hearer,
or the situation generally), proceed to give the relevant examples
found in the material:
l.(a) Dva skolska druga odmah su uvidiala da su postal!
daleki jedan drugome. (DS217. 8)
- The two school friends at once realized that they
had grown apart, (tr. p. 209)
(b) To znaci (...) ne vidjeti i ne spoznati Andricevu
i Selimovicevu razlicitost u istovjetnosti. (ZIN168. 54)
- It means (...) not seeing and not realizing Andric's and
Selimovic's difference in similarity, (my tr,)
(c) Nezamisliv bi, naime, bio lokalni rat u Evropi. Toga
su po svemu sudeci syjesni (...) evropski narodi.
(OKJ5.4)
- A local war in Europe is, that is to say, inconceivable.
European nations probably realize this, (my tr.)
(d) Sviesni smo da je knjizevnost kojoj pripadamo i
siromasna i skucena. (ZNK172. 13)
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-We realize that the literature we belong to is both
poor and limited, (my tr.)
Docnije tek postadoh sviestan te banalne cinjenice.
(ZMZ57.16)
- Only later did 1 become aware of that trivial fact,
(my tr.)
Kad Bugari vide^e sta se dogadja sa partizanima, jurnuSe
sa svih strana. (DS271. 34)
- When the Bulgarians saw what had happened to the
partisans, they charged from all sides, (tr. p. 261)
Veres je dakle otkrio dva antipodna tipa ljudi. (OJN18. 1. 3)
- VereS has, therefore, discovered two constrasting
types of people, (my tr. )
Tokom vremena smo poSeli da zapa%amo neke pojave
koje su se nama dinile kao nedostaci. (OI29. 1. 2)
- As time went by, we began to perceive certain
phenomena which we thought were shortcomings.
(my tr.)
Osam metaka - osam Nemaca ... Onda oni ne bi ovako.
Kako to Pavli ne shvata ? (DS10. 7)
- Eight bullets - eight Germans ... Then they wouldn't
behave like this. Why can't Paul see this ? (tr. p. 14)
You don't realize perhaps that this baby of whom you
are so careless ought to be a very remarkable man.
(P100. 13)
It took us a long time to realize that France was tired
of war. (PI 10. 20)
The old man, seeing Amy collapse, and suddenly
realizing the position, had rushed out for the guard.
(P164. 38)
She herself soon realized that he was uneasy in her
company. (P267. 11)
I had long recognized in Sara, (...) very great faults.
(P322. 3)
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(o) She vvas sent to prison for pawning some old trinkets
which I had long forgotten. My relatives discovered
the fact and called in the police. (P9. 2)
(p) But I said nothing, and I soon discovered how wise I
was. (P92.38)
(q) He does not perceive that, clever as she is, she's a
fool in marriage. (P55. 32)
(r) After a moment, when I perceived that she was angered
against me, 1 hastened to find her. (P90. 24)
(s) Neither of us perceived the warning of change, of
crisis. (P120. 22)
(t) But he, no more than I, perceived that his mother was
almost in poverty. (P336. 11)
(u) It was this terrible truth which I had grasped in the
years 1913 and 1914. (P240. 8)
Once again, it was the verb realize that indicated the existence of
this feature, particularly when contrasted with know in contexts like
the following:
2. (a) They knew that I fully intended to marry Sara Jimson.
(P9.4)
(b) There is 1 know some anxiety about the future of the
property. (P12.23)
(c) 'I did not know*. I said, 'that you were an expert on
farm management. ' (P23.13)
(d) We knew where we were and what we had to do. (P40. 30)
(e) I knew that my father (...) disliked all the ideas of the
young radicals. (PI22. 37)
From the difference discerned between know and realize, the
significance of the action referred to is the significance of the
possible effect of that action. In other words, the action referred
to by the complement of the verb realize is (or may be) a cause of a
further action which is in some ways significant. In 'Do you
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realize that you didn't say hello to Mary this morning' it may be
Mary's further (possible) action that is a matter of concern. It is
also possible that we 'realize' something after the effect has taken
place (as in 'I realized that I had said the wrong thing only when the
yxoman started shouting'). Even in the simple assertions like
'John realized that Mary was sad', or 'I realize that that young man
is a burglar', Mary's being sad and the young man's being a burglar
reflect an action which, either as taking place in the past or in the
future, is significant for a subsequent action. The significance of
effect is recognizable in all examples under (i).
It is not so easy, however, to establish for whom in the context of
situation an action is significant; whether it is significant for the
speaker, or for .he hearer, for the person referred to by the
subject of the sentence or the person referred to by the object of
the sentence. On close examination of the examples vmder (1) it
is obvious that a distinction could not be made adequately on this
basis. For, in some examples (like (lq)» (Is) )# the
action is significant for the subject of the sentence; in some (like
11), (It) ), the action referred to is significant for the object of the
sentence; in some (like (If), (lm), (1 r) ) the action is significant
for both the subject and the object; and in most cases (like the rest
of the examples) the action might be interpreted to be significant
for he situation as a whole, that is to say, all participants in it.
Even for the examples above, where it could be discerned, at least
partially, whose concern is the action referred to, other inter¬
pretations are also possible. It is, therefore, thought best to
qualify this feature as /importance of the situation/ which can then
be contextually further subclassified. Clearly, it cannot be said
that, except in some contexts, the importance of the action is
related to the speaker. The role of the speaker as a commentator
thus comes again in view. There is also nothing to suggest that it
is related to the hearer.
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Granted that intuitively we regard this feature as relevant, how can
we test its accuracy? So far, I have found it impossible to
discover either a syntactic structure which would prove or disprove
the hypothesis, or a collocational impossibility that would be
relevant. Even in examples like (le) where biti sviestan is a verb
marked / -(-Importance/, an object like 'trivial fact' is accepted.
The native speaker of English would also find 'I realize that trivial fact'
acceptable, since it is only at first sight that a sentence like that
looks odd. We are, therefore, forced to leave open the question of
an appropriate test for this feature.
However, (to go back to what was said above about the significance
of the effect of the action referred to), it seems that the mere fact
that some information has been brought to our attention (in the case
of uvidieti. biti sviestan, realize); sought (in the case of saznati.
doznati, otkriti. zapaziti. uociti, perceive, discover, learn, find out
and make out); or accepted (in the case of uvidjeti and recognize),
presupposes a certain importance not necessarily attached to the
action referred to but to the one which might result from it, or has
already resulted from it.
The group of verbs of knowledge and understanding contains items
that are positively specified for this feature and those that are
unspecified. There are no negative specifications, although SC
primiietiti and opaziti and E notice in some contexts almost reach
this point.
It seems that /importance/ is inherent in the following verbs, i. e.













Because of various other features involved the fact that these verbs
are all positively specified for the feature /importance/ does not
mean that they are necessarily substitutable for each other. It only
indicates that whatever context they enter they will presuppose a
certain importance.
The rest of the verbs are unspecified for this feature. They will
depend on the context for the presupposition of /importance/.
Therefore, it follows that they are broader in application than the
positively specified verbs, as far as this feature goes, since those
are normally used only when importance is attached to an action.
5.2 /Volition/ and /intention/, as features of subjective modality,
have in the course of analysis been looked at separately. It then
became obvious that they are frequently in relation of unilateral
implication. That is to say, /intention/ normally implies / Volition/,
whereas / Volition/ does not necessarily imply /intention/.
It has also been found that /intention/ can be inherent in some verbs,
while /Volition/ is not. Or, to put it differently, only one part of
/Volition/ can be inherent, and that is /intention/. This particular
distinction can also be referred to as overt (i. e. /Volition^ versus
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covert (i. e. /intention/). We have to add also that /intention/ can
be expressed overtly (we shall come to this shortly, see p.
Both the feature / Volition/ and the subfeature /intention/ are related
to the subject of a sentence rather than the speaker, unless the
speaker is the subject of the sentence (that is to say, first person
singular).
5. 2. 1 It has been found necessary to distinguish between transitive
and intransitive /Volition/ (that is to say, between 'I want him to
know' and 'I want to know') because some verbs behave differently
2
depending on whether the context is transitive or not.
The material contained a considerable number of examples for
/intention/, while the number of examples expressing any kind of
/ Volition/ is very small and we shall quote them all:
3.(a) 'Bole me grudi', saptao je i nije smeo da se pokrene
da ne sazna gde mu je rana. (DS59. 20)
- 'I have a pain in my chest', he whispered to himself,
and did not dare to turn round to find out where, his
3
wound was, (tr. p. 61)
(b) Pavle je dolazio u iskusenje da ga zapita za svoju
porodicu, ali se uzdr&ao, ne £eleci da seliak sazna
ko je on i odakle je. (DS184. 37)
- Paul was tempted to ask about his own family, but he
refrained, he did not want the peasant to know who
he was or where he came from. (tr. p. 179)
(c) U2a se nadao da ce Nemci brzo (...) uvideti besmislenost
drianja tolike vojske za jednu partizansku ceticu.
(DS265. 27)
- Prof hoped that the Germans would soon (...) see
that it was pointless to keep such a big army against
a single platoon of Partisans, (tr. p. 255)
(d) Znam, zelite znati zasto trazim poznanstvo preko
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oglasa. (ZT81.20)
- I know, you wish to know why I seek acquaintance
through advertisement, (my tr.)
(e) 'Zavite me brzo*, re£e, zeleci da sto pre ustane da
sazna ishod borbe i vidi Pavla. (DS88. 32)
- Tie me up quickly', he said; he wanted to get up
as soon as possible and find out the outcome of the
battle and see Paul. (tr. p. 88)
(f) 'Voleo bi* ia da znam imaju li oni vezu sa Rusijom,'
(DS291.39)
- 'What I'd like to know is have they any connection with
Russia.' (tr. p. 279)
(g) Chomsky (...) prilazi jeziSkom ispitivanju sa zeliom
da dozna £to vise o odnosima gramatickog i logi£kog.
(PL144. 11)
- Chomsky approaches linguistic enquiry with the aim
to find out as much as possible about the relationship
between grammar and logic, (my tr.)
(h) They're just delighted to hear there's anyone to tell
them what to do. (P61.4)
(8.) I wanted to know what was happening to her, as if it
were to myself. (P44. 11)
The above examples show some of the ways in which / Volition/ can
be expressed. Gianted that the most obvious way of expressing
/Volition/ would be using verbs like wish, want, or would like to.
we can examine whether the above examples can be paraphrased
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by one of them. Since (5 b), (3 d), (3 e), (3 f) and (3 J*) are straight¬
forward examples of / Volition/, we shall, for the moment, leave
them aside.
(3 a) is better translated by 'lest he should find out ...' (see footnote
3); and this can be paraphrased as 'He didn't dare move because he
didn't want to find out where his wound was'. Lest he should can,
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therefore, be marked as negative volition.
(3c) and (3h) are not so straightforward. In a sense, to hope that
something should happen is to want something to happen; to be
delighted to hear something is frequently to have wanted to hear
something. But still, to paraphrase hope and be delighted by want
or even would like to. would be misleading. It would be misleading
for at least two reasons: one is that hope and be delighted do not
presuppose any degree of intention on the part of the person referred
to by the subject to bring about the desired effect. That is to say,
while hope and be delighted are non-intentional, wish, want and
would like to are not, however little intention they may express.
The other reason is that to be delighted is in the case of (3h) a
consequence of to want, since wish, want and would like to are
characterised as non-past. To be delighted is a fulfilment of
to want. (But, if to be delighted expresses non-past, e.g. I shall
be delighted to hear that*, then the substitution of wish, want or
would like to is possible. )
(3g) includes the nominal phrase sa zeliom, 'with the .vish to'
(probably more common in SC) with the same function as wish,
want and would like to.
La (3b), (3d), (3e), (3 f) and ( i) / Volition/ is expressed by SC
zeljeti ('wish') and htjeti ('want*). The native speakers feel that
the difference between these verbs in the expression of /Volition/
is that zeljeti/wish presuppose an intention towards bringing about
the desired action, or state, while htjeti/want are more neutral.
Hence it would be odd to say 'I wish him to study mathematics, but
I'm not going to influence him'. Volio bih/would like is neutral
like htjeti/want, but also indicating (more strongly than these verbs)
that the speaker might not have the power to do anything about it.
The following diagram will represent this difference between











As the arrows in the diagram show volio bih/would like to are
further away from zeljeti/wish than ht.ieti/want and therefore
£~el.ieti/wish are less likely to be substituted by volio bih/would like
Volio bih/would like to have been included in the analysis because
it seems that some verbs do not readily accept that kind of
conditional volition.
Most verbs of this group can take all three overt markers of
/Volition/. Perceive is interesting in that according to the con¬
struction it requires for the intransitive context ('be able to
perceive'), it indicates yet another feature (the same holds true
for zapaziti below), and that is the presupposition of a stimulus on
the senses (see p. 192 ). By the transitive construction it requires
(*I want him to perceive'), it indicates that it can presuppose
causation.
The verbs that cannot take all three markers of / Volition/ are the
following:
* Other kinds of'overt markers for /Volition/ like desire are
considered less frequent in everyday speech and excluded on
those grounds.

































Pojmiti + + + + + ff;*
uvidj eti + + +
primijetiti + •f + + +
opaziti + + .
zapaziti + + + + +
realize + +
be aware + + + +
make out + + + + +
notic e + + + + +
conceive + + +
An explanation* although tentative, can be given for the non¬
occurrences in the table. Would like to seems to be too weak for
poimiti which is in such contexts essentially marked /-{-Intention/.
But notice that it does not affect verbs like razumjeti and shvatiti.
although even there the construction sounds unusual.
There is an interesting difference here between SC uvidjeti and E
realize. While neither occurs in intransitive constructions, in
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transitive constructions they differ in that realize does not occur
with wish. This can be explained by the fact that realize unlike
nvirljpH does not normally presuppose any persuasion and, therefore,
does not necessarily imply acceptance of a particular piece of
information(see uvidjeti p.*^ ). Since wish presupposes the
intention of bringing an event about the occurrence of realize with
wish is inappropriate. Fort he same reason, uvidjeti with wish
(•Seljeti*) is acceptable.
SC primiietiti and notice behave in the same way - they do not occur
with wish in intransitive contexts. One possible reason is that,
since wish presupposes intention on part of the person referred to
by the subject and these two verbs presuppose some kind of
stimulus on the senses, the collocation is not appropriate. It is
possible in transitive constructions since if we say 'I wish him to
notice the change* we mean to say that we shall do something to
force the fact upon the attention of the person referred to by the
object.
The non-occurrence of SC opaziti in transitive constructions and
with wish in intransitive constructions seems to be due to the fact
T O £
that this verb does not presuppose intention (see p. ).
SC zapaziti and E make out differ in the presupposed certainty of
some kind of result. In the case of make out the facts have yet to
be obtained, whereas in the case of zapaziti the facts are there,
ready and it only depends on the individual's power of perception
to reveal it. In other .ords, while make out stresses objective
inaccessibility (see the feature /Effort/ on p. zapaziti
presupposes, as the main factor, an individual's ability to perceive.
This difference is clearly marked by the syntax of the constructions




WANT: I want him to make out
WOULD LIKE: I would like him to be able to make out
INTRANSITIVE
WISH: I wish to be able to make out
WANT: I want to be able to make out
WOULD LIKE TO: I would like to make out
The non-occurrence with wish of both these verbs and also the change
of construction for make out indicates quite clearly a further feature
of these verbs, i. e. /-Causative/.
The reason for non-occurrence of conceive is not clear and will have
to remain unexplained for the present. The construction that this
verb requires with would like him to: 'I would like him to be able to
conceive ... ' indicates that the verb presupposes /-Causative/.
5. 2. 2 The subfeature /intention/ has been tested overtly by
preceding each verb by nastojati/try (as in (4b) ) but, as will be
exemplified from the material, there are other forms of expressing
'intention to achieve something':
4. (a) Nikola se mu2io da prepozna Munju i cim namisli
d* ga prepoznao, psi se pomesaju i izgubi ga
iz vida. (DS83. 2)
- Nikola strained every nerve to pick out Lightning,
but as soon as he thought he had recognized him
the dogs mingled and he lost sight of him. (tr. p. 83)
(b) Ona nastoii (...) da otkriie i rasvetli smisao
postojanja. (ZK6.30)
- It tries to discover and shed light on the meaning
of existence, (my tr.)
(c) Znanost tendlra da spozna istinu o svijetu. (CSP26. 2)
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- Science strives to find out the truth about the world,
(my tr. )
(d) Ali ni£ta pouzdano nije mogao da sazna. (DS285. 17)
- But he could not get anv reliable information, (tr. p. 273)
(e) ... while our mother, with all her scrupulous anxiety
to understand our troubles, was at a loss among the
violence and confusion of nursery affairs. (P29. 18)
When tested fbr overt intention, the verbs of knowledge and under¬
standing were for the most part found to be able to occur in such
constructions. The exceptions were SC uvidleti and E realize and
be conscious. Although perhaps not in the same context, all the
other verbs could meaningfully occur after nastojati/try.
It has also been found that the verbs capable of overt intention can
also be regarded as achievement verbs.
Gilbert Ryle (1949) draws plausible conclusions about intention
(or voluntary action) and achievement. He says: 'In the most
ordinary employment 'voluntary' and 'involuntary' are used (... )
as adjectives applying to actions which ought not to be done. We
discuss whether someone's action was voluntary or not only when
the action seems to have been his fault. (...) But philosophers, in
discussing what constitutes acts voluntary or involuntary, tend to
describe as voluntary not only reprehensible, but also meritorious
actions (...)'. (p. 69)
'In their use, a person is described as voluntarily doing the right
thing and as voluntarily doing the wrong thing, or as being
responsible not only for action for which he is subject to accusation,
but also for actions entitling him to kudos. It is used, that is, as a
synonym of 'intentional'.' (p. 75)
'There can be achievements which are prefaced by no task perform¬
ances. We sometimes find things without searching, secure
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appointments without applying and arrive at true conclusions without
having weighed the evidence.' (p. 150)
'This is why we can significantly say that someone has aimed in
vain or successfully, but not that he has hit the target in vain or
successfully (...) in particular, heed adverbs like 'carefully',
Attentively', 'studiously', 'vigilantly', 'conscientiously' and
'pertinaciously' cannot be used to qualify such cognative verbs as
•discover', 'prove', 'solve*, 'detect', or 'see' (... )' (p. 151)
'The distinction between task verbs and achievement verbs or 'try'
verbs and 'got it' verbs frees us from another theoretical nuisance.
It has long been realized that verbs like 'know', 'discover', 'solve',
•prove', 'perceive', 'see' and 'observe' are in an important way
incapable of being qualified by adverbs like 'erroneously' and
'incorrectly'. ' (p. 152)
The notion of intention and achievement can, however, be extended
to verbs other than factives like feel, think, believe and hear in
which case the argument of the last paragraph is refuted. These
verbs can overtly express intention or achievement (e. g. 'I tried
to think that he was right', 'I succeeded in thinking that he was
right') and yet, due to the non-factive nature, they readily accept
adverbs like 'erroneously' and 'incorrectly4.
Ryle's distinction on p. 150 is very important. During this
analysis it has been found that very few achievement verbs are
inherently intentional. This was tested by accompanying the verbs
with slucaino/bv chance. Of all the achievement verbs only three
were inherently intentional.
It is perhaps best to give a table of all the distinctions for / Intention/
and /Achievement/ and then discuss significant cases.
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TABLE 4
1 \ rxt. 1 / lf\ oh. / /| 1 ft
znati 0 + know 0 +
Suti OH + understand 0(H) +
saznati OH + comprehend OH +
doznati oH + grasp 0(H) +
spoznati 0 + realize m -
razumjeti 0(H) + recognize + -
shvatiti OH + 0(H) +
pojmiti 0(H) + be conscious - -
biti jasno oH + be clear 0(H) +
biti svjestan - - be aware 0 +
oH +? make out + +
poznavati 0 + hear OH +
upoznati oH + learn OH +
poznati (perf. ) oH + discover 0(H) +
prepoznati(imp.) + + find out 0(H) +
(perf.) o(h) + get to know 0(H) +
u£iti OH + see 0(H) +
uvidjeti - m notice OH +
otkriti OH + perceive 0(H) +
primijetiti 0(H) + conceive 0 +
opaziti oH + feel 0 0
zapaziti OH + think 0 0




The sign in brackets indicates that those verbs can be covertly
intentional in some contexts. The sign 'H1 otherwise indicates that
the feature is inherent.
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We shall now first of all examine more closely the verbs that have
been thought to be /-(-Intention/ in at least some contexts and try to
find out what kind of contexts they are.
(a) GROUP I: /0(-^Intention/; / 4-Achievement/
1. It has been found that SC saznati and doznati presuppose
/intention/ in negative statements past tense (and present tense in
a narrative) with the first person subject, and direct questions.
The same holds true for E learn ('obtain information'). The following
example of a negative statement in the past tense has been found in
the material:
5. On nista vise od nje ne saznade sem to da je neka lepa
zena (...) bila sa cetnicima i da je posle otisla.
(DS289.4)
- He could not get any information from her except the
fact that a good-looking woman (...) had been with
the Chetniks and had later departed, (tr. p. 277)
There are no examples of direct questions but the above argument can
be easily tested. With direct questions phonological stress is also
significant. If the stress is on the subject the context is interpreted
as unspecified for /intention/ (in SC the subject is then omitted).
If the stress is on the verb then some verbs are marked / -(-Intention/.
2. In affirmative statements with past reference or conditionals
these verbs can be interpreted either as presupposing /intention/ or
not, depending on the context:
6. (a) Ako saznaiu da ste sisli, sve ce da nas pobiju. (DS320. 9)
- If they get to know that you've come down here they'll
kill off the lot of us. (tr. p. 306)
(b) Kad bi Brka za to saznaof (DS346. 39)
- If Brka got to know about this.' (tr. p. 331)
(c) Saznao je ne samo za svih pet kontinenata (...) vec i
to da s e svet deli na one koji rade i one za koje se
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radi. (DS. 180. 3)
• Not only did he know the names of all the five
continents (...), but he knew something else too:
he knew that the world was divided into those who
worked and those who had others to work for them,
(tr. p. 175)
(d) Vrenenom smo saznali da u gradu djeluju stalna opera i
balet. (OI29.1)
- In time, we learnt that there was a permanent opera
and ballet in the town, (my tr.)
(e) I pre desetak dana doznao sam da on vi£e njima nije
potreban. (OK22.3.4)
• And ten days ago I learnt that they don't need him
any more, (my tr.)
(f) Potom na radu, ja sam blisko upoznala Ilica, doznala
njegove ocene ljudi. (ZS13. 9)
- Later, while working with him I got to know Ilic well,
learnt about his ideas about people, (my tr. )
:j(g) Kasnije vec, u Sibiru, doznala sam da Ili£ nije nista
manje od mene £itao klasike. (ZS13. 14)
♦
- Later still, in Siberia, I learnt that Ilic did not read
classics any less than myself, (my tr.)
(h) But I did learn from Edward that, according to his man,
the between-maid at home was not entirely virtuous.
(P76. 11)
(i) And in truth, as I learnt at a later time, from one who
had been a Benjamite, Lucy was a terror to Brown.
(P97. 30)
3. These verbs presuppose /intention/ in the future tense:
7. (a) Ve6eras ce konacno saznati sta je sa njom. (DS345. 36)
- He will finally learn to-night what has happened to
her. (my tr.)
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(b) Plasio 6e da nece imati snage da napusti ovaj kraj
dok ne bude doznao sta je sa Brankom. (DS284. 37)
- He was afraid that he would not have the strength to
leave this district until he had found out what had
happened to Branka. (tr. p. 273)
(c) Primjenom komutacije doznace: se ono najbitinije.
(PL128. 33)
- By commutation it will be possible to learn the most
essential facts, (my tr. )
The rest of the verbs can be easily tested:
8. (a) Sta sam ocekivao od tog cilja nikad mi nece biti jasno.
(ZMZ56. 26)
- It will never be clear to me what I expected from that
goal, (my tr. )
(b) Jasno mi je zasto sam lagao njoj, ali zasto sam lagao
sebi? (ZMZ57. 35)
- It's clear to me why I lied to her, but why did I lie
to myself? (my tr. )
(c) Ali zna da ce uspjeti samo ako otkrije svo.j unutrasnji
svijet. (ZL10.48)
• But he knows that he will succeed only if he discovers
his inner world, (my tr.)
We can therefore conclude that the feature /intention/ is, as far as
these verbs are concerned (unless they are preceded by, for
example, modal mo<£i/can) connected with contexts with past and
future reference, and not with those referring to present events.
The distinction between the speaker and the subject of the sentence
is again relevant with respect to the feature /intention/. For
example, in the future tense first person subject all the verbs of
this group (except SC opaziti) are / +Intention/. In the future tense
second person subject and third person .ubject the intention varies
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with each verb. The table below will show other distinctions
between the speaker and the subject in the constructions that have
been found significant. Also, specifications for the verbs of this
group that have not been explicitly discussed above will be given.
It should be noted that /intention/ is not considered to be a
substitutability feature, since it is relevant for verbs in so many
different contexts. It can, however, prove to be a contextual
restriction in the sense of impossibility of substitution, for smaller
groups of verbs, e.g. 'skill' contexts (p. 197).
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It can be observed from the table that the significant differences
are marked:
(a) hi negative statements (past tense) with first person
subjects;
(b) In direct questions (past tense) when the stress is on the
verb; and
(c) In the future tense, first, second and third person
subject.
(b) GROUP II
E recognize in the sense of 'accepting something as true or existent'
can be marked /+Intention/ but it is doubtful, or not very plausible
to regard it as / +Achieveinent/. In its other sense considered
here, i. e, the sense of 'known before', it is not inherently / +Intention/,
but it is inherently /-fAchievement/ (see also examples under (9)
below).
$
SC (pre) poznati is interesting in that it is / +Intention/ if it is in
the imperfective form , and unspecified if it is in the perfective
form:
9. (a) Kad medju njima prepoznade (perfective) najlepsi glas,
Bojanin, on uzbudjeno pridje vatri. (DS90. 7)
- When he recognized Bojana's voice, the finest among
the singers, he became filled with agitation and moved
to the fire. (tr. p. 90)
(b) Pavle poznade (perfective) i tekst i citaca. (DS20. 3)
* Poznati and prepoznati ('recognize') are synonymous as perfect-
ives, while they differ as imperfectives: poznavati can be trans¬
lated by the E know, while prepoznavati can be rendered by the
E recognize.
** This phenomenon is, as Prof. D. Ward points out, a common
characteristic of the meaning of at least some imperfective verbs
both in Russian and in SC.
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Paul recognized both the words and the reader,
(tr. p. 23)
(c) Pavle je iXao pogledom od jednog do drugog zaspalog
partizana i prepoznavao (imperfective) ih. (DS28. 33)
- Paul's glance travelled from one sleeping Partisan
to another; he recognized each in turn. (tr. p. 31)
(d) Video je da je to veliko moravsko selo koje nije
prepoznavao (imperfective). (DS200. 33)
- He saw that it was a large village by the Morava which
he could not recognize. (tr. p. 194)
(e) Stajela je kod vrata, pozdravljala se sa svima,
prepoznavala ih i sa svakim pones to progovorila.
(DS321. 15)
• She stood at the door and greeted them all, saying
something to each of them as she recognized them,
(tr. p. 307)
(c) GROUP III: /-{-Intention/; /-{-Achievement/
The material contains only two examples of the E verb make out,
but it can easily be tested that this verb is different from the rest
of the achievement verbs in that it is inherently intentional (*I made
it out by chance). Here are the two examples which clearly show
that it is /-Hntention/ in negative statements and conditionals, the
latter one distinguishing it from the other achievement verbs,
which, as we have seen, are unspecified for /intention/ in condi¬
tionals (see examples (6a-b) ):
10. (a) It would seem, therefore, that the girl did not drive
at eighty miles an hour in order to kill me. Though
I can't make out why she has chosen in that case to
bring me to Tolbrook. (PI2. 20)
(b) This would not alarm me so much if I could make out
what goes on in the girl's head. (P9. 17)
(d) Although Group IV (/ 0 Intention/: / +Achievement/) are
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unspecified for /intention/ (in other words, with the exception of
znati and know, if they occur in intentional contexts, the intention
has to be marked overtly) it has been thought intuitively correct to
regard them as achievement verbs, not only because they can
express achievement overtly, but also because they distinctly
embody this feature, since possession of information is achieve*
ment in the most significant sense.
Znati and know differ from the rest of the group in the fact that they
are marked / +Intention/ in some future tense contexts (consider
their substitution in (7a) ).
(e) GROUP V: / 0 Intention/; / 0 Achievement/
SC osjetiti. misliti and vjerovati, as well as E feel, think and
believe have been assigned zero specifications for both /intention/
and/Achievement/ for the mere reason that, unless these features
are overtly marked by preceding them with verbs like try and
succeed for /intention/ and /Achievement/ respectively, these
verbs do not normally indicate any intention on the part of the
speaker or the subject of the sentence.
(*) GROUP VI: /-Intention/; /-Achievement/
SC uvidjeti and E realize and be conscious have been given negative
specifications for both /intention/ and /Achievement/, since they
do not occur even in contexts with overt markers of these features.
(g) GROUP VII
SC biti svie8tan, with respect to some features equivalent to the E
be conscious, differs from it here in that it can, in some contexts,
express / +Intention/. For example:
11. Nisam svjestan Sta se sa mnorn deSava.
- I don't know what's happening to me.
where there is an intention or a wish to find out, or make things
clear. Whether this verb is, on the basis of examples like (11),
inherently an achievement verb is not clear. It seems that, in
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order to make an adequate representation, a distinction would have
to be made between the sense of the verb in (11), in which case it
is similar to razumieti. shavatiti. understand, etc., (see the
feature /Analysis/, p. 154), and elsewhere where it would be, like
be conscious, assigned negative specifications for /intention/ and
/Achievement/, and share with it the feature /Observation/ (see
Chapter 6, Group I, p. 145). However, since no further significant
differences have been established for biti sviestan and be conscious,
we are obliged to leave this question open and in the meantime treat




1. For example SC biti sviestan (in one of its senses) and uvidleti and
E realize and be conscious differ from the rest of this subset
by being /-Intention/ (to be discussed later, see p.128 );
SC uvidieti and E recognize are further distinguished from the
rest by being / +Acknowledgement/ (also to be discussed,
see p. 153). We shall also see that SC saznati and doznati and
E learn differ from the rest in the way information is obtained
(see p. 172).
2. On p. 167 the term 'Di-transitive' is used in connection with
V + Object constructions to distinguish between the two kinds of
objects co-occurring with the same verb. It is not necessary
to make this distinction here, since we are basically concerned
with the verbs in the infinitive, and not with the ones actually
carrying the feature / Volition/, although they have been brought
in to establish the differences between the analysed verbs.
3. Heppell-Mihajlovic translation is misleading and ambiguous.
Instead of emphasizing the fact that the person did not want to
find out about his wound (as the original indicates by da ne
('lest he') ), the translation gives quite the opposite interpretation.
In other words, find out should also be negated by something like
lest he ... .
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CHAPTER SIX
6. 1 One of the most relevant features of subjective modality for
this semantic field is the feature /Ability/. It is present in one
form or another in all the verbs of knowledge and understanding.
It ;eems plausible to assume that each verb stresses one aspect
of ability more han another. However, this is not to say that the
substitutability of these verbs is always ensured, as far as the
feature /Ability/ goes. We shall see that the groups that are
formed by assigning the verbs the subfeatures of /Ability/ are in
some cases mutually exclusive. This happens at the lower levels
of classification and it is there that the restrictions on the
substitutability of verbs have to be met.
The examination of these verbs points out the fact that, together,
they presuppose at least three distinct types of ability: ability to
observe, ability to store information and ability to reason. There
are alLO verbs that seem to presuppose either observation and
reasoning or all three: observation and storing information and
reasoning, so that we can basically divide them into five groups on
the basis of the three types £ ability.
The fact that in these verbs there have been found three types of
ability: observation, storing and reasoning, is very significant,
because it convincingly suggests three major steps in our acquisition
of knowledge. Many instances of the impossibility of substituting,
for example, be conscious for know or know for understand can be
accounted for in this way.
By 'observation' I mean an action which involves our senses and,
consequently, requires that the information be accessible to them.
The most clearly distinguished senses are vision, hearing and touch.
There are others that concern this group of verbs but that are not
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easily definable; and they are especially relevant for verbs like
be conscious or feel. Let us suggest, however, that the meaning
of such verbs is indeterminate with respect to which sense is
involved.
By •storing* information, I mean the ability to keep that information
as a possession. (By 'storing* I do not necessarily mean remember¬
ing or being able uo recall, ) We shall see that verbs like know
cannot be in some contexts substituted for any other verb of the
group, which strongly suggests that in our acquisition of knowledge
there may be information which is either relevant only for a limited
period of time or simply acquired to be stored and not necessarily
reasoned upon. The fact that the first step, i. e. the manner of
not
observation is ^encoded in verbs like know, accounts for its flexibility
in use.
By 'reasoning' I mean in one sense operating upon the information
already obtained and stored. But the verbs of this semantic field
express other kinds of reasoning too (to this question we return
later, see p. 153 ).
As has already been said above, some verbs not only presuppose
observation but also indicate that the speaker has (or has had) a
further step in mind, either that of storing information or that of
reasoning upon it. This distinction makes it possible to account
for differences between, for example, verbs like notice, which seems
to be an 'observation* verb, and perceive, which seems to presuppose
all three kinds of ability.
The three-step acquisition of knowledge and the five identified
groups of knowledge and understanding can be schematically
represented as follows:
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We can now proceed to discuss eachiltfoup in more detail,













Consider the following examples:
l.(a) Jevta nije odmah bio svestan toga. (DS105. 8)
• Jevta did not immediately realize this. (tr. p. 104)
(b) Vihor ogor£enja i bola eve je ispreturao i uskovitlao
u Gvozdenu, tako da on ni.ie bio svestan svoga postupka
pred odredom, ni re2i koje je izrekao Pavlu dok ga je
ovaj umirivao. (DS129. 19)
- A tumult of pain and bitterness whirled furiously
round in Gvozden's head, so that he was not aware
of his behaviour in front of the company; nor of the
words he had shouted at Paul when the latter tried to
calm him down (...). (tr. p. 128)
(c) Pavie ga ni.ie prepoznao u mraku. (DS65. 26)
- Paul could not recognize him in the dark. (tr. p. 66)
(d) 0£i jedan drugom nisu videli ali jedan drugom osetise
misli. (DS32. 9)
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- They could not see each other's eyes, but they felt
each other's thoughts, (tr. p. 34)
(e) I star! partizani osedali su po Vukovum dr^anju da
on teSko pati. (DS285.4)
• Even the old Partisans who knew him well sensed
from Vuk's behaviour that he was suffering acutely,
(tr. p. 273)
(f) Starac primeti da Jovan nesto te£fco brine. (DS171. 34)
- The old man noticed that something was seriously
worrying John. (tr. p. 167)
(g) Pavle se okrenu k njemu, opazi niegovu uzbudjenost i
mirno rece (...)• (DS54. 35)
- Paul turned towards him, and noticing his excitement,
said quietly (...) (tr. p. 56)
, (h) I did not even wait to get my hat or my handbag, and
when, seated in the train, 1 realized the fact I said
'Never mind'. (P68.43)
(i) But now, remembering that room, I realize for the first
time that Sara slept in it. (Pi30. 5)
(j) For I could not recognize the fields. (Pi 17. 37)
(k) But in this midland town, I was conscious for the first
time of a deep anxiety, an oppression that becomes
almost unbearable. (P58.19)
(1) She isn't even aware of this hatred and jealousy which
surrounds her. (P342. 11)
(m) Lucy herself felt some change in me. (P61. 34)
(n) | noticed then that no one was paying the least attention
to the scene upon the landing. (P65. 37)
From the examples it can be observed, first of all, that the verbs
of this group presuppose the ability of the senses to detect events
which build up information. It can also be observed that this
ability is conditioned to a very large degree by the surroundings
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and the possibility to detect information. This is why it has been
said above (see p. 87 ) that ability and possibility are implicationally
related, i. e. ability implies possibility.
Also, it is obvious that SC (pre)poznati and E recognize (in the sense
of 'known before') differ from the rest of the group in one important
respect : the ability to observe here presupposes memory about objects
and in that sense also presupposes repetitiveness of events. That is
to say, the verbs are not used unless the context presupposes that
an event has happened before, or that an object has been seen before.
We shall call this feature /Memory : Repetitive/. It is a
substitutability feature for these two verbs. The other verbs of the
group are negatively specified for it.
But these two verbs have also got something in common with some
of the verbs of the rest of the group and that is an implication of a
specific sense, either that of vision or any other, as a necessary
requirement for observation. The sense implied will depend on the
context (e. g. in 'I recognized his voice' the sense implied is that of
hearing). A particular sense is also presupposed in SC primiietiti
and opaziti and E notice. Unlike them, biti svjestan, osjetiti,
be conscious, be aware and feel do not presuppose any of the senses
specifically. Rather, they can presuppose all of them at the same
time. By this we can account for them having broader use in
comparison with the rest of the group. In other words, a relation
of implication holds between primiietiti/opaziti/notice and biti











The verbs on the left hand side are, therefore, hyponyms of the
verbs on the right hand side.
This difference is reflected in the impossibility of substituting, for
example, notice in (Id).
There is, however, a further difference and a very significant one.
The substitutability of these verbs is restricted on the basis of
contemporaneity of the moment of speech and the action referred to.
If the two are contemporaneous, the substitution is possible, i. e.
neutralization occurs, but if (as in (lb) and (li) ) they are not
contemporaneous, substitution seems odd and inappropriate.
We can, therefore, represent the relationship of the verbs of










biti svjestan 0 0 -
(pre)poznati + - +
osjetiti 0 0 m
primij etiti + 0 m
opaziti + 0 m
realize 0 0 m
recognize + m +
be conscious 0 0 m
be aware 0 0 m
feel 0 0 m
notice + 0 m
SF SF
(see also Group V, on p. 189)
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In the material, there are quite a number of contexts with znati and
know in which no other verb of knowledge and understanding can be
replaced with approximately the same meaning. Be aware is an
exception, but its substitution seems to be limited to only some of
these contexts. This suggests that there is a sense of these verbs
which distinguishes them from the rest of the group. For want of
a better term we shall call the feature reflecting this difference
/Storing information/, which means that, in certain contexts, these
verbs presuppose nothing more but that the information has (or has
not) been stored (obtained). Here are some such contexts:
2. (a) Sem to da je elektricarski radnik, niko u odredu, osim
mozda komesara, nije ni£ta znao o njemu. (DS101. 14)
- Apart from the fact that he was an electrician,
nobody in the company, except perhaps the Commissar,
knew anything about him. (tr. p. 100)
(b) Ne znam ni koliko je poginulo. (DS153. 29)
- I don't even know how many men we've lost. (tr. p. 151)
(c) Partizanske veze koje treba da obezbede 5amce za
prelaz reke, znao je jedino Jovan, kurir. (DS156. 13)
• Only John the courier knew he Party contacts, who
were to provide boats for them to cross the river,
(tr. p. 153)
(d) Jovan za nesrecu nije znao ime nijednog cetniXkog
komandanta u Levcu. (DS161. 33)
- Unfortunately John did not know the name of a single
commanding-officer in LevaS. (tr. p. 158)
(e) Nije znao koje je vreme. (DS200. 18)
- He did not know what time it was. (tr. p. 194)
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(f) 'Je It domacice, gde ti je mu£?'
tNe znam ja, bogami, gde je, trazite ga. (DS255. 19)
- 'Tell me, where is your husband?'
'I don't know where he isf- you look for him. (tr. p. 244)
(g) 'Ja ne znam £ta je u pismu, moSda nemam pravo da
govorim.' (DS299.4)
• 'I don't know what's in he letter, and perhaps I've
no right to speak. ' (tr. p. 286)
(h) 'Ja znam gde stanuju. • (DS333. 23)
" k**ow where they live.' (tr. p. 319)
(i) Znao ie da je kod kuce samo ona ostala. (DS370. 4)
• He knew that :;he was the only one left at home,
(tr. p. 352)
(j) 'I don't know what Robert is doing - he doesn't tell me. •
(P49. 44)
(k) Edward's secretary came up to me and asked me if I
knew where he was. (P166. 36)
(1) They know where to find me if they want me. (P205. 18)
(m) 'Who's in charge of the milking?'
'I don't know, sir.' (P211.21)
(n) And just as Ann knew where everything in the house
was to be found, she had always the latest news of
her father and her mother. (P256. 3)
(o) We exchanged letters at Easter and Christmas, but
between while I sometimes did not know her address.
(P293. 34)
(p) I don't know what Amy believed, but her faith did not
need theology. (P339. 2)
In any of these contexts no other presupposition is attached to the
verbs znati and know except the fact that (true) information has or
has not been stored. All these examples can be paraphrased by:
X possesses/does not possess information Y.
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The possibility of substituting be aware with the same meaning is
not entirely clear. However, a few suggestions will be given
here.
It seems, first of all, that it is not used in any context which might
in any way presuppose involvement of the senses, and we have seen
above that be aware also belongs to Group I, which would cause
ambiguities. This might be a possible explanation for the non-
occurence of be aware in (2e).
Secondly, the native speaker of E feels that the use of be aware is
more appropriate in a continuation of a thought or dialogue, than
in its beginning. If (2h) were interpreted to mean initiation of a
dialogue, the substitution of be aware would be questionable. If,
on the other hand, it were interpreted as an answer to a question,
the substitution would seem appropriate. (See also (2f) and (2m).)
Thirdly, the fact that this verb seems to carry more importance
with it than znati and know do (and therefore has been positively
specified for the feature /importance/ , see p. 121) might be a
reason for non-substitutability of be aware in (2k) and 21) in the
contexts in which these sentences occurred in the material.
Particularly (2k) is interesting here since it relates to the feature
/Speaker's knowledge/, see p. 94 . It is possible that if we are
approached by someone with the question 'Are you aware of where
he is', the dominant interpretation on our part would be that the
speaker possesses information and is about to impart it, This
interpretation might be caused by the positive specification of
be aware for the feature /importance/. Being unspecified for this
feature, znati and know would, on the other hand, probably make
the other interpretation equally possible. This suggestion is
tentative, but it seems wofth considering especially if an expression
is analysed outside the context of situation. It is only then that
we can observe that be aware differs from znati and know to a
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large extent in what interpretation they may be given: while
be aware would mostly be interpreted as / +Speaker's knowledge/,
the interpretation of znati and know would tend to be that of
/-Speaker's knowledge/. But, since intonation is very much part
of a full examination of instances of this type, but has not been
investigated here, we shall leave this question aside.










Within this group a few subgroups can be encountered, although
they all, clearly, presuppose / +Reasoning/.
First of all, SC misliti and vjerovati and E think and believe, form
a subgroup of their own, as negative-commitals. Hence, these
verbs are not normally readily substitutable with the same meaning
for the rest of he group. (We return to them later, see p. 180 .)
Also, SC razumjeti and shvatiti and E tinder stand, which as we
shall see later, can be interpreted as /-Direct information/ in
V +that +Sentence, and in that case belong to non-factives just
like hear or feel can in such cases be substituted for the above
four verbs in affirmative statements with a considerable overlap
in meaning. Here, however, we shall look at them in cases when
they are unspecified for the feature /Direct information/. (On the
feature /Direct information/ see p. 170 .)
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Secondly, SC spoznati presupposes /Thinking/, while SC uvidjeti
presupposes some kind of persuasion, whether verbal or otherwise.
It also seems to presuppose /Acknowledgement/ and in his it is
similar to E recognize (in one of its senses). Uvidjeti is, however,
broader in meaning than 3poznati since the latter is restricted by
the feature /Thinking/, as possibly the only form of persuasiveness.
As we have mentioned before, spoznati is not frequently, if at all,
used in everyday speech in my dialect, but is confined to critical
texts and literary works. The substitution between the two, then,
tends to fall within these contexts. Here are a few examples of
the three verbs:
3, (a) Istina, mi knjizevno djelo ne moiemo spoznati (.., )
mimo njegova jezika. (OJ8. 2)
- It is true that we cannot understand a literary work
*
outside its language, (my tr. )
(b) Znanost tendira da spozna istinu o svijetu, (OSP26. 2)
- Science strives to find out the truth about the world,
(my tr.)
(c) Ona je uvidjala da se njena (...) patnja u izvjesnoj
daljoj buducnosti moze stisati i zacijeliti. (GF132. 2)
- She realized that her suffering could in some distant
future be soothed and healed, (my tr. )
(d) Kada su Pavolve akcije otkrile prisustvo njegove Sete
preko Morave, Nemci uvidese da je na Jastrepcu ostao
samo jedan deo partizana. (DS266. 9)
- When Paul's activities revealed the presence of his
platoon on the other side of the Morava, the Germans
* 'Literary work' is one object which uvidjeti and recognize
do not accept, but if the object were 'value of a literary work',
the substitution with the same meaning would be possible.
** Realize, like uvidjeti, cannot be substituted in an overtly
intentional context, hence its non-substitutability in the
translation. '
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saw that only one section of the Partisans remained
on the Jastrebac. (tr. p. 256)
(e) There was but one cause of bitterness between us, my
jealousy of Edward. But that was not recognized; I
did not allow myself to be jealous (...). (P22. 3)
(f) I did not see that look again until the moment when
he finally recognized his failure. (P195. 37)
(g) I recognized my bitter disappointment (...). (p201. 25)
It can be seen from he examples that, unlike uvidjeti. recognize
does not necessarily presuppose any outside prompting, and can,
therefore, be classed as unspecified for /Persuasion/. The same
holds true for spoznati. which reflects some kind of resolution of
the individual, and is outward bound. With uvidjeti, as with
realize (these being /-Intention/), the direction of the coming change
is inward bound (or towards the individual). But this distinction
does not seem to prevent substitution and neutralization is achieved
in the above examples. In a table, their relationships can be






spoznati m + 0
uvidj eti + 0 +
recognize 0 0 +
SF SF SF
6.4.2 SC razumieti. shvatiti, pojgmiti, biti jasno and E understand,
comprehend, grasp, be clear and conceive seem to presuppose a
rather special kind of thinking, i. e. analytic thinking, which involves
'taking apart' all bits of information available to see how they 'fit
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together1. These verbs are rather special in application in that
they are one step removed from the presupposition of merely storing
information. That is to say, the stored information is already
implied in the contexts containing the above verbs, and what they
presuppose, apart from taking for granted that information is
obtained, is analysis of that information. We shall call this feature
simply /Analysis/. The two-step process of storing information
and analysing it is obvious in negative sentences. Examples in the
material are numerous:
4, (a) Mislio je da Pavle ne razume seljake i njihovu nesrecu.
(DS125. 39)
- He thought that Paul could not understand the peasants
and their misfortunes, (tr. p. 125)
(b) Naljuti se, htede da mu u lice skrese da nema niita
gluplje i jalovije no kad neko jboce da postane
intelektualac na osnovu nekoliko pro£itanih knjiga koje
nije ni razumeo. (DS151.38)
- He felt angry, and wanted to tell Mirko straight to
his face that there was nothing more stupid and
pointless than trying to make oneself out to be an
intellectual on the basis of a few books which had not
even been properly tinderstood, (tr. p. 149)
(c) On se nije ljutio niti je optuiivao Brku i drug© koji ga
nisu shvatili. (DS303. 14)
- He wasn't angry, and did not reproach Brka and the
Comrades who had not understood them, (tr. p. 290)
(d) Ne mogu da po.imim da je neko mogao sa takvom
taSno£^u opisati neciji zivot. (ZPS63.43)
- I can't conceive that anyone could describe somebody's
life with such precision, (my tr.)
(e) Aleksandru ni/ie odmah bilo iasno na koje 6e ljude
rnoci da se osloni. (NIN62)
- It was not immediately clear to Alexander which men
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he could rely upon, (my tr.)
(f) 'I can't understand why you want to go to Tolbrook. '
(PI 1. 4)
(g) 'You tinderstand nothing - nothing at all, and I don't
think you ever will. ' (P40. 17)
(h) I could not understand this marriage. (P51. 17)
(i) He never understood the force of moral conviction in
certain souls, or its variety of forms. (P78. 11)
(j) And I can still see the look of his blue eyes fixed upon
me with the appeal which I cannot understand. (PI 20. 15)
(k) But I did not understand what he meant. (PI58. 10)
(1) She was frowning as if to concentrate on something that
she could not grasp. (P273. 36)
(m)I still wonder how she divined wishes which were
scarcely clear to myself. (P76. 33)
(n) 'I cannot conceive how you can make such a fearful
object of yourself. ' (P19. 5)
Notice, however, that neutralization is possible in some of these
contexts with znati and know. That is to say, znati and know, which
are considered to be /-Analysis/, can, in some cases, be
substituted for the verbs positively specified for this feature, with
the same meaning. The ubstitution leading to neutralization
(rather than change of meaning), is possible in V + 5entence
constructions (see (4e), (4f), (4k), (4n) ), and nominalizations (see
(4i) ). It is generally not possible in V +Object sentence constructions
and, in fact, it is in these cases that the difference between
/^Analysis/ and /-Analysis/ is most observable.
Native speakers seem to differ as to whether they think that there
is a difference between znati/know and 'analysis' verbs even in
V +Sentence constructions. It seems reasonable to maintain,
therefore, that they are interchangeable, since we are here concerned
primarily with accounting for all possibilities, i. e. including as a
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possibility even something ihat is acceptable to only a few native
speakers. Znati has, in the following example (5a), been replaced
in the E translation by both know and understand. Interchangeability
is also possible in (5b):
5. (a) 1JajafluuaaiQ. Mta se to de^ava sa vama. ' (DS274. 17)
" I don't know what is happening to you. ' (tr. p. 263)
(b) 'Then I don't know why your digestion is so bad. ' (P172. 11)
(5a) is, at the same time, the most normal syntactic framework for
biti sviestan when used in this sense.
But consider (4d). If znati/know were substituted here, the meaning
would be changed in the same direction as with V +Object examples.
From this we can conclude that V +Gbject constructions as well as
V +that +Sentence constructions imply storing information, while
other Y +Sentence constructions imply analysis. So that now we can
amend our statement from above and say that neutralization of
znati /know with the verbs marked / +Analysis/ is possible only in
V +Sentence constructions and, of these, with all but V +that +
Sentence constructions.
A few more facts have been observed in connection with the 'analysis*
verbs. First of all, since they are / +Analysis/, they also presuppose
complexity of the analysed object. Secondly, the choice between
/ +Animate/ and /-Animate/ object in V +Object constructions
presupposesa further difference in features. If the object is
I iAnimatel the context presupposes / -Sympathy/. This holds true
for SC razumjetj and shvatiti and E understand and comprehend.
The rest of the group do not jhare this feature. Here are some
examples:
6. (a) 'Ona me razume', pomisli radosno Uca i zagleda joj
se u oSi. (DS94. 30)
- 'Yes, she understands me', thought Prof joyfully,
and looked straight into her eyes. (tr. p. 94)
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(b) Otac je, treba ga razumbti. (DS135.12)
- He is a father, one should understand him, (my tr.)
(c) Zeleo je da dusevnu i ziv^anu prenapetost olakla i
srniri pricajuci s nekim svojim, bliskim, ko bi mogao
da ga shvati i razume. (DS215. 26)
- He wanted to relax his feeling of mental and nervous
tension, and calm himself by talking to someone of
, his own type, near to him, who would be able to
understand him. (tr. p. 208)
(d) It is impossible for her to understand me or me to
argue with her, (Pi92. 17)
(e) How can they understand us or our problems. (PI 96. 14)
(f) They don't understand children. (P298. 19)
(g) I suppose for all her love of Edward* she had never
come very near to comprehending him. (P273. 38)
(6c) is particularly interesting since both shvatiti and razurajeti
are used with more or less the same meaning. It seems that the
point of repetition is the emphasis needed for the expression of the
thought. However, in (7), where the construction is V +that +
Sentence, and where shvatiti is qualified by brzo ('quickly'), the
difference between razurajeti, which is still /+Sympathy/, and
shvatiti, which here is unspecified for this feature, is obvious:
7. Nesto poznaju6i ljude, a jos vile slute^i sloSenost
Sovekove prirode, Pavle, je razumeo i brzo shvatio da
ljudi ne vole da se pokeravaju. (DS13. 31)
- He had som e knowledge of people and even more insight
into the complexity of human nature, so he had quickly
realized that people do not like to be submissive.
(tr. p. 17)
It seems that razigneti and shvatiti are, therefore, substitutable with
the same meaning if shvatiti is not qualified by an adverbial like
brzo. Razumieti cannot be qualified by the same adverbial i'r\ iWese contaxH.
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A further point with (7) is that the subject of the subordinate clause
is / +Animate/, and also that emotions are expressed by the context.
It seems that, whenever this is the case, ragumieti. shvatiti.
understand and comprehend are interpreted as / +Sympathy/. Also,
even if the subject of the subordinate clause is not / +Animate/, but
emotions are expressed by the context, the verbs would still be
assigned/ ^-Sympathy/. Here are some examples from SC and E:
8. (a) MoSSe se lako razumjeti za&to dramski umjetnici £ele
veca prava u druStvenoi reformi. (OT12. 1.3)
- One can understand why dramatists want greater rights
in social reform, (my tr.)
(b) An old house like this is charged with memory (...)
but I can't expect a boy like Robert to understand that.
(P26. 6)
(c) I understand now why you like her so much. (P74. 10)
(d) I asked him if he understood how greatly she had
suffered. (P98.34)
(e) As a woman, she perfectly under stood why I liked to
keep my dress on, even though I might appear ridiculous.
(P150. 34)
In addition to this, the same presupposition is present in V +Object
constructions, where the object reflects emotional states. For
example:
9. (a) Jovan je razumeo njenu brigu, ali i o onome sto je
znao nije hteo nista odredjeno da joj ka5e. (DS295. 23)
- John understood the reason for her anxiety, but did
not want to tell her anything definite about what he
knew. (tr. p. 283)
(b) (...) while our mother with all her scrupulous anxiety
to understand our troubles was at a loss among the
violence and confusion of nursery affairs. (P29. 18)
(c) That room was forbidden to us by my father, who under*
stood my mother's need of a refuge from her family. (P30
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(d) I seemed to enter into the meaning of Lucy's life and
to understand her happiness. (P61.31)
(e) I felt now that I understood these looks of desperation
which I had seen already a hundred times. (P142. 35)
(f) Now I understood his struggle. (P150. 12)
(g) Luckily Ann, even without looking at me, seemed to
understand my distress. (P175. 26)
(h) For I saw that hair meant so much to the boy and that
even barbers understood his secret desires. (P246. 13)
(i) I began to under stand for the first time the anxiety of
parents in wartime. (P246. 39)
On the other hand, if the object or subject of the subordinate clause
is not / +Animate/, or if the subordinate clause does not express
emotional state, these verbs presuppose simply complexity of the
object or the subject of the subordinate clause. For example:
10. (a) Niegovu misao razumele svi i slozise se s njim. (DS334, 15)
- They all understood his thoughts, and agreed with him.
(tr. p. 319)
(b) But I did not understand what he meant. (P158. 10)
(c) I understood tla t he was thinking of Tolbrook. (P158. 17)
(d) He understands the real workings of party politics.
(P20714)
(e) She never understood the democratic process. (P207. 35)
(f) I do not know if I understood the nature of Amy's
disaster. (P281.23)
(g) We can understand new ideas in the world, but we cannot
ahare new feelings. (P283.43)
(h) Poor Tom, he doesn't comprehend great events when
they take place in front of his eyes. (P182.41)
Among those verbs that are /-Sympathy/ E grasp and conceive are
further restricted. Unlike the rest of the 'analysis' verbs that
can be substituted in 'sympathy' contexts, but with a different meaning*
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grasp generally does not occur in V +Object / +Animate/ at all and its
application is restricted in the contexts discussed above. The native
speaker of English feels that it can be substituted in (8d) and (10f).
These two contexts show that grasp presupposes not only complexity
of what is referred to by the object, but also the entire network of
implications behind that complexity. Consider the following
examples:
11. (a) For what is it, a fabric hanj;i||g in the air, a construction
of ideas, sympathies, habits, something so impalpable
that you cannot grasp it. (P239. 35)
(b) It was this terrible truth which I had grasped in the
years 1913 and 1914, before that last and most savage
of wars. (P240. 8)
Clearly, here the verb expresses taking in and processing in the
brain not only parts of what is referred to, or its major factors,
but also its consequences and bearing on other events.
The other verbs do not seem to have the same requirement but, since
they can be substituted for grasp in contexts like (lla-b) we shall
assign to them zero specification with respect to the feature
/ Implication/.
E conceive is restricted in a different way. It involves imagination
and indeed in one of its senses means 'to imagine*. Since imagina¬
tion necessarily presupposes creativeness, conceive has been
assigned the feature /+Creative/ on the basis of examples like (12):
12. I could conceive nothing more stupid than to proceed
by zigzags. (P246. 22)
No other verb of the group can be substituted in this purely 'creative'
context which, points out the fact that hey are, in fact, /-Creative/.
However, neutralization is possible in many other contexts,
especially in contexts like (4n) above, or the context of (13):
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13. (a)Butno one could conceive where he was finding the money.
(P206. 5)
(b)Seeing all at once that the girl was very white, and
conceiving that she must be distressed, I went to bed,
(P210. 9)
(c)She can never conceive that in the world's eyes he may
have a different value, (P269. 35)
The reason for non-substitutability of other verbs in (12) seems to
be the overt expression of 'creativeness' in V + Object constructions.
Consider also the impossibility of substituting with the same meaning
conceive (or know and znati) in (10h) or (14):
14, I don't speak to her because she cannot understand (...)
the real solid world, where Lucy and I loved and fought.
(P55. 38)
By way of conclusion about the verbs of Group III (with the exception
of misliti/think, vjerovati/believe), we can represent their relation¬














spoznati - + 0 -
uvidjeti + 0 + -
razumjeti + + 0 -
shvatiti + + 0 m
pojmiti + - 0 -
biti jasno + - 0 m
znati (0)
biti svjestai L (0)
recognize 0 0 + -
understand + + 0 -
comprehenc + + 0 m
grasp + - + -
be clear + m 0 m
conceive + - 0 +
know (0)
SF SF SF SF SF SF SF
Neutralization is possible in some contexts between 'analysis' verbs and
'persuasion' verbs with the exception of grasp and conceive which have
restrictions in terms of the features /implication/ and /Creative/
respectively.
Also, spoznati, being restricted by the feature / Thinking/ is some¬
times difficult to substitute. But if we consider spoznati. uvidieti
and recognize contrasted with the rest of the verbs* in the above
contexts, we shall be able to observe that the neutralization of
features /Persuasion/ and /Analysis/ is possible mainly in V +
Sentence constructions, especially of the type V + that + Sentence
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and also with V + Object where the object is a nominalization.
For example see (8b), (8c), (8d), (8e), (9c), (9d), (9f), (9h), (9i),
(10c), (13b) and (13e).






upoznati get to know
u£iti
(studirati)
(the verbs in brackets have been introduced merely for comparison
and are not considered anywhere else in the text. )
The main reason for grouping chese verbs together is the fact that
they presuppose not only storing information but also a specific
kind f observation. This is particularly obvious, with, for
example, SC cuti and E hear which presuppose mainly the sense of
hearing (or the sense of vision, when reading). The rest of the
verbs imply different senses in different contexts. For example,
one can learn about something or somebody either by hearing about
them, or by observing them. The same holds true for saznati.
doznati and get to know, whereas with poznavati, upoznati. uciti and
learn (in the sense of 'memorizing'), the stress is on personal
observation which means that they can involve the reference not only
to the sense of hearing or vision, but to the other senses as well.
We can, therefore, divide the verbs of this group (we shall see
later that the division can be extended to the other verbs of this
semantic field) into (a) those that presuppose hearsay (what we shall
name /-Direct information/) (b) those that presuppose personal
observation(/+Direct information/); and (c) those that are unspecified
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with respect to this feature. As far as Group IV is concerned,
SC E hear are negatively specified, poznavati, upoznati,
u&ti, studirati. learn (in the sense of •memorizing'), study and
teach are positively specified while saznati. doznati. learn (in the
sense of 'obtaining information') and get to know seem to be
unspecified unless the context itself presupposes /-Direct informa¬
tion/, in which case they are negatively specified (see p. 172).
6. 5, 1 Let us start with the positively specified sub-group:
poznavati, upoznati, u£iti, studirati, learn, study and teach.
Poznavati - imperfective and upoznati - perfective are mainly con¬
sequentially related because of their difference in aspect, but they
both presuppose the same feature, which we shall call /Details/ and
describe it as a feature that restricts those verbs to the contexts
which involve knowledge of at least a few details about the object
observed. But, there is a difference between them in terms of the
sentence construction they enter: while poznavati is generally
applicable only in V + Object constructions, upoznati cam enter other
constructions as well. Here are a few examples of poznavati and
»ipr.-y.r.a»i in V + Object constructions:
15. (a) Pred spavanje pregleda decje pisanke, ispravlja, stavlja
crvenom olovkom ocene, ne razmisljajuci mnogo, jer on
poznaje svako dete. (DS11.9)
. , - Before going to sleep he would look at the children's
exercises, correct them and put in the marks with his
red pencil, without bothering to think much, because he
knew each child, (tr. p. 15)
(b) Dobro poznajuci komesara, U2a je ovaj njegov postupak
tumafiio kao lukavstvo sracunato da izazove kajanje i
samokritiku kocl njega. (DS14. 20)
- Knowing the Commissar well, Prof interpreted his
behaviour as a cunning and calculating ruse to arouse
remorse and selfcriticism in himself, (tr. p. 18)
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(c) JPre rata au se slabo poznavali i zazirali su jedan od
drugoga. (DS41.36)
- Before the war they had hardly been acquaintances and
had rather avoided each other, (tr. p. 44)
(d) Kostica ie dobro poznavao. (DS340. 17)
- He knew Kostic well, (tr. p. 325)
(e) Gete iive kao porodice, ljudi se naviknu jedan na drugog,
do sitnica upoznaju jedan drugom l?ivot« mane i vrline.
srode se i srastu. (DS145. 10)
• The platoons lived like families, the men got used to
one another, and knew to the last detail each other's
way of life, and faults and virtues; something like a
bond of kinship developed among them, (tr, p. 143)
(f) Ljudi se srodili sa opasnostima, privikli na teXak Xivot,
upoznali vo.inicku smrt. (DS226. 28)
- The men develop a kinship with danger, they are used
to a hard life, and acquainted with a soldier's death,
(tr. p. 218)
In these contexts znati and know are readily substituted. Poznavati,
like know, in some contexts indicates great similarity with
(pre)poznati and recognize (from Group I) in that it presupposes
/MemoryrRepetitive/:
16. (&) £oban£e nije sanjalo da ce poljske putanje na kojima je
ono poznavalo svoju stopalu i krivi mali prst utisnut
posle ki&e, postati opasna mesta (...). (DS182. 32)
- The peasant boy had not dreamt that the field paths on
which he had recognized his footprint with its crooked
toe after the rain would become a place of danger (...)
(tr. p. 177)
(b) Ni jednu od tih stvari nije poznavao. (D3237. 37)
~ He did not recognize any of these things, (tr. p. 229)
(c) Bila je to neka zena koju on niie poznavao. (DS246. 13)
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- It was a woman whom he did not recognize, (tr. p. 237)
(d) Almost at the same moment I seemed to remember the
man's face; that he knew me. (P302. 29)
These examples show the close relationship between poznati perfect¬
ive and poznavati imperfective, which is not obvious at first sight.
Examination of examples under (15) and (16), on the other hand,
reveals that, while poznavati, znati and know can be substituted in
both kinds of contexts, i. e. in those that are unspecified for
/Memory/ (as in (15) ) and those that are positively specified for
this feature (as in (16) ), (pre)poznati and recognize are applicable
only in (16). This indicates that (pre)poznati and recognize are
hyponyms of pnznavati and, therefore, of znati and know. The






Unlike these verbs, upoznati can be di-transitive . By a di-
transitive verb, in this context, is meant a verb which may take two
objects, of which one refers to the person obtaining the information
in question (which I will call for convenience 'the personal object')
and the other referring to what is known or learned (which may be
called 'the object known'). If the personal object is co-referential
with the subject of the verb it will, of course, be expressed by a
reflexive pronoun (in SC the form se). Consider the following
examples:
17. (a) Najprije smo pokusali da se upoznamo (reflexive di-
transitive) sa prirodom muzi£kog obrazovanja u
Sarajevu. (OI29.2)
- We first of all tried to get acquainted with the nature
of the musical education in Sarajevo, (my tr.)
* I am indebted to Prof. J. Lyons for bringing this term to my attention.
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(b) I vjerujem da 6e svaki buduci ovakav izbor upoznati
gitaoce (di-transitive) i sa autorima iz ovih gradova.
(ZJJ24.19)
- And I believe that every future selection of this kind
will inform the readers about the authors from these
cities, (my tr. )
SC uciti can also be di-transitive. If it is di-transitive, it is equiva-
alent to E teach. If it is a simple transitive (with or without deletion
of the known object), it may be translated by E study:
18. (a) 'Dobro da ucill Cela ku<£a posti zbog tebe.' (DS179. 36)
- 'Now mind you study well. The whole house is fasting
because of you. ' (tr. p. 174)
(b) uOcu da ucim skolu za sudiju. '
•Ne ti ces da u&i£ za inXenjera.
Masine da pravis. ' (DS280. 23)
- 'I want to study to be a judge. '
i
'No you should study to be an engineer and make
machines, * (tr. p. 269)
(c) Od njih se uffi (reflexive di-transitive) Sta treba uciniti
da bi se ponovilo Sudo koje se zove pesma. (OSS19. 4. 1)
- He is learning from them what ought to be done so that
the miracle called 'a poem' could be repeated, (my tr. )
(d) Isto je tako vjerovatno da postoji brojna potencijalna
publika, koja se gubi jer je niko ne u£i (di-transitive)
kako da slu^a sa uzivanjem klasicnu muziku. (OI29. 2. 2)
- It is also possible that a large potential audience
exists which is being lost because nobody is teaching
it how to listen with pleasure to classical music.
(my tr. )
(e) Za njega se ne zna gdje je ta£no ucio muziku. (OMZ30. 3. 1)
- It is not known where exactly he studied music, (my tr. )
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While study in E seems to be used with respect to all levels of
education, studiratl in SC is confined to higher education. There¬
fore, 'uXiti engleski' and 'studirati engleski' automatically differ¬
entiate between / -Higher education/ and / +Higher education/
respectively. In the rural areas of Yugoslavia, however, uciti is
used as an overall verb (as in example (18b) ).
SC uciti and studirati and E learn and study are also restricted by
the feature /Memory/, except that in their case the memory is not
necessarily repetitive, but, rather, cumulative, in the sense that
it need not be the case that one and the same event or object is
being referred to. We shall, therefore, name this feature /Memory:
Cumulative/. The point is clear from the examples in (18) but here
are some with learn:
19. (a) As for my age, did not Caxton begin to learn Greek
at sixty? (PI6. 33)
(b) And all the history she ever learnt was army history.
(P41. 36)
(c) 'He hasn't leant vet when it's time to stop playing',
Lucy would answer, 'and unless he learns it now he'll
never learn it. ' (P215. 35)
(d) Death is a great teacher - from him men learn what are
the things they value. (P252. 27)
(e) A woman came every day to give her lessons, which
she learned very easily, and yet with anxiety. (P255. 8)
(f) And what do they learn in the new schools, egotism,
materialism. (P307. 39)
The features that SC poznavati, upoznati. u£iti. studirati and














(znati) 0 0 0
poznavati 0 0 - 0
upoznati m 0 0 0
uciti - + 0 -
studirati m + - +
(know) 0 0 m 0
learn - + - 0
study m + - 0
teach m - + 0
SF SF SF SF
Learn and study are not synonymous, as it appears from the table.
The application of study, as well as studirati. is restricted to
perusal of textbooks and cannot apply in 'experience' contexts (as *n
'I 'learnt to avoid him' (PI22, 33) or 'They have learnt from
experience how much the young trust to luck' (P212. 21) ) or 'skill'
contexts (see p. 189 ), since studirati and study seem to be narrower
in scope. Rather, it seems that !hey arejhyponyms of learn and
ugiti.
6. 6 There are verbs of this iemantic field that are negatively
specified for the feature /Direct information/. Such are SC cuti
and E hear. What I mean by /-Direct information/ is in fact the
necessary condition of a threefold relationship between: the person
that receives information, the source of information and the object
or situation referred to. While the receiver is / +Animate/f
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/ +Human/, the source and the object may be either positively or
negatively specified for animacy. The source can be a variety of
things from a human being to various kinds of media. What is
important, however, is the triangle of the receiver, the source and
the object. This triangle is maintained even if it is explicit in the
context that the source and the object are referentially identical (as
in 'I heard from John himself that he was leaving for Canada').
Also in contexts like (20):
20. Ufca rece da ce on govoriti na kraju kad cuje gta ostall
misle. (DS22. 14)
- Prof said that he would speak at the end when he had
heardwhat the others thought, (my tr.)
In support of the argument, here are some examples with Suti and
hear:
21. (a) Suo je iz razgovora apsenika da je upravnik zatvora
neki dobar covek. (DS171. 16)
- He gathered from the conversation of the prisoners
that the governor was a good sort. (tr. p. 166)
(b) 'A od koga-si-toiula?' (DS323. 33)
- 'And who did you hear this from?* (tr, p. 309)
(c) 'Suo sam od nekih ljudi da je to nemaSki £ovek.'
(DS175. 17)
" 'I've heard from certain people that he is working
for the Germans, • (tr. p. 170)
(d) We heard by wire that John was coming home from a
German hospital. (P258. 4)
We notice with the examples < f (21) that he threefold relationship
is overtly marked by: iz razgovpra apsenika ('from the conversation
of the prisoners'), od ko^a ('from whom'), od nekih l.judi ('from
certain people'), by wire. But even if this part of ihe triangle is
not overtly expressed, the contexts in which cuti and hear appextc dre
I-Direct information/:
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22. (a) 'Majku ti ubili, to si sigumo £uo.' (DS238. 35)
- 'Your mother was killed, I suppose you must have
heard. ' (tr. p. 230)
(b) Za&to nije pobegla? ZaSto kad je sigurno £ula da su
.partizani dosli? (DS289. 12)
- But why hadn't Branka run away? Why not, when she
must have heard the Partisans had come? (tr. p.277)
(c) Kad partizani du§e da je U£a ranjen, pofce&e da be&e
uz kosu. (DS 328. 31)
- When the Partisans heard that Prof had been wounded,
they began to run along the slope, (tr. p. 314)
(d) 'Have you heard that Tolbrook is being sold, to be
pulled down?' (Pi5, 30)
(e) But when, three months later, we heard that Lucy had
married Brown, I spoke again scornfully of her. (P69. 11)
(f) We had heard, of course, that he was a rising man.
(P120. 32)
(g) For at that time, I knew nothing of the woman except
what I had heard. (P316. 18)
The difference between cuti and hear and saznati, doznati, learn
and get to know is interesting in that if the latter group occur in
contexts that are /-Direct information/ (that is to say, if the three¬
fold relationship of receiver - source - object is implied), they are
clearly negatively specified. Otherwise, they are neutralized in a
context. Let us first consider contexts marked / -Direct informa¬
tion/ :
23. (a) Koliko je dana proslo od kazne? Mora to odmah
saznati. (DS61. 18)
- How many days was it since his punishment had
started? He must know at once, (tr, p. 62)
(b) 'Zavite me brzo', rece, zeleci da sto pre ustane da
sazna ishod borbe. (DS88. 32)
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- 'Tie me up quickly', he said; he wantedito get up
as soon as possible and find out the outcome of the
battle, (tr. p. 88)
(c) Zar ja tek ovde da saznam da se Nemci povlace?
(DS323.5)
- And to think that it was here that I heard the Germans
had withdrawn, (tr, p. 309)
(d) 'Ako saznaju da ste sisli, sve da nas pobiju. ' (DS320. 9)
- 'If they get to know that you've come down here, they'll
kill off the lot of us, ' (tr, p, 306)
(e) Pla^io se da nece imati snage da napusti ovaj kraj dok
ne bude doznao sta je sa Brankom. (DS284, 37)
- He was afraid that he would not have die strength to
leave this district until he had found out what had
happened to Branka. (tr. p. 273)
(f) I pre desetak dana doznao sam da on vise njima nije
potreban. (OK22. 3. 4)
- Ten days ago I learnt that they didn't need him any
more, (my tr.)
(g) But! I did learn from Edward that according to his man,
the between-maid at home was not entirely virtuous.
(P76. 11)
(h) And in truth, as I learnt at a later time from one who
had been a Benjamite, Lucy was a terror to Brown.
(P97. 30)
(There are no examples in the original E material with get to know,
but it is obvious that it can be substituted in all contexts under (23).)
The peculiarity of these verbs, therefore, lies in the fact that,
unlike some verbs that are unspecified for /Direct information/ and
in examples like those under (23) would still remain unspecified,
these verbs actually indicate negative specifications. (For example,
if we consider substituting find out in (23f), we would not be able to
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tell how that information had been obtained: whether indirectly, or
through direct observation.)
But, in contexts that themselves are unspecified for this feature,
eaznati. dosnati, learn and get to know also ;eem to be unspecified:
24. (a) Kasnije ve<£, u Sibiru, doznala sam da Ilic nije nista
manje od mene &teo klasike. (ZS13.14)
• Later yet, in Siberia, I learnt that Ilic did not read
classics any less than myself, (my tr.)
(b) (...) a ja sam verovao da niko nikada nedfe saznati
moje podmukle namere (...) Verujem da to nikada
niko ne bi doznao da vi niste obelodanili u svojoj
knjizi. (ZPS62.46)
- (...) and I believed that nobody would ever find out
about my mean intentions (...) I beBeve that nobody
would have dver: discovered it if you hadn't revealed
it in your book, (my tr. )
All four verbs are interchangeable and here unspecified for the
feature /Direct information/. The instances of (24) bring out the
point of contextual neutralization very clearly. That is, since these
verbs have been found to be negatively specified for this feature in
contexts that are themselves negatively specified, and since they in
unspecified contexts carry neutral specifications, they are, in fact,
inherently I-Direct information/, but they become unspecified in
contexts where a specification is not important or not required.
Saznati and learn, but not the < ther two can also be used in contexts
that are clearly /+Direct information/. For example:
25. (a) 'Da, da] 3ve je drukfcije i mnogo drukcije no £to je
nekad bilo1, pomisli Pavle sa osecanjem razocarenja
u sebe, kao da veceras prvi put sve ovo saznaie.
(DS183. 1)
- 'Yes, indeed] Everything is different, very different,
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from what it used to be', thought Paul, with a feeling
of disappointment in himself, as though all these
things were clear to him for the first time this evenixg.
(tr. p. 177)
(b) 'Moja ceta je uniltena. Ona vile ne postoji', u£asavao
se Uca kao da to prvi put saznaje. (DS324. 11)
- 'My platoon has been wiped out. It does not exist
any more', Prof was filled with horror, as though he
realized this fact for the first time. (tr. p. 310)
(c) U takvim napisima pesnika se pokazuje da je Sovek
saznajuci svet oko sebe i odusevljavajuci se njime
zaboravio sebe (...) (ZS031.7)
- In such writings of poets it can be seen how a man
forgets himself in trying to understand the world
around him and in being thrilled by it. (my tr.)
(d) For even this Ann, this Robert, are so changed in a
single night, that I must learn them again in the
morning. (P109. 16)
Instances of (25) show how closely these two verbs are related to
some of the verbs of Group III. Clearly, spoznati and all the
'analysis* verbs are substitutable here. (Uvidjeti is restricted
in its occurrence with V + Object constructions, and, therefore,
inapplicable in (25e) and (25d). )





Observation and Storing Reasoning
-Direct inf. Unspecified + Direct inf.
saznati + 0 0
doznati + 0 -
learn + 0 0
get to know + 0 -
SF SF SF
6.6.1 The feature /Direct information/ is, in fact, relevant for
most of the verbs outside Group IV. They are either negatively
specified or unspecified for this feature.
If we examine the substitutability of znati in the instances (20) -
(25), we can observe that Jhe substitution is possible:
a. unless /-Direct information/ is overtly marked as
in (21). (22g), (23g), (23h) ;
b. unless the aspectual feature / +Event/ is overtly marked
by a time adverbial, as in (20), (22c), (23b), (23e),
(23d), (23f), (24a), (25a), (25b), (25d).
(The situation with respect to E know is less clear. Some speakers
suggest that it can be used in at least some of these contexts; and
there is at least one context of this kind in the material, example
(26). But many native speakers have rejected its acceptability,
on the grounds of infrequency of use in current English:
26. When Edward knew the story of the maid (...) he
laughed and said (...) (P78. 7) )
c. unless the aspectual feature /Process/ is overtly
marked (as in (25c) );
It may be noted that tad/then, as adverbials, are acceptable with
znati/know, but in that case they are consequentially related with
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£uti and hear. For example:
27. And then we heard that he had married a young girl.
(P205. 10)
The substitutability of vidieti and see is restricted in a different
way, due to the fact that these two verbs are in another semantic
field marked / +Visual/. Hence the impossibility of substituting
them in contexts which would be made ambiguous with respect to
this feature, as, for example, in (22), (23c), (23d), (23f), (25c)
and (25d). I -fVisual/ is, therefore, presupposed in vidjeti and
see if the objects referred to in the context are marked / +Concrete/.
The substitution of vidjeti and see in sentences of (21) shows that
the overt marker of /"Direct information/ is not always a restric¬
tion on substitutability. From (21a) it is obvious that the restric¬
tion does not apply if the person referred to by the subject of the
sentence is not necessarily the receiver of information. Otherwise
the restriction holds, as in (21b-d), (23g-h).
Otkriti and discover also have different restrictions. Their
substitutability for <Suti /hear is restricted with respect to the
feature /Intention/ in the contexts that mark past actions, where
cuti/hear are unspecified for /intention/, and otkriti/discover might
in some cases be interpreted as intentional as in (22a-g).
Neutralization between these verbs is possible in contexts referring
to non-past actions. Consider them in examples (23a - e).
Since saznati. doznati, learn and get to know can also be inter¬
preted as intentional in the same context as otkriti/ discover, the
substitution is possible in most cases: e.g. (23a - f), (24),
(25).
In contexts overtly marked /-Direct information/ otkriti/discover
behave like vidjeti/ see.
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Find out behaves similarly to otkriti/discover, except that its
substitution is not restricted by contexts being overtly marked
/-Direct information/, see (21), (23g - h).
In (25c - d) find out would have to appear in the construction
V +about +Object,












discover ^ doznati si/63££? =Re.oewe^ [see





We can, therefore, conclude from the above examples that the
verbs discussed are unspecified for the feature /Direct information/.
Apart from 'skill* verbs (see p. 189 ), for which this feature does
not seem to be relevant, and apart from misliti, vierovati. think
and believe (discussed on pp. 182-1S9)» we can now list the
specification of verbs of knowledge and understanding for this
feature. It seems plausible, in as far as it was possible to judge










































doznati get to know
The verbs that are assigned only positive specifications (underlined
under I) have been found not to occur (at least not frequently) in
I-Direct information/ contexts, and (as we have seen above) only
&uti/hear as negatively specified, never occur in any other type of
context. We can go even further and say that the verbs only
marked '+' and the verbs only marked (apart from saznati.
doznati. learn and get to know which are exceptions) are inherently
/ -fDirect information/ and / -Direct information/ respectively.
6. 6. 2 It seems convenient at this point to examine a group of
verbs in terms of the feature / + Direct information/ in order to
m
+
see in what way the feature /- Factivity/ is relevant and in what
way it influences their substitutability for each other. We have in









We have seen (see p. j3 ) that, on the basis of the 'but1 test, the
above verbs have been thought to be: (a) non-factives (razumieti,
shvatiti. cuti. osjetiti. understand, hear, feel); and (b) negative-
committals (misliti, vierovati. think, believe).
These verbs will be examined with respect to such contexts as
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(28), i, e. with respect to the construction V + that + Sentence,
20. I understand that he has brought back nothing from
his ten years' farming in Canada and South America.
(P18. 8)
Clearly, this context indicates information indirectly obtained and
we can conclude that the verb understand is in such contexts marked
/•Direct information/. It is also in such contexts used most
frequently in the present tense. What about the other verbs?
As far as razumieti and shvatiti are concerned, it seems that (28)
would be translated into SC by the construction kako sam ja razumio/
shvatio ('as I understood it'). Notice that the translation is rendered
by the past tense rather than the present tense. The meaning,
however, remains essentially the same as in (28), It seems,
therefore, plausible to take this construction as the one that will,
with respect to these two verbs, correctly render in SC two features:
/-Factive/ and / -Direct information/. The difference between SC
and E here lies in two factors. One is tense difference, and the
other overt vs. covert expression of the feature /-Factive/. But
the differences are, obviously, not crucial, since the semantic
similarityus preserved.




'kako sam ja1— 4 understand
(past tense) (present tense)
SC £uti and E hear are used in both past and present tense with
approximately the same meaning. Here are some examples:
29, (a) Bio je pre rata kaplar kao ja, a sada je, £u,iem
(present), pre^ao za narednika i komanduje
getom. (DS173. 36)
- He was a corporal like me before the war, but I
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hear he's become an officer and is in command
of a platoon, (tr. p. 169)
(b) '3ta je? 6ujem (present) da si rani en. Gde?'
(DS89. 22)
- 'What's the matter? I hear you're wounded.
Where?' (tr. p. 89)
(c) '£ula sam (past) da se preko Mo rave pojavio neki
veliki odred. ' (DS323. 10)
- 'I heard that a big company had appeared on the
other side of the Morava. ' (tr. p. 309)
(d) I hear Mrs, Eels is a very nice woman and she has
helped Edward a lot in his worries. (P87. 33)
(e) 'But Edward, I heard you were rather intimate with
a certain lady. ' (P70. 6)
(f) 'I heard that your Tolbrook congregation was less
than it used to be. ' (P290, 29)
(g) When 1 heard that Amy was dying I couldn't believe
itj, (P336. 3)
(The non-commitment is explicitly stated in (29g) by the phrase 'I
couldn't believe it'. )
The relationship of the above three verbs with cuti and hear can,




<J 1?shvatiti (paSt tense>
£uti (past, present tense)
understand (present tense)
hear (past, present tense)
From the substitution of vjerovati and believe in the above examples,
it appears that the feature /-Direct information/ is preserved if
they are employed in the present tense. See examples (28), (29e),
(2 9d). It is hard to decide what exactly happens if they are used
in the past tense. It seems, from examples (29c) and (29f) either
that neutralization occurs, or that the verbs become / +Direct
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information/. If we examine vjerovati and believe in contexts
for misliti and think, we shall soon be convinced that vjerovati
and believe are, in fact, unspecified for the feature /Direct
information/ and that they can occur in contexts specified as
I-Direct information/, as well as contexts marked / -flDirect
information/. Consider vjerovati and believe when substituted for
misliti and think, which, as is obvious both from the examples
above and from (30), are positively specified for the feature /Direct
information/:
30. (a) Ljudi misle da mi ne znamo §ta hocemo. (DS15. 23)
- The men think that we don't know what we want,
(tr. p. 19)
(b) U£a je zadovoljno osluskivao razgovor i mislio da
je kriza progla i da ih sad vige niko ne moze
pobediti. (DS89.7)
- Prof listened happily to the conversation, and
thought that the crisis was over and that they
would not be defeated again, (tr. p. 89)
(c) U daljini se cmeo dugi niz drveca gubeci se ka
Moravi. Jovan pomisli da bi to mogla biti
sumica. pa pojuvd u torn pravcu. (DS197. 13)
- In the distance was a black line of trees,
gradually disappearing from sight in the direction
of the Morava. John thought that it might be a
little wood, so he hurried in that direction.
(tr. p. 91)
(d) I think I know what it means to have perfect faith.
(P141. 21)
(e) She thinks that because I am old I know nothing about
the real world in which she livea (PI63. 33)
(f) I thought she was asking me a question, but I did not
know what it was. (PI99. 21)
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-> think (pres. past)
Osietiti and feel, which a re non-factives, share the feature / -IDirect
information/ with misliti and think and can be replaced by them,
as well as by vjerovati and believe, in contexts like the following:
31. (a) Jovan oseti da odbijanie javke £ini ubedljivom
niegovu laz i pretvaranie. (DS169. 7)
- John felt that his refusal to give a code made his
lies and deception more convincing, (tr. p. 164)
(h) Sukob u £tabu, podvoienost celi.ie (... ) bili su.
osecao ie. u stvari ne samo izrazi neslaganja u
taktici, vec opasnost za odred. (DS129. 30)
- Conflicts among the Staff, differences of opinion
in the cell (...) - these he felt to be not only
expressions of different opinions as to tactics,
but a source of danger to the company.
(tr. p. 128)
(c) We felt that she was a special cat, quite different
from the kitchen and yard cats. (P31. 15)
(d) I had written to him about an alteration in my will.
For I felt I ought to make some special provision
for Ann. (P32. 15)
(e) I feel that here is someone eager to be my tinder-
standing friend. (P73. 10)
(f) She has turned herself into a char because she
feels that her own class is finished. (P72. 2)
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(s) I felt that for his own sake I ought to tell him that
his appearance must be painful to Ann. (P79. 2)
(h) I felt that Lucy, as my mother said, was beyond
us; an unreasonable creature. (P96. 34)
(i) They feel that thev have better things to do than to
gossip and dance and be polite. (P141. 33)
(j) But I don't feel I ought to let Robert walk right
over me. (P191.24)
(k) I felt that it was I who had committed some crime.
(P193. 13)
(1) The old man felt, for that moment only, that he was
an instrument of government, that he disposed
supreme power. (PI 98. 2)
(m) And I felt perhaps that to bring a Julie to Tolbrook
would be an impiety to my father's house, now in
my care. (P209.4)
(n) Nothing, I felt, was worse for a girl in her situation
than idleness. (P224. 15)
(o) 'You see, he feels that he has disappointed us all. '
(P267. 17)
(p) People like John feel that thev aren't wanted.
(P277. 5)
Yet, a difference can be observed, quite clearly, if not with respect
to other verbs, then certainly with respect to misliti and think, if
substituted in these contexts and elsewhere (see examples below).
From (31?), it is clear that os jetiti and feel are non-factive, i. e.
they presuppose no commitment of the speaker as to either truth or
falsity of the complement. But the substitution of misliti and think
brings out the fact that, at least in some contexts, these two verbs
can be held to presuppose, even in the affirmative sentences,
falsity of the complement. For example, (31c) perhaps implies
that that particular cat was not at all special. See also (3If),
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(31k), (31o), (31 p).
It seems that this also holds true for vierovati and believe. See
again especially (31c), (3If), (31o), (31p). And, indeed, all the
other examples of ( ) can have a similar interpretation with
respect to misliti/think, vierovati/believe.
Here are some more examples with feel to prove the point. Consider
the substitution of misliti and think in:
32. (a) For I had not before remembered Amy so well,
and I felt that I had done her great injustice in
her life. (Pill. 19)
(b) We felt that our lives had fallen in an age of
revolutions and heroic adventures. (P139. 21)
(c) The very beauties of the place, the glitter of
flowers, the scents, the waving branches (...)
increased my panic. For I felt that I did not
belong among them. (P210. 35)
(d) 'Yes', Edward said, 'there's another group of
war welcomers. I'd forgotten them - the people
who feel that the world is wicked » that it
deserves punishment. ' (P226. 13)
(e) I felt that he was to be an honour to the Wilchers.
(P232. 23)
(f) At once, feeling perhaps that I was not inclined
for a sail, he added, 'But perhaps we had better
wait for a better day. ' (P232. 37)
(g) I felt (...) that harm had been done. (P287. 32)
This might indicate that "the negative-committals misliti. think,
vierovati and believe (which presuppose the commitment of the
subject to the falsity of the complement in negative statements,
as in 'He doesn't think she's going to marry Robert') in some
instances carry over the presupposition of the commitment to the
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falsity of the complement also to the affirmative statements. In
any case, such interpretation is possible.
Notice also that such interpretation is not excluded even with non-
factives like razumieti, Suti, understand (past tense) and hear.
My intuition about SC interprets razumieti and shvatiti in the con¬
struction Subject + V (past tense) + that + Sentence ('Ja sam
razumio/shvatio') as presupposing the falsity of the complement, so
that in (28) the complement 'that he has brought back nothing ...' is
taken to be false. And, in fact, that is most probably the reason
for overt marking of non-commitment by kako sam ia razumio/
shvatio ('as I understood it').
As a final point about this group of verbs, we should point out that
the substitution of the above four negative-committals in contexts for
osjetiti/feel, depends very much on how prominent in the context is
the feature /Observation/ which, as we have seen (see p. 145 ),
involves the senses. Being unspecified for /Specific sense/,
osjetiti/feel tend to express a less clearly formulated awareness, or
a less ready ability to account for it. If the feature is fetrongly felt
in a context and cannot be neutralized as in (31) and (3 2), the
substitution is inappropriate. For example:
3 3, (a) Pavle eseti-da bi sad mogao potpuno da ga
prelomi. (DS136. 19)
- Paul felt that he could now soften him up
completely, (tr. p. 134)
(b) Jovan oseti da ie do£ao trenutak. (DS196. 33)
- John felt that the moment had come, (tr. p. 190)
(c) Pavle oseti da ovakav ton vredia Maksima.
(DS218. 19)
- Paul felt that Maxim was offended by this
tone, (tr. p. 210)
(d) Bio je u groznici, osecao je da se velika
stvar dogadja, sudbonosna za odred. (DS144. 23)
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- He was trembling feverishly: he felt that
something very important was happening,
something fateful for the company, (tr. p. 142)
(e) Osecao 1e da eu u pitanju minuti. (DS205. 27)
- He felt that it was indeed a question of
minutes, (tr. p. 199)
(f) Qsecao ie da ona mora da iska£e sve &to ima.
(DS302. 15)
- He felt that she had to unburden herself
completely, (tr. p. 289)
(g) But now, as I pace restlessly through the lower
rooms, I feel it is something deeper, more
passionate. (P89. 16)
(h) He paused and I felt that he had plumped the
word out in defiance of embarrassment.
(P227. 12)
(i) And I felt that not only Edward but I too was
receding into a past which was irrecoverable.
(P283. 32)
We can therefore summarise the relationships of the verbs of













razumjeti + m 0 -
shvatiti + m 0 - -
£uti + m 0 m -
osjetiti + m m + +
misliti + 0 + -
vj erovati - + 0 0 m
understand + * 0 a* m
hear + - 0 - m
feel + m - + +
think m + 0 + m




From the table it is clear that substitution with overlapping mean¬
ing is possible (a) between razumieti. shvatiti, cuti, vjerovati.
understand, hear and believe in contexts presupposing / -Direct
information/; and (b) between osjetiti. misliti, vjerovati, feel,
think and believe in contexts presupposing / +Direct information/.
It can also be seen that the commitment of the speaker to the
falsity of the complement can, in some contexts, be presupposed
by all the verbs except Q3ietiti and feel.













Rather than considering it on its own, we shall explain briefly
here what is thought to be the difference between this group and
Group I in terms of /Ability/, since they seem to overlap to a
large extent.
First of all, it seems evident that the difference between the two
groups is that, while the verbs of Group I fbiti, sviestan,
prepoznati. osietiti. primiietiti, opaziti. realize, recognize,
be conscious, be aware, feel and notice (see p. 145 ) ) stop short
of any implication other than that of the one presupposing the
feature /Observation/, the verbs of Group V seem to go further
in that they imply observation in order to store information, and
in order to be able to reason upon it. This might explain, for
example, the difference between otkriti/discover and primiietiti.
opaziti/notice. The difference is, it seems, due to the feature
/importance/, for which otkriti/discover are positively specified
and primiietiti. opaziti/notice are not; also it seems to be due to
the feature /intention/ which is present in otkriti/discover in
negative statements, direct questions and some statements in the
future tense; in primiietiti/notice in direct questions and the
future tense statements; and not at all in opaziti (see p. 136 ).
But, since negative statements can be regarded as the most
conciisive evidence of the presence of the feature /intention/ in a
verb, and it is present in otkriti/discover and the other verbs of
Group V, this influences the kind of context which the two groups
can enter. As a result, the difference is also felt in affirmative
statements like the following:
34. (a) VereS je dakle otkrio dva antipodna tipa ljudi.
(OJN18. 1. 3)
- VereS has therefore discovered two contrast-
ing types of people, (my tr.)
(b) And several years passed before I discovered.
or rather one of my tenants discovered, that a
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great part of the works was missing. (P320.4)
The native speaker feels that the substitution of primiietiti,
opaziti/notice is insufficient or inadequate to indicate the signifi¬
cance of the situation.
However, the basic difference between the two groups seems to
lie in the fact that Group I presupposes stimulus on the senses
(see p. 145 ), whereas Group V is unspecified with respect to the
feature. As a consequence, Group I, especially primijetiti.
opaziti/notice, may reflect more casual observation, in other
words information obtained without being sought and without
effort, whereas Group V can be used with respect to information
usually obtained with effort and not easily observed. Let us
contrast discover and notice again in the following examples:
35, (a) (...) and he had a small boy's astonished
and aggrieved air when he discovered that
we had not been shooting or fishing or
picnicking lately, (PI08. 13)
(b) For I have discovered that old people can
enjoy life with as much appreciation as a
child eats his breakfast. (P37. 25)
(c) This was the secret I had discovered when,
at the outbreak of war, I stood in a row with
the other volunteers and found that we were
friends. (P301.20)
(d) For I thought hat long before that, the family
would discover where I was. (P315. 19)
36 . (a) So I had time to notice how well Sara looked
after both my houses. (P36. 15)
(b) Now I had noticed this look once or twice
before. (P181. 32)
(c) She does not notice the apple-scented lanes,
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the bright crops. (P325.40)
(d) Ann got up and left the room so skilfully
that I did not notice that she had gone till I
turned to her again. (P340. 34)
If we express componentially the kind of observation implied in
primiietiti. opaziti/notice as /-Effort/ and also if we assume that
the stimulus of the senses is directly connected with the feature
/Direct information/, we can draw a few conclusions about the
contexts in (35) and (3 6) with respect to the interchangeability of
discover and notice. In terms of these two features we can
conclude that:
(35a) » /-Direct information/, /-Effort/
(35b), (35c) » /+Direct information/, /-Effort/
+ +
(35d) * /-Direct information/, /-Effort/
(35a- d) a /fDirect information/, /-Effort/
As for the verbs of Group I and Group V, we can see that Group I
are all /+Direct information/ since they all require some kind of
stimulus of the senses, but Group V can be divided into:









With respect to the feature /Effort/, we can observe from the
examples above, as well as from the contexts given below, that
Group I, all except prepoznati and recognize, are /-Effort/, and
these two are /^Effort/. Of Group V, only make out seems to
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*
be positively specified and the rest are unspecified. Here are
some more examples with the verbs of Group V which will show
also when neutralization is possible:
37. (a) 'Situacija je ozbiljna. To vi i sami vidite. *
(DS62. 6)
- 'Our situation i3 serious. You can see that
for yourselves. ' (tr. p. 63)
(b) Kasnije, kad se videlo da ce revolucija biti
ne samo ustanak, vec i jedan dugotrajan rat
odred se smanjio. (DS117. 12)
- Later, when -t was clear that the Revolution
would not be just a rising, but a long drawn*
out war, the numbers of the company
decreased, (tr. p. 116)
(c) Jedan inostrani kritiSar zapazio je kako
Sudesna lepota lirike naseg pesnika potinje da
impresionira i najmladje potomke Edgara
Alana Poa. (OSS19.4)
- A foreign critic has perceived how the
peculiar beauty of the lyricism of our poet
is also beginning to impress the youngest
descendants of Edgar Allan Poe. (my tr. )
(d) Dva toka, vazda, mogu da se uo£e u bezmalo
svakoj SlaviSekovoj pesmi. (ZMS21.40)
- Two currents can always be perceived in
almost every poem by Slavi&ek. (my tr.)
(e) All zna da ce uspjeti samo ako otkrlie svoj
unutraSnji svijet. (ZL10.48)
- But he knows that he will succeed only if he
discovers his inner world, (my tr. )
* And this seems to be the reason for the possibility of substituting
this verb for the verbs marked /^Analysis/.
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(f) Yet when I examine myself* as now* in a long
glass* with Ann's eyes* I see that I must be a
queer object to a stranger. (P10.11)
(g) But now I saw that to the wanderer all this
world is home. (F301. 16)
(h) This would not alarm me so much if I could
make out what goes on in the girl's head.
(P9. 17)
(i) And I perceived already that these brilliant
young men, like Edward, found me dull and
foolish. (P71.36)
(j) But we perceived that, when he was with us,
his affection was real and quick. (P123. 17)
(k) I had not yet discovered that women were not
to be Edward's ruin. (P167. 1)
(1) It was at such meetings that I first discovered
how unreasonable and bitter people can be*
when they are frightened. (P247. 13)
We can see that notice is substitutable in (37a), (37c), (37d),
(37f), (37i), (37j), (371). The non-substitutability of notice in the
other contexts of (37) is accounted for by the feature /Direct
information/ and /Effort/. The same holds true for primijetitl
and opaziti, except that opaziti is further restricted since it
involves a specific sense (see p. 1^7 )•













biti svjestan + m + + m m
(pre)poznati + 0 0 + 0 m
osjetiti + 0 0 + m m
primijetiti + 0 0 + m m
op&ziti + 0 0 + m m
realize + m + + - m
1
recognize + 0 0 + 0 m
be conscious + m + + - m
be aware + - + + m m
feel + 0 0 + - m
notice + 0 0 + - -
vidjeti + + 0 0 0 +
zapaziti + + + + 0 +
uoditi + + + + 0 +
otkriti + + + 0 0 +
V see + + 0 0 0 +
make out + + + + + +
perceive + + + + 0 +
discover + + + 0 0 +
find out + + + 0 0 +
The substitutability features are here /intention/, /Direct
information/ and /Effort/. From the table, and from the above
examples, it can be seen that the substitution between Group I
and Group V is possible if the contexts can be assigned the features
I "Intention/, / +Direct information/ and /-Effort/.
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The justification for dividing these verbs into two groups lies
precisely in the fact that, since Group V primarily presuppose
/intention/ and /Effort/, or at least are not negatively specified
for these features, they, as a consequence, necessarily involve
some other process beyond that reflected in the feature
/Observation/; and that process may be either that of storing




A particular kind of 'ability' verbs are 'skill' verbs, i, e, those
that are considered to be substitutable in contexts expressing
skill. We shall discuss the following:
biti sposoban
Of these, SC (na)u£iti and E learn are considered to be non-
factives, and the rest negative-committals (see p. 32 ).
They all occur in V + V sentence constructions (be capable also
occurs in V + of + Object constructions, see (8c, d, e) ). Four
of them, znati, (na)uttiti, know and learn, take kako/ how in
contexts which imply a particular way of doing thing i, e., the
constructionist V +kako/how + V. While this construction
is in such contexts obligatory with E know (see also p. "79 ), it
seems to be optional with the other three.
The 'skill' contexts are numerous in the material, in particular
those containing mo^i and can. From these, we shall have to
select a number cf contexts which appear to be most relevant,
and exclude those that provide less significant information.
7. 1. 1 We shall, first of all, examine how znati, umjeti and
know are related to each other:
l.(a) Razdor medju njima u najkriti&xijem trenutku,
SC E
know










mislio je Pavle, dovesce odred do propasti, a
niie znao kako da ga izbegne. (DS18. 30)
- This split between them at a most crucial
moment, in Paul's opinion, would bring the
company to the verge of disaster, and he did
not know how to avoid it. (tr. p. 22)
Ni Maksim ni druga dva ilegalca koji su posli
sa Vukom nisu ni§ta znali da mu kai£u o zeni
i detetu. (DS234. 27)
- Neither Maxim nor the other two conspirators
who had set off with Vuk could tell him anything
about his wife and child, (tr, p. 22 6)
Nije mogao da ih gleda, a niie znao kako da im
pomogne. (DS107. 14)
- He could not bear to look at ihem, but he did
not know how he could help them, (tr. p. 107)
'Radi se o internoj stvari a on zna samo da
y.amnta rami, • (DS189. 19)
- 'It's something internal, and all he can do is
to bandage wounds, (tr. p. 184)
'Ja cu da preplivam. '
'A Sta cu ja sto ne znam? (DS209. 18)
- 'I'll swim. *
•And what about me - I can't, (my tr. )
(...) sa mladicima od kojih vecina pre odlaska
u odred nije znala ni puskom da rukuje.
(DS265. 23)
- (...) with youths who until their arrival in
the company had not known how to handle a
gun, (tr. p. 255)
•Ti samo znas da kukas. ' (DS321. 11)
- 'Hush, all you can do is to moan. ' (tr. p. 307)
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2. (a) Pevali su i oni koii umeiu i oni koii ne umeju.
(DS90. 15)
- They were all singing, those who could sing
well, and thos e who could not, (tr, p. 90)
(b) 'Kako to ne times da se radujes. ' (DS88. 2)
• 'Don't you know how to feel glad?' (tr, p. 88)
(c) Umela ie ardacno da vodi obigne razgovore.
(DS300, 37)
- She could really enjoy quite ordinary
conversation, (tr. p. 287)
(d) 'Oni (konji) sve razumeju kao ljudi samo Sto
ne umeiu da govore. (DS392. 1)
- They (horses) can understand everything, just
like human beings, only they can't talk.
(tr. p. 373)
(e) Kad bi izbila neka neprilika, ona bi se umesala
i pokusavala da je otkloni sto je bolje znala i
umela. (PW208. 7)
- When there was trouble she would interfere
and try to minimize it aa best she could.
(my tr. )
3. (a) It is only the love of knowing how to do things
which Nature plants in every child. (P25, 6)
(b) 'Don't you know how to mind your business yet?'
(P26. 35)
(c) And she would know how to keep her place.
(P36.8)
(d) 'I didn't know how to be happy. ' (P52, 15)
(e) My father did not seem to know how to answer.
and remained silent. (P95. 11)
(f) 'They are all looking for something, some
happiness; but they* don't know how to get it.' (P142. 16)
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(g) 'And I thought I knew how to love. ' (Pi78. 21)
(h) She would speak brusquely to the boy like a
%
shy young woman, who does not know how to
manage a love affair. (P218. 29)
(i) yiLe knew how to hurt each other. (P296. 32)
Examination of the results shows that, in (1), (2) and (3), znati
is always substitutable for the other two verbs, umjeti is always
substitutable for know how, but not always for znati, and know
how is not always substitutable for umj eti and znati.
It seems that the substitutability of umieti for znati here is not
readily acceptable in some cases for at least two reasons. One
seems to be that, if a context indicates some kind of intention
(as in (la) and (lc) ) to find the way of doing things, the native
speaker finds it inappropriate to substitute umieti. since it is
/ -Intention/. The other reason appears to be that, unless a
context presupposes skill in the narrowest sense, i. e. involving
a particular way of doing things, umieti is not substitutable (as
in (lb) ). In other words, unless a context implies 'how to do
things', umieti is inapplicable. This leads to the conclusion
that the feature /Skill/ is inherent in umieti. From the same
example it can be seen that it is inherent in know how as well.
It is, in fact, striking that umjeti expresses covertly precisely
what know how expresses overtly, by the preposition how (hence
the non-substitutability of this verb in (lg) ).
7. 1. 2 (Na) uciti and learn are positively specified for the
feature /Learnt/ and they also presuppose /Memory :
Nonrepetitive/ (unlike, for example, recognize which presupposes
/Memory-Repetitive/, see p. 145). This feature prevents their
substitution in (lb), (le), (2a), (2b), (2d), (3c), (3d), (3e), (3h).
Here are some examples with leaxnJio prove the point:
4. (a) Only my brother Bill of our family ever
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learnt to swim. (P44. 39)
(b) riearnt to avoid him, for when he caught my
eye, he would at onces come towards me and
say something incomprehensible. (P122. 33)
(c) Robert, who had just learnt to walk. loved
to escape from his mother. (P218.4)
(d) Probably, in her modern school, just as she
never learnt how to enter a room (... ) she
was never taught how to begin, maintain and
conclude a real conversat ion. (P238. 27)
(e) For though he can't speak, he has learnt to
pray. (P288. 20)
(f) I had learnt to appreciate the quality of a woman
who could devote herself to chairs, tables,
carpets. (P320.8)
(g) She is a slow but careful needle woman,
having learnt to sew. I imagine, only in the last
year. (P331. 18)
(h) (... ) whereas it is perfectly obvious that he has
only just learnt to whistle and doesn't know any
tune. (P341.28)
7. 1. 3 Moci and can are distinguished from the rest of the group,
quite strikingly by the feature / Potential/. The difference
between potentiality and actuality is emphasized particularly in
contexts of (3), in which modi and can are not substitutable.
The exceptions are (3b) and (3h) where neutralization is possible
for can. The difference can be described as that of involving
potential ability, regardless of whether it is going to be put into
practice or not. It can a'-so be described as 'inherent' in the
sense of being present in am individual permanently. Notice
that in (4), where the feature / Learnt/ is made explicit by a
time adverbial (4a - d), (4g), (4h) ), moci and can are not
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substitutable. In such contexts the difference between potential¬
ity and actuality is clearly observable.
'Inherent? and 'potential' can, therefore, be used interchangeably
here, and we shall label the feature / Potential-inherent/. The
feature is particularly obvious in (2d) above. The difference
between /Learnt/ and / Potential-inherent/ is explicit also in
(If), hence the non-substitutability of moci and can. But while
can seems to allow neutralization in a context like (le), moci
does not. This is also reflected in (lg) and (2a).
A-. this point we can summarize in a table the relationships of








znati 0 0 0 0 0
umjeti + 0 0 0 m
(na)uciti 0 + + - 0
moci 0 - - 0 m
know how + + 0 - 0
learn 0 + + - 0
can 0 0 0 0 m
SF SF SF SF
Let us, however, look at some examples with moci and can:
5. (a) Izgladneo, premorio se i podeo da bunca.
Vile ni o cemu ne moze pametno da misli.
(DS10. 25)
- He was hungry, worn out, and his mind
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had began to wander; he could no longer
think straight about anything, (tr. p. 14)
'U ratu par£e ciste krpe i rakija mogu
voiniku Sivot da spasu.' (DS30. 20)
- 'In a war a piece of clean rag and a drop
of rakija may cavp a cr.1rH or'a Hfa, • (tr. p. 33)
'Da njega nema ne bi' migla da zivim. •
(DS33. 22)
- 'If it wasn't for him I couldn't go on living',
(tr. p. 36)
'Dok mogu, teracu bicikle. a kad ostarim,
kupicu cezu. ' (DS43. 2)
" 'While I can. I'll ride a bike, and when I get
old I'll buy a cab. ' (tr. p. 45)
Kad se malo oslobodio, on je (...) tvrdio (...)
da zna partizanske pesme, pa ako zele mogu
i da cuiu. (D371.5)
- When he was a little more at ease (...) he
affirmed (...) that he knew some Partisan
songs; if they liked they could hear them,
(tr. p. 72)
Bio je kurir koji je mogao da prod.ie Nemcu
kroz pocepan dzep i da izvrsi zadatakt (DS98. 11)
- He was the sort of courier who could slip
through the German's fingers and get his job
done, (tr. p. 98)
Kad je pao mrak, te se moglo slobodno preci
iz dvorista u dvoriste, Aca pogrbljen udje u
sobu kod Pavla i Vuka. (DS189. 11)
- When darkness fell, they could move freely
from one courtyard to another, Aca, Still
doubled up went to the room where Paul and
Vuk were talking, (tr. p. 184)
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(h) Pomisao da bi to ona mogla biti uzasavala
ga jc. (DS245. 35)
» The thought that it might be her filled him
with horror, (tr. p. 237)
(i) 'Nisam mogla da spavam.1 (DS301.11)
- I couldn't sleep. 1 (tr. p. 288)
(j) 'Zna$ da imam slabo srce i da ne mogu da
izdrzim hod. ' (DS369. 18)
- 'You know I've got a weak heart and can't
stand long marches. ' (tr. p. 352)
6. (a) (...) and Ann, who can spend a whole evening
with her nose in a book (... ) (P13.11)
(b) It was a love such as can only exist between
brother and sister. (P21. 38)
(c) I never hated anyone as I could hate Lucy. (P27. 23)
(d) My father would boast that Lucy could climb
and ride and shoot better than any of us.
(P41. 33)
(e) Neither she nor I could swim. (P44. 38)
(f) Lucy could not read so well as myself.
(P47. 3)
(g) 'You can come with me and see the fun. •
(P62.7)
(h) At college I sought to be of that group of rich
young men who were scholars and dandies at
the same time, who could talk both philosophy
and horses. (P71. 30)
(i) 'Can he be serious ... ' (P102.44)
(j) 'He knows he can always find someone to love
him. (P145. 26)
(k) He could not speak, but he could think and feel.
and write very legibly. (P158. 7)( about a
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person who had had a stroke)
(1) 'An old miser who can only think and talk
about money.' ' (P181.43)
(m) His mother and father have been under the
illusion that I could not handle children and
did not like them. (P212. 39)
(n) 'She can't have gone with Robert. ' (P213. 32)
(o) It was probably raining. I could not ride a
bicycle and was obliged to use the trap and
the yard pony. (P249. 28)
(p) 'Can I see you at tea?' (P286. 27)
(q) Babies, as soon as they can walk, begin to
explore the world. (P301. 37)
(r) 'But they say she can cook ... ' (P316. 24)
First of all, it is easily observed that moci and can differ from
the verbs discussed above in that they can express permission,
as in (5e), (6g), (6p).
They also differ from the above verbs in that they can occur in contexts
expressing one aspect of modality, namely possibility, as in (5h),
(6b), (6i), (6n) - in SC expressed by ni.ie moguce ('it is not possible
that'). If we compare these contexts with (5b) we shall notice
that they differ in the possibility they express. While (5b)
expresses merely potential possibility, not attached to any particular
situation or group of people, (5h), (6b), (6i) and (6n) express a
possibility of a particular occasion, attached to a particular
individual or a particular group of people and commented upon by
the speaker. We can therefore distinguish between /Potential
possibility/ of (5b) and/Speaker's comment/ (i.e. 'objective
modality', see p.85 ) in the case of (5h), (6b), (6i) and (6n).
Of the verbs discussed above, only znati can be substituted in
(5b). The feature /potential-inherent/ can again be discerned
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in (5a), (5f), (6a) and (6c), where (na)uciti, know how and
learn are not substitutable. In (6e) there is no explicit or
overt marking of the feature /Learnt/ (such as talk philosophy in
(6h) ), so that the substitution of moci (unlike can) would result
in ambiguity between physical impediment (examplified in (6k) ),
*
and lack of skill, (See also example (le) ). It follows from
this that moci suggests more strongly than can the feature
I ^Physical/ although they can both occur in such contexts.
(61). as well as (lg) reveal one more feature relevant to the
group of 'skill' verbs, and that is the feature /Habitual/, The
results show that of all the verbs, only moci, know how and
learn are not substitutable here. (6e) is ambiguous between
lack of skill and situational impossiblity, so that different
substitutions are possible. In the former interpretation, znati
umieti, nauciti, know how, learn are also substitutable.
The relationships of the verbs can, so far, be represented as
follows:
* The ambiguity is avoided, for example, if the verb preceded
by can need not presuppose / +Physical/, as in 'talk philosophy'









Pot'L Inh't. Int'n. Habit'l. Spkr's. Comm't .4SMemory overt
znati 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 - - 0 -
umjeti + 0 0 0 0 - 0 *p» mm m -
(na)u<5iti 0 + + 0 - 0 0 mm mm - -
moci 0 - 0 ■m 0 - - 0 0 0 0
know how + + + 0 - 0 - mm - - m
learn 0 + + 0 - 0 mm - - mm -
can 0 0 0 0 0 mm 0 0 0 0 0
SF SF SF SF SF SF SF SF SF
7,1.9- We shall now look at how biti u stanju and be able relate
to the rest of the verbs.
If we substitute them in the above contexts of (1), (2), (3), (4),
(5) and (6), we will be able to notice that they are substitutable
in all contexts which allow for the feature /Potential-inherent/.
Such contexts are:
(la), (lb), (Id), (lg), (2b), (2c), (2d), (2e), (3a), (3b), (3c),
(3e), (3h). (4e), (4f), (5a), (5c), (5d). (5f). (5j> (6a), (6c), (6d).
(6h), (6k), (61), one interpretation of (6o); (6q) and (6r).
While be able allows for neutralization between / -fPhysical/ and
/•fSkill/, bitu u stanju, like moci, does not. See examples (le),
(2a), (6e), (6f). On the other hand, while biti u stanju allows
for /Potential possibility/, be able does not, see example (5b).
They can also both occur in contexts marked / +Habitual/, as
in (lg) and (61).
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Since they are restricted to the type of context which we have
named 'skill' context* they can also be considered as positively
specified for /Skill/.
The following are some of the examples of biti u stanju and be
able found in the material:
7. (a) 'Oni nisu u staniu da dogadiaie gledaju
sire. ' (DS26. 12)
- 'They aren't able to take a broader view
of things. ' (tr. p. 28)
(b) (...) perhaps because my mother did not
feel able to walk the two miles for a second
time. (P43.9)
(c) (...) my firm had been able to find the money.
(P206. 2)
(d) But I was rarely able to be alone with him.
(P234. 12)
(e) And again I was able to congratulate myself
on my foresight in keeping always a store of
change. (P300.41)
(f) She was propped up in bed with pillows and
barely able to turn her head. (P336. 18)
Biti u staniu is not substitutable in (7d), which suggests that it
cannot, unlike be able, imply solely an influence from outside
an individual, without any reference to the individual's inner
capacities. We shall name this feature /Outside influence/.
7.1. 5 If we now substitute biti sposoban and be capable of
above, we will notice that they are basically substitutable in
three types of contexts. Granted that these two verbs are also
typical 'skill' verbs, we observe that they occur in: (a) contexts
that allow for the feature /Physical/, as in (5a), (5c), (5d),
(5j)» (6d), (6q); (b) contexts that allow for the feature /Potential-
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inherent/, as in (Id), (2e), (5f), (6a), (6h), (6m); (c) contexts
that allow for the feature /Habitual/, as in (lg) and (61).
Judging from the non-substitutability of be capable of in (2d)
which presupposes an innate capacity, we can pose a difference
between these two verbs in terms of this feature which we shall
name /innate/. On the other hand, while be capable of can
occur in contexts that are / +Learnt/, as in (3b) and (3d),
biti sposoban is not substitutable.
Before we summarize the relationships of the •skill* verbs, we
shall give a few examples of biti sposoban and be capable of,
to support the above conclusions:
8. (a) U sadasnjem raspoloSenju on ni.ie bio sposoban
da trazi druga resenja. (DS374. 36)
- In his present mood he was unable to think
of another way out, (tr. p. 357)
(b) Ako ,ie kr eativno sposoban da osjeti
unutrasnju bitnost djela i literature, on ce
biti sposoban i da je izrazi. (ZIN168. 42)
- If he is creatively capable of perceiving
the inner essence of a literary work and
literature, he will also be capable of
expressing it. (my tr.)
(c) 'He is a fool, and she is capable of anything
to amuse herself. * (P74. 26)
(d) (...) just as all women ought to be capable of
devotion. (P157. 39)
(e) I did not know that a woman was capable of
this careful approach to an historical problem.
(P236. 11)
The final picture of the relationships of 'skill* verbs can be





















































































































































































The verbs of knowledge and understanding can be further classi-
fied according to whether they can occur in a context expressing
a prediction. Before we start discussing the predictive contexts
found in the material, we shall briefly look at Boyd and Thorne
(1969) and Mcintosh (1966) in order to refer to some points for
our analysis.
Boyd and Thorne make one very important claim and that is that,
to quote, 'It must be emphasized that saying that 'He will live
in Edinburgh' is potentially a prediction is not at all the same
thing as saying that it is future tense (...) In fact we would
claim that there are only two tenses in E, past and present
(better past and non-past). Thus if I say 'My cousin is down¬
stairs, He will be wondering what has happened to me', the
difference between the two sentences is not the result of my
having switched tenses (in fact it is clear that the time reference
of both sentences is the same - they are both non-past) but of
my having switched from making a statement in the first case
to making a prediction in the second (...) It must be
emphasized that the only function of the modal verb will is to
indicate that the illocutionary potential of the sentence in which
it occurs is that of being a prediction. ' (1969:63-64)
This claim is important because it accounts for the fact that
with the verbs of knowledge and understanding prediction can
be expressed in V + Sentence constructions where the tense of
the subordinate clause is the same as that of the main verb,
and also in V + Object constructions where the object has clear
reference to actions following the time of utterance. Here are
some examples with znati and know:
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1. (a) Galamilo se, dovikivalo se, tako da se
nile znalo na ci.ioi ie strani vecina.
(DS47. 1)
- There was so much noise and shouting
that it was impossible to know what was
the opinion of the majority, (tr. p. 49)
(b) 6ovek stvarno ne zna sta sve ima u sebi.
(DS93. 30)
- Nobody really knows what he's like
inside, (tr. p. 93)
(c) Sta bi Pavle rekao? 'Znao sam ia da je ta
starkelia pudljivko. pijandura, najgora
izdaiica na kugli zemaljskoi. ' (DS106. 2)
- And what would Paul say? 'Yes, I knew
♦hat' that old fool, a coward, a drunkard,
was the worst traitor in the whole world. '
(my tr. ; the Heppell-Mihajlovic transla¬
tion is incorrect: 'Yes, I knew that old
fool was a coward and a drunkard, and the
worst traitor in the whole world. *)
(d) Niko sem Vuka ni ovum trenutku nfie vidio
ni znao tu novu, nepredvidjenu te&kocu.
fDS212. 33)
- At that moment no one except Vuk realized
this new, unforeseen difficulty, (tr. p. 205)
(e) Pavle ie znao da od uspeha te akcije mnogo
zavise njihove dalje operacije. (DS251. 30)
• Paul knew that their future operations in
that district were closely bound up with the
success of this action, (tr. p. 242)
(f) Oni su gledali seljake i znali da nemaju gde
da se vrate. (DS331.7)
- The Partisans looked at the peasants, and
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knew that hey had nowhere to go back to,
(tr. p. 316)
(g) But I knew very well the danger of such
notions to an old man. (P105. 21)
(h) We knew that he forgot us as soon as we were
out of his sight. (P123. 15)
(i) I know very well that the pipe is doing service
somewhere about the farm. (P152. 22)
(j) They are the lovers, the pilgrims of the
world, who carry their burdens from one
disappointment to another, and know it is use¬
less even to complain. (P176. 4)
(k) I knew at once that they had something on their
minds. (P184. 37)
(1) 'Come, Edward, even the stupidest soldier
knows the consequences of war in modern
Europe.' (P221. 32)
(m) 'Ha, I knew you could see the coastguard
station^' (P261.2)
All examples under (1) can be paraphrased by (Subject)
'predict' *ti that ... and the subordinate clauses can be expressed
by the future tense.
In his article 'Predictive statements', Mcintosh (1966) discusses
predictions 'effected grammatically', i. e. those expressed by
be going to + Inf (and be going to be + -ing) and will + inf (and
will be + -ing). This particular aspect does not concern us
here, since we shall be dealing solely with the semantic aspect
of the feature /Predictive/, that is to say, we shall look at
how this feature is represented by the main verb in V + Sentence
and V + Object constructions.
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I
What is a prediction? To quote Mcintosh: 'By 'predictive'
I do not necessarily mean something which is without a well-
founded basis in reason or in observation; I merely wish to
separate statements which simply convey judgements or
assessments about what is going to happen from others which
carry other implications as well, e.g. those which we might
describe as 'decision' or 'promise*. ' (1966:303)
Mcintosh stresses that 'a full analysis of this problem would
have to take account of differences between first, second and
third person. In genera^ statements involving the second or
third person (and especially the latter) can more readily be
predictive than those involving the first. ' (1966:305)
With those constructions in which the verbs of knowledge and
understanding are employed to express predictions, i. e.
V + Sentence and V + Object constructions, a new condition,
not unrelated to the question of the first, second and third
person, has to be accounted for. The condition is that
normally there should exist referential non-identity between
the subject of the main clause and that of the subordinate
clause. Consider example (2). As it stands, it cannot be
interpreted as a prediction. The referential non-identity will
render, at least in some cases, such interpretation:
2. 'Znam sta hocu. ' (DS26. 4)
The following combinations are most likely to be interpreted as
predictions:
The predictive implications are not normally attached to:














However, example (3a) below indicates that predictions can
be expressed by the combination Main Clause Subject: II person
• Subordinate Clause Subject: i/III person, if there is an overt
marker of uncertainty present in the main clause', such as 'mora
da .,. ' ('Must ...'). or, for example, probably. If there is no
such marker, the sentence will be interpreted simply as a
descriptive statement.
Mcintosh also concludes that 'there are cases where a person's
knowledge about something going on at present may be as deficient
as it is about anything in the future. ' (1966: 317) He examplifies
this by 'He'll be earning a lot of money over in the States', and
he labels this kind of prediction as 'conjecture'. It is the same
kind of prediction that Boyd and Thorne refer to above (1969:
63-64).
8. 1. 1 The following verbs of knowledge and understanding have























To this list we shall add, and consider separately, SC osietiti
and E feel. The reason that they are not included in the above
list is that, as non-factives (see p. 33 ), they cannot express
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a prediction. Rather, they express something that can be
named an expectation, expectations not presupposing commit¬
ment of the speaker about the truth or falsity of the complement.
In this study we shall concern ourselves only with those verbs













as well as osietiti and feel as expressing expectations.
8. 1. 2 Consider the substitution of these verbs in the following
examples with znati and know, as well as in those under (1):
3, (a) 'Ti mora da znas Sta ce biti sa nama.
Vidim ne&to si naumio.' (DS31. 23)
• - 'But you must know what is going to
happen to us. I can see that you have
thought of something.1 (tr. p. 34)
(b) Niko nije bio raspolozen i spreman da
suprotstavi drugi predlog, iako su svi
znali da 6e umornu, izgladnelu i
desetkovanu kolonu mars na Belu Stenu
dovesti u novo i tesko iskusenje. (DS61. 32)
- No one was in the mood to put forward
an alternative suggestion, although they
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all knew well that for the weary starving and
depleted column the march to the White
Rock would be a fresh and heavy trial.
(tr. p. 63)
Zna on tacno sta ce bitl posle rata. (DS95. 3)
- He knew just what things would be like after
the war, (tr. p. 94)
'Ne sekiraj se, ne sekiraj se! Na vreme si
stigao djavolu na svadbu. Da ai samo znao,
izgubio bi ti vezu jos za neki dan. ' (DS98.16)
- 'Not to worry! You've arrived in time for
the devil's wedding! If you'd knownvlt.
you'd have come even later. * (my tr. )
Ko jc znao da ce ovako da ispadne. (DS116. 5)
- Who could have told that things would turn
out like this, (tr. p. 115)
'Ne znam kako ce ovo da ispadne. ' (DS280. 36)
" 'I don't know how things are going to turn out,
(tr. p. 269)
•Bio sam kod opstine ... Nisam znao da cete -
kod mene. ' (DS18637)
- 'I went to the town hall ... I didn't know you
would be coming :o me.' (tr. p. 181)
V V / /
'Zao mi je sto necu videti kako ce izgledati ta
nasa sloboda, Kad bi' to ta£no znao. lakse bi
mi bilo. (DS281. 33)
- I'm sorry that I shan't see what this freedom
of ours is going to be like. If I knew just
how things were going to be. I shouldit mind
so much.' (tr. p. 270)
On se pribojavao duzeg zadrzavanja u ovom
kraju jer je znao da ce Nemci, posle svega
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sto bu partizani ucinili na ovom terenu.
sve snage baciti na niih. (DS284. 25)
- He was afraid of a longish stay in this
region, as he knew that. after all the
Partisans had done there. the Germans
would throw all their strength at them,
(tr. p. 273)
'Da je ona. isposnice, znala, da ces ti
posle rata postati kapetan, pristala bi
sigurao. ' (DS380. 1)
• 'If she'd known, old chap, that you'd be
a captain after the war, she'd have
accepted you for sure. * (tr. p. 361)
Ana j e znala da izmadju n jih nikada nece
biti prave srece. Da li je to shvatila u
toku svo.ie bolesti. ili raniie. bilo je
nejasno. (OFI32. 2. 1)
- Ann knew that there would never be real
happiness between them. Whether she
realized it during her illness, or before
that, it was uncertain, (my tr.)
I know that I shall not be whipped while I
am ill, so I do not care. (P47.40)
I knew that I should have to fight this child's
battles. (PI 16.4)
Now the truth is I had not opened any letters
from certain members of the family, because
I knew that they would be full of complaints
against Ann. (P131.28)
But I know that the old Ibkckguard will swear
he never had a pipe. (P152. 22)
'How do you know what bad characters may
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come about the place.' (P213. 27)
(q) Yet I knew even then that this act must
change all my relations with Julie. (P229. 27)
(r) 'I don't know what's going to happen to him.1
(P234.41)
(s) I knew that they would talk about their sons.
(P257. 19)
/ \
(t) 'I knew you would havejcome. Because of
Papa.' (P297.8)
(u) (...) for I knew that if the family pursued me,
thev would seek me in one of my usual places
in Kensington. (P301.ll)
(v) But I could not know how that break would
affect her. (P304. 19)
(w) We could not know that events within a few
years would prove the southern ape to be the
human ancestor. (AG28. 12)
In the contexts under (1) and (3) we can clearly distinguish between
several different kinds of prediction. First of all, there are
predictions that definitely presuppose previous repeated
experience. Such contexts are: (lg)» (lh), (li), (1 j), (3i),
(31), (3n), (3o), (3s), (3t) and (3u). Secondly, there are predic¬
tions that do not presuppose (as far as cam be detected) amy
previous stimulating event. Such predictions are normally
initiated at the time of utterance. The following contexts seem
to be of that kind: (lb), (le), (11). (3a), (3b), (3c), (3h). (3k).
(3r), (3v). Thirdly, there are those that distinctly presuppose
am event immediately preceding the time of utterance:
(If), (lk), (3m), (3q). And finally, there are those which are
uttered after the fulfilment (or non-fulfilment) of the prediction,
as in (lc), (lm), (3d), (3e), (3g), (3j) and (3w).
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The substitution of the selected group of verbs in these contexts
has revealed a few interesting points. Granted that these
verbs are also restricted in terms of other features discussed
*
above , it has been found that, according to the results, the
verbs vidjeti and see occur only with predictions based on the
immediately preceding event or in contexts that allow for that
kind of interpretation. In fact, this seems to be the basic
difference between znati/know and vidieti/see with respect to
predictive statements. The following sentences with see show
this difference clearly:
4. (a) I saw that he would object to the name
Edward. (Pi 16. 8)
(b) But seeing that I could get no support from
my mother. I went back to Lucy. (PI 61. 11)
(c) 'And what were your conditions ?'
'I didn't make any. I saw it wouldn't do. *
(P324.41)
The substitution of znati/know in (4), with the same meaning,
is impossible without a time adverbial such as tada/then. to
indicate the restriction in time. Otherwise, the sentences
under (4) would be interpreted either as presupposing previous
repeated experience, or as predictions not connected with any
preceding event.
It seems that E be clear occurs with two kinds of predictions,
those based on experience and those based on an event
immediately preceding them. SC biti jasno. although similar
* for example biti iasno. shvatiti. be clear and understand pre-
suppose the feature / + Analysis/; understand, especially in
V +that + Sentence constructions, is ambiguous towards the
feature /-Direct information/; be conscious presupposes the
feature /Observation - Sense non-specific/
220
in meaning elsewhere* is not restricted in the same way.
E perceive is, like vidjeti and see, restricted to predictions
based on an immediately preceding event. This seems apparent
from the following examples:
5. (a) (...) but I perceived that Robert meant to
worry me about the trees. (P18. 26)
(b) For I perceived (...) that if 1 began to
worry about a silly flirtation between the
two young people (,..)! should get no
peace at Tolbrook. (P23. 28)
(c) If I gave way, I perceived that the boy's
character already headstrong, would be
entirely wrecked. (P318. 18)
The substitutability of znati/know in (5b-c) indicates that another
way of neutralization between vidjeti/ see/perceive and znati/know
is by conditional sentences.
The rest of the verbs do not seem to be confined to one or the
other of the three first types of prediction discussed above. The
fourth type is most commonly introduced by znati and know, and
in some cases, for which the pattern has not yet been found, also
by biti svjestan, be conscious, be aware and realize.
8.1.3 SC misliti and vjerovati, and E think and believe, as
negative committals, i. e. as verbs that in negative statements
presuppose the falsity of the complement, can only in such
statements introduce a prediction. This is why, if negated,
they can be substituted in (3k) and (31) and also in (4b) with a
change in construction and (4c). Their substitutability does
not seem (otherwise) to be confined to any of the types of
predictions recognized above.
8.1.4 SC osjctiti and E feel, although non-factives, and
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therefore not presupposing any kind of commitment of the
speaker, can, however, be substituted in some of the above
contexts, in particular those that allow for the necessary
vagueness attached to the meaning of a non-factive verb.
Except for their obvious non-occurrence in the sentences
above which are expressed after the fulfilment of a prediction,
they are not restricted to any of the other three recognized
types.
Since the term •prediction* expresses a full commitment of
the speaker to the truth or falsity of the complement, and
osietiti and feel do not fulfil this requirement, being non-factive,
it seems appropriate to attach to these verbs the term
•expectation*. This term has been chosen for want of a better
one to stand for the non-commitment that the two verbs carry
as part of their meaning.
Before we conclude this chapter, consider the following examples
osietiti and feel in which some kind of 'expectation' is
being expressed:
6. (a) Svi partizani, sa Ucom i Pavlom, osecali
su da ie zaseda sudbonosna. (DS80.24)
- All the Partisans, including Prof and Paul,
felt that the ambush would decide their
fate, (tr. p. 81)
(b) Osecaiuci blisku opasnost, on se baci u
tmje(...) (DS197. 3)
- Feeling that he was in imminent danger,
he flung himself down into the thorns (...)
(tr. p. 191)
(c) I fled from Brown because I felt that if I
did not run, he would get me. (P21. 14)
(d) I felt that he was to be an honour to the
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Wilchers (...) (P232. 23)
(e) I knew that this was a joke and yet I felt
that I was going to be murdered. (P333. 20)
Here the uncertainty attached to osletiti/feel prohibits the sub¬
stitution of znati/know. The similarity with misliti/ vierovati
and think/believe (in affirmative statements) is, however,
noticeable, in V + Sentence constructions like (6c), (6d) and
(6e).
The relationships of the verbs discussed can, therefore, be



















znati 0 0 0 0 -
vidjeti - m 0 m
biti jasno 0 0 0 - -
shvatiti 0 0 0 - -
biti svjestan 0 0 0 (0) m
misliti (neg. ) 0 0 0 0 0 (aff)
vjerovati (neg.) 0 0 0 0 0 (aff)
(osjetiti) 0 0 0 m 0
know 0 0 0 0 -
see - m 0 m -
be clear 0 «* 0 «* -
realize 0 0 0 (0) -
understand 0 0 0
be conscious 0 0 0 (0) -
be aware 0 0 0 (0) -
perceive m m 0 •* •»
think (neg. ) 0 0 0 0 0 (aff)
believe (neg. ) 0 0 0 0 0 (aff)
(feel) 0 0 0 - 0
SF SF SF SF SF
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SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS
In this work an attempt has been made to establish semantic
correspondences and differences between the verbs of knowledge
and understanding in Serbo-Croat and English by way of a
componential analysis.
On the basis of the material at hand, two basic types of distinct¬
ive features have been encountered: non-contextual (or inherent)
features, and contextual (or substitutability) features. The
contextual features signify possible substitutions, while the non-
contextual ones act as restrictions of a more general nature, in
the sense that, provided two verbs are substitutable in a
particular context, their substitutability will further depend on
whether they have the same specifications for a non-contextual
feature. For example, if the context in question is / + Intention/
and if one of the verbs is negatively specified for it, the
substitution of the two verbs for each other with the same meaning
is inappropriate.
It has become evident that, in the majority of cases, the
encountered substitutability features are, in fact, inherent
features for some of the verbs substitutable in contexts that
reflect these features. (Or, conversely, some inherent features
are substitutability features for a certain group of verbs. )
On the basis of the material, it was possible to establish thirty-
one contextual and twelve non-contextual features. The number
of contextual features indicates the number of different contexts
within which the verbs of knowledge and understanding differ in
possibility of substitution.
All the features in the analysis, apart from /Speaker's comment/
225
are regarded as subfeatures of subjective modality. Also,
they are all considered to be based on presuppositions.
In order to provide a fuller picture of the relationships of
these verbs, restrictions in terms of aspectual differences,
time adverbials and sentence construction have also been
considered.
The following is a description of the verbs of knowledge and
tinderstanding in terms of the established features.
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INDEX OF CODES REPRESENTING FEA TURES IN THE SUMMARY
1 * Aspect
1A * Process
1A1 * Repetitive Process
1A2 * Continuous Process
IB « State
1C » Event
2 ■ Adverbials (numbering the same as in Appendix of
Chapter III, except that here '2' precedes).
2A : 2A1 2B : 2B1 2C : 2C1
2A2 2B2















4 a Type of Sentence
4A a Implied question a a that
4B « Direct question
b *what
4C a Negative statement
c awhy
d a how
4D a Affirmative statement e « when
f awhere
g a whether






6B a Affirmative committals
6C a Negative committals
6D a Non-factives
7 a /Speaker's knowledge/
7A a / Parenthetic/
7A1 a initial position: /informative/









Negative statement, first person: speaker's intention
Direct question: subject's intention
Future
First person: speaker's intention
Second person: speaker's intention
Second person: subject's intention
Third person: speaker's intention










12A a /Ability/ - /Observation/
12A1 * /Specific sense/
12A2 s / Contemporaneous/
12A3 a /Memory/ - /Repetitive/
12B s /Ability/ • /Storing/
12C a /Ability/ - /Reasoning/
12C1 s / Persuasion/
12C2 s /Thinking/
12C3 a /Acknowledgement/
12C4 a /Analysis/, /Complexity/
12C5 a /Sympathy /
12C6 a / Implications/
12C7 a /Creative/
12D a /Ability/ - (/Observation/ /Storing/)
12D1 a /Details/ - /Memory/
12D2 a /Cumulative/
12D3 a /Di-Transitive/
12D4 a /Higher education/
12D5 a /Direct information/
12E a /Ability/ - (Observation/ /Storing/ /Reasoning/)
12E1 a /Effort/
12F a /Skill/
12F1 a / Learnt/
12F2 a /Memory/ - / Cumulative/
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12F3 a /Overt/
12F4 a /Potential - inherent/
12F5 « /innate/
12F6 » /Habitual/
12F7 * /Outside influence/
12F8 » /Potential possibility/
12F9 » /Physical/
12F10 * /Permission/
12F11 * /Speaker's comment/
13 * /Prediction/
13A a /Before the fulfilment/
13A1 * /Experience/
13A2 * /-Preceding event/
13A3 a /+Preceding event/




+ «= inherent feature* except under 2» 4* 7A, 9 and 10*
(In 2, 4 and 9 it indicates occurrences* in 7A and
10 it reflects positive specifications within certain
contexts and not generally. )
* negative specification or non-occmrremte.
t- s inherent negative specification
No sign in front of number s zero specification.
Underlining »contextual (substitutability) feature (the
numbers which are not underlined represent
non-contextua1 features),
brackets = infrequent occurrence.
There are verbs for which two clear-cut senses have been
encountered. Such are: SC znati and E know, learn and recognise.
Specifications of both senses for each verb will be given separately
in the following order:
znati
j 'storing information* contexts
znati^ = 'skill' contexts
know 35 'storing information' contexts
know how SS 'skill' contexts
learn.
X




recognize^ X 'known before*
Apart from recognize, all these verbs vary in factivity in the two
different senses. It might be argued that* on the basis of differ¬
ence in factivity, some other verbs like SC shvatiti. razumieti.
and E understand could be said to have two different seises since
they are non-factive in V + that + Sentence construction where
they are negatively specified for the feature /Direct information/.
However* there seems to be no further ground for establishing
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this distinction since the underlying meaning represented by
the feature / +Analysis/ is retained even in such context*. For
these verbs two readings will be given for the features /Factivity/
and /Direct information/.
biti jasno s 1, 2, 3, 4, 5B, +6A, 7, 8, 9, +10A,
10B, +10C1, + 10C2, 10C3, +10C4,
-10C5, +11, 12C2. +12C4. - 12C5,
12C6, -12C7. 12D5. 13A1, 13A2, 13A3,
-13B, -13C;
biti sposoban = 1A, IB, 1C, -2A3, -2A5, -2A9, -4, 5C,
■<6C, 7, 8, 9. 10, +11, +12F, -12F1,
-12F2, -12F3, +12F4, 12F5, 12F6,
"12F7. -12F8, 12F9;
biti svjestan = 1, 2, 3, -4Bg, -4Cg, 5A, 5B, +6A, +7,
+ 8, 9,4 10, 4ll, 12A1, 12A2. -12A3,
12C1, 12C2. 12C3, (1204). 4-17.Kl, 12D5.




1A, IB, 1C, 2, -4, 5C, +6C, 7, 8, 9,
10, +11, -H2F, -12F1, -12F2, 12F3,
+ 12F4, 12F5. 12F6, -12F7, 12F8, 12F9;
1A1, 1C, 2, 3, 4, 5B, +6D, 7, 8, 9, 10A,
10B, +10C1, +10C2, 10C3, +10C4, -10C5,
+ 11, +12A1, 4- 12D5:
1A1, 1C (imperfective 1A1), 2, 3, 4, 5B,
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+ 6B, 7, +8, 9, +10, +11, +12A1, 12D2.
12D4, 4 12D5;
1A2 (perfective 1A2, 1C), -2A8, -2C1,
3, +4a, +6C, 7, 8, 9. 10, 11, +12D5, ,13;
1A, IB, 1C, 2, -4. 5C, +6C, 7, 8, 49,
4 10, +11, 12F, -12F1. -12F2. 12F3,
12F4. 12F5. -12F6, 12F7. 12F8, 12F9.
12F10. 12F11;
1A1, 1C (imperfective 1A1, 1A2), 2, -4A,
-4f, 5B, +6B, 7, 8, +9B2, +9B3, 10A,
10B, +11, + 12A1, 12A2, - 12A3, 4l2El,
+ 12D5;
1A1, 1A2, 1C (imperfective IB), 2, «4Ab,
-4C, -4D, -4E, -4Df, -4g(A-C), SB, +6D,
7, 8. 9, 10, 11, 12A1, 12A2, - 12A3.
«4i2El, +12D5;
1A1, 1A2, 1C (imperfective 1A1, 1A2), 2,
3, -4Aa, 5A, 5B, +6B, 7. +8, 9, +10A,
+ 10B, +10C1, -10C2, +10C3, 10C4, 10C5,
+H, 12C2. 12D2, 12D4. 12E1, 12D5;
1A1, 1A2, 1C (imperfective 1A2, IB),
-2A8, -2B4, -4g, 5B, +6A, 7, 8, -9B3,
+ 10A, 10B, +10C1, +10C2, 10C3, +10C4,
10C5, +11, 12C2, +12C4. -12C5, 12C6,
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-12C7, 12D5;
poznavati a IB, 2A1, 2B3, 2B5, 2C2a, 2C2b, 2C3b,
2D1, 2D3, 2E, 2F3, 2F5, «4» 5A, 5B,
+ 6A, 7, 8, 9, 10, +11, 12A3, 12D2, -12D3,
12D4, +12D5;
(pre)poznati a 1A1, 1C (imperfective 1A1), 2A1, 2A2, 2A3,
2A4, 2A5, 2A6, 2A7, 2C4, 2D1, 2F1. 3, -4,
5A, 5B, +6A, 7, 8, 9, 10, +11, + 12A1,





a 1A1, 1C (imperfective \a), 2, 3, -4A, 5B,
w
+6B, 7, 8, -9B1, 10A, +10B, +10C1, -10C2,
+ 10C3. -10C4. 10C5, +11, +12A1, 12A2.
-12A3. 412E1, +12D5;
= 1A2, IB, 1C (imperfective 1A2, IB), -2A8,
3, 4, 5A, 5B, +6A/+6D, 7, 7A1, 7A2, +7A3,
7A4, 8. 9, +10A, 10B, +10C1, +10C2, 10C3,
+ 10C4, 10C5, +11, 12C2. +12C4, 12C5.
12C6, -12C7. 12D5/-12D5;
a 1A1, 1C (imperfective 1A1), 2, 3, 4, 5B,
+ 6B, 7, +8, 9, +10, +11, +12A1, 12C2,
12D2, 12D4, 412D5:
a 1A1, 1A2, 1C (imperfective 1A2, IB),
2A8, 3, 4, 5A, 5B, +6A/+6D, 7, 7A1,
7A2, +7A3, 7A4, +8, 9, +10A, 10B, +10C1,
235
+ 10C2, 10C3, +10C4, 10C5, +11, 12.C2,
+ 12C4, 12C5, 12C6. - 12C7. 12D5/-12D5.
13A1, 13A2. 13A3. -13B. -13C:
1A1, 1C (imperfective 1A), -2A8, -2B1,
-2B2, -2B3, -2B4, -2C1, -2C2a, -2C2b,
-4A, -4B, 5B, +6A, +7, +8, 9, 10, +11,
-12C1. +12C2, 12C3, + 12C±, +12D5;
1A2, 3, 5B, +6A, 7, 8, 9, 10, +11, 4l2A3.
+ 12D2, -12D3, +12D4, +12D5;
1A (perfective 1A, 1C), 2, 3, -4A, -4g(A-C),
5A, 5B, +6D, 7, 8, 9, 10A, 10B, +10C1,
10C2, +10C3, 10C4, 10C5, +11, 4l2A3,
+ 12D2, 12D3, -12D4. +12D5. 12F, +12F1,
+ 12F2, 12F3. -12F4, -12F5. 12F6. -12F7.
-L2F8, -12F9;
1A, IB, 1C, -2A3, -2A5, -2A9, -4, 5C,
+ 6C, 7, 8, -9, -10, +11, +12F, 12F1, 12F2.
12F3, 12F4. 12F5, 12F6, -12F7, -12F8,
-12F9;
1A, 1G (imperfective 1A), 2, 3, -4A, 5B,
+ 6B, 7, +8, 9, + lOA, +10B, +10C1, -10C2,
+ 10C3, -10C4, +10C5, +11, -H2A1, 12E1,
+ 12D5;
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1A, 1C (imperfective 1A), -2A2, -2A3,
-2A4, -2A5, -2A6, -2A7, -2A9, 3, 5A, 5B,
+6A, 7, 8, 9, 10A. 10B, + 10C1. 10C2,
+10C3, -10C4, 10C5, +11, «/l2A3, 12D2.
12D3. 12D4. +12D5;
1A, 1C (imperfective IB), -2C1, -4A, -4e,
-4g, 5B, +6A, +7, +8, -9B, -*10. 4> 11,
+ 12C1. 12C2, +12C3, ^12C4, +12D5;
1A2, IB, 1C, 2, 3, -4Bg, -4Cg, 5B, +6B,
7, + 7A1, + 7A2, 7A3, -7A4, 8, 9, +10A,
10B, +10C1, +10C2, 10C3, +10C4, 10C5,
+ 11* 12C1. 12C2. 12C3. 12C4, 12C6, 12D4.
12D5, -13A1, -13A2, 13A3, -13B, -13C;
IB (perfective 1A1, 1C), -2A8, -2C1, 3,
-4A, +4a, +6C, 7, 8, 9. 10, 11, 12P5. Ui
IA, 1C (imperfective 1A), 2, 3, «4A, 5A,
5B, +6B, 7, +8, -9A1, +10A, +10B, +10C1,
-10C2, +10C3, -10C4, +10C5, +11, +12A1,
12E1, +12D5;
IB, 1C, -2A8, 3, 4, 5A, 5B, +6A, 7, +7A,
8, 9, 10, +11, 12A3, +12B, 12C1. 12C2.
12C3. 12C4), 12D2. -12D3. 12D4.
12D5, 13(A-B). -13C;
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znati = IB, 1C, 5C, + 6C, 7. 8, 9, 10, +11, 12F,
w
12F1. 12F2, 12F3, 12F4, 12F5. 12F6. -12F7.
12F8, -12F9;
be able a 1A, IB, 1C, 2, -4, 5C, +6C, 7, 8, 9, 10,
+ 11, +12F, 12F1. 12F2, 12F3. 12F4. 12F5,
12F6, 12F7, -12F8. 12F9;
be aware a 1A, IB, 1C, 2, 3, -4g(A-C), 5A, 5B, +6B,
7, -7A1, -7A2, 7A3, +7A4, +8, -9A1. -9B1,
10, +11, 12A1, 12A2. -12A3, (12B), 12C2.
4l2El, 12D5. 13A1. 13A2, 13A3. (13B), -13C:
be capable of a 1A, IB, 1C, -2A3, »2A5, -2A9, -4, 5C, +6C,
7. 8, 9. 10, +11, +12F, 12F1. 12F2, -12F3.
+ 12F4. -12F5, 12F6, -12F7, «12F8. 12F9;
be clear * 1A, IB, 1C, 2, 3, 4, 5B, +6A, 7, 8, 9» +10A,
10B, +10C1, +10C2, 10C3, +10C4, 10C5,
+H. 12C2, +12C4, -12C5, 12C6, -12C7,
12D5. 13A1. -13A2. 13A3, -13B, -13C;
be conscious a 1A, IB, 1C, 2, »4e, -4g(A-C), 5A, 5B,
*
+ 6B, 7, +8, 9, 410, 411, 12A1, 12A2, -12A3,
12C2. 412E1, +12D5, 13A1, 13A2. 13A3. (13B),
-13C;
believe a IB, 1C, -2A8, 3, +4a, +6C, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11.
12D5, 13A1, 13A2, 13A3. 13B, 13C;
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can a 1A, IB, 1C, 2, -4, 5C, +6C, 7, 8, 4l0.
+ 11. 12F, 12F1 - 12F11;
conceive '« 1A1, 1C, -2B2, -2B3, -2B4, -4A, -4Ba,
-4g(A-C), 5B, +6C, 7, 8, -9B, 10, +11,
+12C4, -12C5, 12C6, +12C7. +12D5;
comprehend » 1A2, IB, 1C, -2A8, -2A9, -2B1, -4Dg, 5A,
5B. +6A, 7, 7A1, 7A2, + 7A3. 7A4. 8, 9,
+ 10A, 10B, +10C1, +10C2, 10C3, +10C4,
10C5, +11, 12C2. 12C4. 12C5, 12C6, -12C7.
12D5;
discover a 1A, 1C, 2, 3, -4Aa, 5A, 5B, +6B, 7, +8,
9, +1 OA, +1 OB, +10C1, -10C2, +10C3,
10C4, 10C5, +11, 12C2. JL2D2, 12D4. 12E1,
12D5;
feel a 1A, IB, 1C, 2, -4b, -4d, -4e, -4f, -4g(A-C),
5B, +6D, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12A1, 12A2,
-12A3» ^12E1, +12D5. 13A1, 13A2, 13A3.
-13B. 13C;
find out a 1A, 1C, 2, 3, -4Aa, 5B, +6B, 7, +8, 9, +10A,
+ 10B* +10C1, -10C2, +10C3, 10C4, 10C5,
+ 11, 12C2, 12D2. 12D4, 1JE1, 12D5;
get to know a 1A, 1C, 2, 3, -4Aa, 5A, 5B, +6B, 7, 8, 9,
10A, +10B, +10C1, 10C2, +10C3, 10C4,
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IA, 1C, -2A8, -2B1, -2B3, -2B5, -4Aa,
5B, +6A, 7. +8, 9, + 10A, 10B, +10C1.
+ 10C2, 10C3, +10C4, 10C5, +11, 12C2.
12C4. -12C5, +12C6. -12C7, 12D5;
1A1, 1C, 2, 3, 4, 5B, + 6D, 7, 8, 9. 10A,
10B, + 10C1, + 10C2, 10C3, +10C4, -10C5,
+ 11, + 12A1, 412D5:
IB, 1C, -2A8, 4, 5A, 5B, +6A, 7, +7A1,
7A2, 7A3, 7A4, 8, 9, 10, +11, 12A3. + 12B,
12C1, 12C2, 12C3. 4(12C4), 12D2, -12D3.
12D4, 12D5. 13(A-B), -13C;
1, -2A8, 5C, +6C, 7, 8, 9, 10, +11, -H2F,
+ 12F1, 12F2, 12F3. -12F(4-9);
1A, 1C, 2, 3, 4, 5A, 5B, +6B, 7, •«, 9,
+ 10, +11, 12C2. 12D4, -12D5;
1A. 1C, 2, 3, 5A, 5B, 5C, +6D, 7, 8, 9,
10A, 10B, +10C1, 10C2, +10C3, 10C4,
10C5, +11, +12A1, 412A3. 12C2. +12D2.
-12D3, 12D4. + 12D5, 12F, + 12F1. +12F2,
12F3, -12F(4-9);
1A, 1C, -2A8, *2B1, -2B2, -2B3, -2B4,
-2B6, -4Ba, -4Dg, 5B, +6B, 7, +8, -9A1,
240
+ 10. +11, 12C4. + 12E1, +12D5;
1A, 1C, 2, 3, -4A, 5B, +6B, 7, 8, -9B1,
10A, +10B, +10C1, -10C2, +10C3. -10C4,
10C5, +11, +12A1, 12A2. -12A3, 412E1,
+ 12D5:
IA, 1C, 2, -4A, -4Cg, 5B, +6B, 7, +8, 9,
+ 10A, 10B, +10C1, -10C2, +10C3, -10C4,
10G5, +11, 12C2, 12E1, 12D5. -13A1,
-13A2, 13A3. -13B, -13C;
1A2, IB, 1C, -2B2, -2B4, -4A, -4Gd, -4e.
-4Cf, -4G, 5B, +6A, +7. 7A1, 7A2. + 7A3,
+ 7A4, +8, -9A1, -9B, ^10, 4ll, 12A1,
12A2. -12A3, 12C2. 12C3. 4l2C4, 12E1,
■H2D5. 13A. (13B). -13C;
IB, 1C, 2, -4d, -4f(A-C), -4g, 5B, +6A,
+ 7, +8, 9, +10, .11, 12C1. 12C2. +12C3,
^12C4. 12E1. 12D5;
1A, 3, 5A, 5B, +6A, 7, 8, 9, 10, +11,
+ 12A1, -12A2. +12A3, 12E1, +12D5;
1A, IB, 1C, 2, 3. -4g(B-C), 5B, +6B, 7,
+ 7A1. +7A2, +7A3, -7A4. 8, 9, +10A, 10B,
+ 10C1, +10C2, 10C3, +10C4, 10C5, +11,
12C1, 12C2. 12C3, 12C4. 12C6. 12E1, 12D5,
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1A2, 1C, 3, -4, 5B. + 6A, 7, 8, 9, 10,
+ 11, -*12A3. +12D2. -12D3. 12D4. +12D5;
1A2, 1C, 3, (4?). 5A, 5B, +6A, 7, 8, 9,
10» +11» -12A3. -12D2, +12D3, (12D4),
+ 12D5:
1A2, 1C, -2A8, 3, +4a, +6C, 7, 8, 9, 10,
11, +12D5, 13;
1A2, IB, 1C, -2A8, -4g, 5A, 5B, + 6A/-I6D
7, 7A1, 7A2, +7A3, 7A4, 8, 9, +10A, 10B,
+ 10C1, +10C2, 10C3, +10C4, 10C5, +11,
12C2, +12C4, 12C5. 12C6. -12C7. 12D5/
-12D5, 13A1. 13A2, 13A3. -13B, -13C.
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